Bob Ritchie

Sportsnet’s Ben Nicholson-Smith has reported, and confirmed by other MLB media members, that the Toronto Blue Jays have acquired Seranthony Dominguez from the Baltimore Orioles in exchange for minor-league pitcher Juaron Watts-Brown. Dominguez, a 30-year-old relief right-handed pitcher, has posted excellent numbers this season. His xERA ranks in the 77th percentile, and as of July 23, his WPA was in the 85th percentile. He is a strikeout pitcher (30.9 K%) but walks batters at a high rate (13.7 BB%). The MLB average K% and BB% for relievers are 22.5 and 9.4, respectively. Also, his 0.86 HR/9 is lower than Toronto’s bullpen mark of 1.07. Additionally, Dominguez has postseason experience with the Orioles and the Phillies, including Philadelphia’s appearance in the 2022 World Series. In his postseason career, he has posted a 0.78 FIP and a 0.60 WPA in 17 ⅔ innings. Dominiguez will become a free agent after the 2025 season. In my article, Trade Deadline Reliever Options To Bolster The Blue Jays’ Bullpen, I listed Dominguez in Tier 2 of relievers. His xERA impact on Toronto’s bullpen would be similar to that of Phil Maton and David Bednar. The Dominguez acquisition should elevate the overall performance of Toronto’s bullpen. Watts-Brown is a 23-year-old right-handed pitcher who reached Double A this season, where he posted a 3.48 ERA and a 3.95 FIP. In its recent prospect rankings, Jays Centre recently ranked Watts-Brown 14th on the Blue Jays' top prospects list. Baseball America projected his future as, “Watts-Brown shows projectable starter traits with command of a four-pitch mix and a swing-and-miss weapon in his slider.” The trade makes sense for both Toronto and Baltimore. The Blue Jays need to bolster their bullpen, and Dominguez fills that need. From the Orioles’ perspective, Watts-Brown will join an organization in search of quality pitching and depth. Thanks to forum user @Terminator for starting the comments thread. View full article

MLB’s July 31 trade deadline is fast approaching, and the pace of rumours is increasing. Concerning the Toronto Blue Jays, speculation among MLB observers includes the team’s acquisition of a starting pitcher, a right-handed power bat, and bullpen arms. I addressed the starting pitcher topic in my article, The Blue Jays' Top Three Starters Need A Boost At The Trade Deadline: Here Are Options. Now, to turn the focus on bullpen arms. For my analysis, the two key metrics are xERA and WPA. xERA is a good metric to judge a reliever’s performance because it considers the quality of batted-ball contact, strikeouts, walks, and hit-by-pitches, which are elements over which a reliever has a significant degree of influence. WPA is particularly informative regarding a reliever’s performance because it measures the reliever’s impact on winning. In the words of FanGraphs, WPA “doesn’t tell you how well a player performed, it tells you how important their performance was.” On the surface, Toronto’s bullpen does not need a boost. Among American League teams, Toronto is tied with Boston with the second-best xERA, and the Blue Jays’ bullpen corps has the third-highest WPA and is number two in WPA/LI. However, there are issues to consider. As with all pitchers, there is the general risk of injury. Additionally, Yimi Garcia and Nick Sandlin have missed considerable time this season due to injury, including the present moment. Because Toronto’s bullpen depth has been taxed already, a bullpen arm or two could come in handy. Garcia and Chad Green have not pitched well in 2025. Their xERA percentile rankings are 21st and 10th, respectively. Mason Fluharty and Braydon Fisher have posted very good to excellent xERA marks (77th and 94th percentile, respectively). However, they are rookies with minimal MLB experience. Therefore, we may see some negative performance regression as teams adjust to these MLB newbies. Therefore, it would be prudent for Toronto’s management to add quality, experienced relievers before the upcoming trade deadline. Jays Centre’s Braden Ramsey provided the foundation for this article with his piece, 21 Late-Inning Relievers Who Could Be On The Move Before The MLB Trade Deadline. Accordingly, this article will examine those 21 relievers at a high level and then narrow the options down to three bullpen arms, each of whom would bolster Toronto’s bullpen. Let’s dig into the numbers. Consider Table 1 and Table 2. I calculated the xERA, WPA, and WPA/LI percentiles for relievers who have pitched at least 10 innings in 2025 (326 relievers qualified). WPA/LI is informative because it allows the observer to compare two relievers who may not have the same number of high-leverage opportunities. However, to rank the relievers, I excluded WPA/LI and used the average of the xERA and WPA percentile values. The final step in constructing Table 1 was to allocate the 21 relievers into three tiers, with seven relievers in each tier. However, Seth Halvorsen and Kenley Jansen had identical scores of 63, so I moved Jansen into Tier 2. Table 2 shows the xERA, WPA, and WPA/LI percentile rankings of Toronto’s relievers with at least 10 innings under their 2025 belt. Among other data points, Table 1 shows the trade values of the listed relievers. I use Baseball Trade Values as the source for player acquisition costs because it is an objective third-party with a good, yet not perfect, track record. Ultimately, the market determines a player’s trade value, and various factors influence that value, including demand and supply, trade deadline pressure, and different approaches to appraising players. For an explanation of how BTV values players, please refer to this and this. Trade values are a crucial consideration in identifying trade targets. As shown in Table 3, Toronto has limited player capital to make trades. Suppose the Blue Jays acquired Emmanuel Clase. Toronto’s player capital would then be significantly constrained, and accordingly, the Blue Jays' ability to add other players (a starter, a position player, or another reliever) would be reduced. Now, consider Table 4. To determine the hypothetical impact of reliever targets on Toronto’s bullpen, I arbitrarily selected relievers residing in the middle of Tiers 1, 2, and 3. Those pitchers were Clase, Pete Fairbanks, and Griffin Jax. I included Jax because he is a prominent name. However, none of the pitchers listed in Tier 3 excite me. Lastly, I held the number of Toronto’s relievers constant at eight and dropped the Blue Jay with the lowest xERA percentile ranking (Green) if one reliever was acquired. I eliminated Green and Garcia, who have Toronto’s two lowest xERA percentile rankings, if Management added two relievers. Concerning Table 4, there are four observations to note: Individually, Clase, Fairbanks, and Jax would enhance Toronto’s bullpen xERA. The impact on WPA would be minimal, in the case of Clase and Fairbanks, and lessened with Jax in the pen. The xERA and xERA-WPA average value-added would be highest with Clase and Fairbanks. The BTVs of Clase and Jax are very high. Hence, if Toronto acquired either or both, Toronto’s player capital would be significantly depleted. Given the high cost to acquire Clase and Jax, are there other reliever options? Yes, I present Table 5. Suppose Toronto considered Dennis Santana, Phil Maton, and David Bednar (“Scenario 2”) instead of Clase, Fairbanks, and Jax (“Scenario 1”). As Table 5 shows, the difference in the impact upon Toronto’s xERA under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is minimal. Additionally, the positive effect on WPA is more pronounced under Scenario 2 than under Scenario 1. For example, the Santana-Maton duo would outpace the Clase-Fairbanks combo (+10 versus +8). Furthermore, if BTV’s trade values are in line with the market, Toronto could achieve the desired xERA and WPA combo performance upgrades at a much lower acquisition cost under Scenario 2 than Scenario 1. In summary, one of the key takeaways from Tables 4 and 5 is that Toronto can strengthen its bullpen by acquiring quality relievers at a relatively low cost in terms of player capital (see Scenario 2). Due to the poor 2025 performances of Garcia and Green, along with the other identified issues, Toronto would greatly benefit from acquiring two of Santana, Maton, and Bednar. Let’s take a closer look at these pitchers: Voila, Table 6. The highlights are as follows: The trio (Santana, Maton, and Bednar) has posted K%-BB% marks better than Toronto’s bullpen corps. Also, those K%-BB% scores are higher than Garcia’s and Green’s. In high and medium-leverage situations, the trio has better FIP numbers than Garcia and Green. Green’s 2.57 HR/9 is tied for sixth highest among the 326 relievers with a minimum of 10 innings pitched. Notably, the trio members have HR/9 rates better than Garcia's and Green's. As Jay Jaffe noted in his article, No-Hitters Are Great, but the Long Ball Still Wins in October, “… in the postseason, home runs account for a higher percentage of runs than in the regular season.” Hence, by acquiring two of the trio members in trade, Toronto should lower its overall HR/9 rate, which would be a positive development. Concerning GB%, St. Louis‘ infield has MLB’s highest OAA (25), and Pittsburgh’s infield ranks third best (19 OAA). Toronto’s infield slides in at number seven with an 11 OAA score. Therefore, although it is unlikely that Toronto’s infield will enhance the fortunes of the trio compared to the infields of their current teams, a higher GB% would alter the profile of Toronto’s bullpen, which is not a bad thing. In terms of batter handedness, the trio members have better xwOBA scores than Garcia and Green, whether against right-handed or left-handed hitters. In other words, any combination of Santana, Maton, or Bednar would not raise platoon-split issues for John Schneider. A final matter to address is the potential 40-man and 26-man roster moves that would be required if Toronto adds one or more bullpen arms. The candidates for these roster moves are Green, Tommy Nance, and Justin Bruihl, all current members of Toronto’s bullpen. Also, if Garcia returns to form, there can still be a roster spot for him. Therefore, concerning roster moves, Toronto has options to make bullpen acquisitions work. The Last Word Toronto would benefit significantly if it acquired one or more quality relievers. Although there are prominent relievers on the market, including Clase and Jax, the cost to acquire them is exceptionally high. A lower-cost option would be for Toronto to target Santana, Maton, and Bednar. The player capital price for this trio should be less than the acquisitions of Clase and Jax would be, and Toronto would still markedly bolster its bullpen. Additionally, Toronto would have more resources remaining to make other acquisitions. Ross Atkins, make it happen! View full article

As the MLB deadline approaches, many rumours are swirling around the Blue Jays. Media speculation includes Toronto’s interest in improving the bullpen, acquiring a right-handed power bat, and adding a pitcher to the starting rotation. The performance of the Blue Jays’ starting rotation has declined since 2023, when their starters produced a 3.85 ERA, followed by a 3.95 ERA in 2024 and a 4.55 ERA thus far in 2025. Among American League rotations, those ERA marks ranked second, ninth, and thirteenth, respectively. Part of that decline in 2025 is attributable to the underperformance of the starters not named José Berrios, Kevin Gausman, Chris Bassitt, Max Scherzer, and Bowden Francis. The other starters have produced a 5.79 ERA in 74 2/3 innings (15% of all innings pitched by Toronto’s starters). However, the performance of the Big Three (Berrios, Gausman, and Bassitt) has negatively regressed after the 2022 campaign. The ERAs of the Big Three were 3.48, 3.85, and 3.98 in 2023, 2024, and 2025. On a relative basis, the difference between the American League Average Starter ERA and the Big Three’s ERA has steadily declined. The delta in 2023 was 0.86 (4.34 – 3.48), 0.21 (4.06 – 3.85) in 2024, and 0.06 (4.04 – 3.98) this campaign. Indeed, Eric Lauer’s 3.61 ERA has been a pleasant surprise. Yet, Scherzer’s 4.70 ERA and his late-career injury history, combined with the performance decline of the Big Three, cast doubts about the Toronto starting rotation’s ability to perform at an elite level in the postseason. During the playoffs, teams do not need a five-man rotation due to the number of off days. From 2014 to 2024, on average, three starters accounted for 83% of the starts of a World Series team. However, a fourth starting pitcher was needed to cover most of the remaining starts. Please note that I excluded 2020 because, due to the pandemic, the season and postseason were unusual. In constructing Table 2, I calculated the ERA, xERA, and FIP percentile rankings of MLB starters who pitched a minimum of 20 innings in 2025 (193 starters qualified). Because ERA, xERA, and FIP are all useful pitching metrics, I then calculated the average of these percentile rankings. For example, Lauer’s ERA, xERA, and FIP percentile rankings were 61, 86, and 67, respectively. Hence, the reader will observe that Lauer’s average of his ERA, xERA, and FIP percentile rankings is 72. Additionally, for each team’s rotation, I assumed that teams would use their best-performing starters (those with the highest average of their respective ERA, xERA, and FIP percentile rankings or those starters with the highest ERA percentile rankings) regardless. For example, Lauer will be part of the Top 4 and 3, but Scherzer will not. Please note that the percentiles and the related average were calculated to the fourth decimal place. Hence, the average presented may be one percentile point higher or lower due to rounding. Concerning starter slot numbers, I prefer to use the percentile rankings of a given metric. For example, a starting pitcher with an ERA that ranks in the 81st to 100th percentile is a#1 starter. A starter with an ERA that ranks in the 61st to 80th percentile is a #2. A #3 is a starter with an ERA in the 41st to 60th percentile. And on. I also applied this approach to evaluating a team’s Top 4, Top 3, and so on. Accordingly, Toronto’s Top 3’s average of the ERA, xERA, and FIP percentile rankings is at the lower range of a #2 starter. Now compare Toronto’s Top 3 to those of the Tigers, Astros, and Yankees. They have Top 3 starters in the lower end of the #1 starter slot. In other words, thus far in 2025, the Top 3 of those foes are decidedly better than Toronto’s. Furthermore, the Tigers, Astros, Yankees, and Red Sox have much superior #1 starters than Toronto. Additionally, based on ERA, Toronto’s starter groupings (Top 4, Top 3, etc.) fall well short of the other listed teams. Toronto would greatly benefit if it acquired a starter who can be a number one or number two. Let us begin the search! The criteria I used to select starter targets are as follows: Any team with a probability of making the postseason of 25% or less (as of July 20) is a seller. Please refer to FanGraphs for the list of teams. A starter must have a trade value (per Baseball Trade Values as of July 20) of less than $40 million. Starting pitchers must have a minimum of 300 career MLB innings pitched. I excluded any pitcher, currently on the 60-day Injured List, and not scheduled to return until after the July 31 trade deadline. The average of a starter's ERA, xERA, and FIP percentile rankings must be higher than 60. I use Baseball Trade Values as the source for player trade value because it is an objective third-party with a good, yet not perfect, track record. Ultimately, the market determines a player’s trade value, and various factors influence that value, including demand and supply, trade deadline pressure, and different approaches to valuing players. For an explanation of how BTV values players, please refer to this and this. Concerning the $40 million threshold, I selected that cut-off number because Toronto has a limited number of high-end trade chips. Hence, because Toronto’s three most valued prospects (per BTV) have a total value of $54.1 million, the Blue Jays are unlikely to have the player capital needed to acquire Paul Skenes ($132.9 million BTV) or Hunter Greene ($130.6 million BTV). Lo, and behold, Table 4, the list of trade targets! Please note that the “availability” assessment is according to BTV. Although the names in Table 4 are interesting, what matters is the impact an acquired starter would have on Toronto during the remainder of the 2025 season and the postseason. If only there were a table handy to see the impact of an acquired starter on the Blue Jays’ fortunes. Hmmm. Wouldn’t you know it, there is! See Table 5. Table 5 is Table 2’s data with the insertion of a selection of player metrics found in Table 4. The highlights from Table 5 are as follows: Based on 2025’s numbers, Trevor Rogers, Adrian Houser, or Kris Bubic would vault Toronto’s rotation into the upper echelon of the listed AL ballclubs. Sonny Gray or Merrill Kelly would improve the Blue Jays’ collection of starters but would not significantly move the needle. Many MLB observers have identified Mitch Keller as a trade target, but his 2025 performance is similar to that of Gray and Kelly. Like Keller, some people have opined that Seth Lugo should be a trade target for Toronto. Although his ERA is 85th percentile, his xERA and FIP marks are 36th and 49th percentile, respectively. I am not keen on Lugo. Starter Targets Rogers would be my #1 target. Admittedly, I am cheating because it is unlikely that Baltimore would make him available. However, it is hard to overlook the significant impact he would make on Toronto’s 2025 rotation, as shown in Table 5. Although his 2024 season was disappointing, it was likely due to his recovery from injuries. Furthermore, Rogers is under team control for the 2026 season, and his current salary is $2.6 million (2026 will be his final arb year). Although the acquisition cost is higher than Kelly’s and Houser’s, Rogers’s 2025 performance and 2026 contract status make him a worthwhile investment, justifying the higher acquisition cost. Kelly would be a solid #2 starter. He would be a high-quality addition that would bolster the overall performance of Toronto’s rotation. As Table 6 shows, his ERA- has been better than average in the past three seasons. Lastly, Kelly’s BTV is not onerous. On the negative side, Kelly would be a rental. As Table 5 shows, Houser’s average of his ERA, xERA, and FIP percentile rankings would noticeably improve the relative status of Toronto’s starting rotation. Additionally, his low BTV would give Toronto’s management more remaining assets to make other acquisitions than a Rogers trade would. My concern with Houser is whether he can maintain his current performance level. However, his FIP suggests that he can maintain his pitching prowess for the balance of the 2025 campaign. Lastly, like Kelly, Houser would be a rental. The Last Word Toronto’s starting rotation has underperformed this year. Although the depth starters have not pitched well, the Big Three have been around league average. Furthermore, given the need to use four starters in the postseason, Toronto’s Top 4 and Top 3, for that matter, lag the American League teams they may face in the postseason. Accordingly, if Toronto adds a high-quality starting pitcher for the balance of the 2025 season and the postseason, Blue Jays' management would enhance the odds of making the playoffs and succeeding in them. My preferred starter targets, from most desired to least, are Rogers, Kelly, and Houser. View full article

My view is that what happens during the Atkins Regime is their responsibility. One should not pick and choose from things that went well or did not. Additionally, the Bichette pick was ultimately made, which is a positive organizational move. Despite differing views held by the superior, the person given the authority to make the decision (the Scouting Director) did so.

MLB held the 2025 Rule 4 draft, formerly known as the June amateur draft, on July 13 and 14. The Toronto Blue Jays selected JoJo Parker with the eighth overall pick and made 19 selections in total. For complete coverage of Toronto's draft, this website is the place to be. The reader can review a scouting report for each draftee, along with additional insights about the player. The 2025 draft was the 10th during the Ross Atkins regime. Concerning first picks, the Blue Jays' highest pick slot was fifth (Austin Martin in 2020) and their lowest was 23rd (Brandon Barriera in 2022). For the 2016-2024 period, the average slot number of Toronto’s first pick was 17. The consensus from various media outlets is that the Blue Jays under Atkins have not drafted well. Analysts have pointed to selections such as T.J. Zeuch and Martin as proof that Toronto has drafted poorly under Atkins. Let’s examine the reasonableness of the "Atkins has drafted poorly" opinion. The Coin Flip How to assess a draft record? Many people use hindsight to evaluate draft results and often express an opinion that resembles, “The decision to draft Player X was bad/poor/good/great.” In my opinion, hindsight should not be used to assess the quality of draft selections. The reason is that when a team makes a draft pick, the front office is knowingly using incomplete information. In other words, draft selections are made with substantial uncertainty. Accordingly, after the fact, it is valid to opine whether a draft pick worked out or not, but not whether it was good or bad. In a previous article, I used the coin flip example to illustrate my point. Suppose someone offers you a coin-flip opportunity. You can pick heads or tails, and you select heads. If the coin comes up heads, you win $5; if it comes up tails, you pay $2. Given that the odds are 50/50 that the coin flip will be heads, you calculate your expected value to be $1.50 (50% of $5 less 50% of $2). So then, you agree to the bet. The person who made the offer flips the coin, and it lands on tails. You lose $2. Did you make a good decision? Yes, because your expected value of the bet was +$1.50. Unfortunately, your decision did not work out. The same approach should be used to evaluate drafts. Therefore, I will proceed to assess whether Toronto's drafting under Atkins has been successful. In other words, whether Toronto's drafts have worked out. I will exclude the 2025 MLB Draft from the analysis. To evaluate how Toronto’s 2016-2024 draft record compares to that of other teams, I compiled a list of drafted and signed players. For each player, I took note of his career Baseball Reference WAR as of July 13, 2025 (the last game before the All-Star Game break). Furthermore, I ignored players with negative bWAR because I wanted to avoid distorting a team’s record. Concerning the bWAR approach, there are two limitations to consider: Similar to a rate-of-return calculation, bWAR results are end-date sensitive. For example, Team A’s bWAR may exceed Team B’s at the All-Star Game break, but it may not after the 2026 season. A reason why Team B’s bWAR total may ultimately surpass Team A’s bWAR is that some of Team B’s selections (from college or high school) are just making their way onto MLB rosters, whereas Team A's picks arrived on the MLB scene sooner. All things being equal, a college player, who may not ultimately generate as much bWAR as a high schooler, is more likely to be on an MLB roster sooner and begin accumulating bWAR. Hence, Team A’s draft record may temporarily be higher than Team B’s because Team A drafted more college players. However, despite these limitations, bWAR is a good, objective measure of a team’s drafting success. Onto Table 1! Table 1 highlights are as follows: Under Atkins, the Blue Jays have drafted and signed 16 players who have generated positive bWAR (for any team), which ranks 20th. Those players have produced a combined 46.7 bWAR, MLB’s 16th highest total. Concerning total bWAR, the top three teams are the Cardinals, Guardians and Dodgers. It is noteworthy that the average pick numbers of the first selections of the Cardinals, Guardians and Dodgers are 20, 17 and 27, respectively. Also, because of prospect promotion incentive picks and compensation picks, some teams will have additional selections that occur before the second round. Please refer to the 2024 draft order for an illustration. Some teams (for example, the Dodgers) will have their first-round pick dropped 10 spots because the team exceeded the competitive balance tax threshold. Please refer to the 2022 draft order for an explanation. After accounting for the additional picks and those falling into the second round, the Cardinals, Guardians and Dodgers had 11, 13 and 11 first-round picks, respectively. Toronto had 10. Another aspect of the Atkins regime’s draft record to explore is the players drafted under Atkins who have the highest and second-highest bWARs, and how they compare to the most productive draft picks by other teams. Consider Table 2 and Table 3. Table 2 shows that Bo Bichette (drafted in 2016) has produced the highest bWAR of any player drafted by Toronto from 2016 to 2024. That bWAR mark ranks as the sixth highest. As demonstrated in Table 3, Alek Manoah’s 7.3 bWAR ranks as the 18th highest among each team’s second-highest bWAR of drafted players. It is noteworthy that the Blue Jay names on Tables 2 and 3 were drafted before Shane Farrell became Toronto’s director of amateur scouting, a role he held from 2020 to 2024. Bichette was drafted when Brian Parker held Farrel’s position, and Toronto selected Manoah in the 2019 MLB Draft when Steve Sanders (2017-2019) was in the Director’s chair. Toronto’s current director of amateur scouting is Marc Tramuta. It will be interesting to see if the team's drafting will be more successful with Tramuta at the helm. Furthermore, as of July 13, 2025, the only Toronto draft pick taken after 2019 to generate a positive bWAR is Matt Swanson (0.3), currently with the Cardinals.. From a strictly bWAR perspective, Toronto’s post-2019 picks have generally not worked out. However, there is some good news that will soften the harshness of my previous comment. Arjun Nimmala (2023) and Trey Yesavage (2024) are Baseball America’s 42nd and 69th-ranked prospects, respectively. First-Round Picks Except for Manoah, Atkins's front office has not selected a player in the first round who has a positive career bWAR. If I were to use hindsight, I would judge Toronto’s record of first-round picks to be terrible. However, as I noted earlier, hindsight is not a suitable basis for evaluating decisions made with incomplete and imperfect information. Accordingly, let’s play the "what if?" game. To play this game, substitute the name of Baseball America’s best-available undrafted player (when it was Toronto’s turn to make a selection) for each of Toronto’s first-round picks. Lo and behold, Table 4. If the Blue Jays had used Baseball America’s list, the total bWAR generated by those draftees would be 1.9, more than the team's actual 4.4. By this method, Toronto’s notable misses were Manoah instead of Bryson Stott, and Jordan Groshans in place of Matthew Libatore. However, the total 1.9 bWAR delta is not significant. Therefore, based on the Baseball America best-available-draftee method, Toronto’s first-round picks (2016-2024) have not worked out, but the margin is slight. Conclusion Overall, the Atkins regime’s drafts have worked out, but have also failed to meet expectations. Why do I say this? Team president Mark Shapiro said in 2018, “… you need to have waves of talent coming, and you need to have dozens of prospects — not two, three, five prospects.” In my opinion, the Atkins regime has not fully delivered on Shapiro’s goal. Yes, Toronto’s draft picks have produced 46.7 bWAR, the 16th most in MLB. However, given the draft results of the Cardinals, Guardians and Dodgers, I expected draft results closer to the top five rather than a cromulent 16th. In fairness, due to COVID-19 and the resulting difficulties in evaluating prospects, the 2020 draft presented challenges to all teams, including the Blue Jays with the fifth overall pick. Additionally, in 2022 and 2023, Toronto’s first picks were high school players (Barriera and Nimmala), who typically take longer to reach MLB than college players do. However, all things considered, the Atkins regime’s draft record is disappointing because it has not surpassed the high bar established by Shapiro. The Last Word Concerning the evaluation of a team’s draft record, a hindsight-based opinion, whether the record is good or poor, is not reasonable. Why? Because there is uncertainty inherent in draft selections when a team makes each pick. The coin-flip example illustrates this point. Hence, a hindsight-based opinion on whether a draft record is good or bad is the result of a flawed evaluation method. A better approach is to assess whether the team’s drafting has been successful. The bWAR generated by the Blue Jays’ selections ranks in the middle of the pack, which is better than many may realize. Additionally, there have been recent positive developments (Nimmala, Yesavage, and the emergence of 2018’s Addison Barger). However, the team's publicly stated objective to acquire and develop 'waves of prospects' has not been fully realized. Therefore, in my opinion, the Atkins regime’s drafting has been moderately successful, which is below expectations. View full article

On Friday, June 27, the Toronto Blue Jays played Game 81 of the 2025 Major League Baseball season. Therefore, it is time for the tried-and-true (tired-and-true?) midseason review. One of the aspects of the team that needed improvement in 2025 was hitting. Last season, Toronto batters produced a 100 wRC+, the American League’s ninth-best. They scored 671 runs (11th-most), and their home run total of 156 ranked 13th among their American League brethren. Those 2024 marks were lower than 2023’s 106 wRC+, 746 runs scored, and 188 home runs. I’ll spare the reader the gory details, but those 2023 numbers were lower than the 2022 marks. Hence, Toronto’s management focused on better performance in the batter’s box from the 2025 Blue Jays. To that end, Toronto added Anthony Santander in the offseason. Unfortunately, Santander’s contributions to the offence have been limited because of underperformance (64 wRC+) and injury woes (he hasn’t played since May 29). Also, injuries have limited Daulton Varsho’s playing time and bat. He underwent offseason shoulder surgery, which delayed his 2025 debut until April 29. Additionally, he suffered a hamstring injury and has not played since May 31. Yet, in 24 games, Varsho produced a 105 wRC+, eight home runs and a 0.337 ISO. Despite these setbacks, Toronto’s batters have performed well thus far this season. Consider Table 1. Batting Summary by Month The Blue Jays had a poor start to the season. In March/April, their wRC+, ISO, runs scored, and home runs ranked no higher than 11th among American League teams. When the calendar turned to May, the Blue Jays lineup became a hitting machine. They ranked no lower than third in the listed metrics. As of June 29, Toronto lagged behind most of the other American League teams in the power department (ISO and home runs) in June. However, compared to other teams, Blue Jay batters were getting on base and scoring runs at a high rate. For the season to date, Toronto hitters have performed well in some metrics (wRC+, OBP, and runs scored), but not in others (ISO and home runs). Batting Details There are many blue cells on Table 2, which is a good thing. The highlights are as follows: Blue Jay batters have performed well in RISP situations. However, there is a significant amount of randomness in RISP results, particularly during the in-season period. For support, please refer to Table 3, which I compiled a few years ago for a Jays From the Couch article (hat tip to Shaun Doyle, JFtC Founder and Analyst Herder). For example, the team with the highest RISP OPS in the first half of the 2022 season posted the 25th-best mark in the second half. Yet, the ballclub with a 0.783 RISP OPS (#5) generated a 0.790 RISP OPS (#6) in the second part of the 2022 season. Therefore, as many studies have demonstrated, RISP results contain a significant amount of randomness and are accordingly not predictive. In other words, a word of caution concerning any assumptions about how the Blue Jays will perform in the second half of the 2025 campaign with RISP. I consider it a positive that Toronto’s wRC+ is above average whether facing right-handers or left-handers. Toronto’s wRC+ from the first to third batting slots ranks ninth, which is disappointing. However, after May 31, Toronto’s 123 wRC+ from these slots ranks as the fifth-highest. The better performance is mainly attributable to Addison Barger’s June wRC+, which was better than Santander’s and Varsho's May wRC+ numbers. The home and away splits are striking. However, the difference is likely due to randomness. For example, Toronto’s 2024 home wRC+ was 102, while it was 99 on the road. For the balance of the 2025 season, the home and away splits should move closer. Concerning wRC+ by position, the excellence of Alejandro Kirk and Vladimir Guerrero Jr. accounts for Toronto’s high catcher and first base rankings. Andrés Giménez’s low wRC+ is the reason for the Blue Jays' low second base ranking. Regarding left field, Jonatan Clase’s and Alan Roden’s low wRC+ figures have been a drag on the overall left field batting results. Run Distribution Concerning the sources of runs, Table 4 shows Toronto’s numbers and rankings among American League teams. For the sake of saving space, I presented only American League East teams and the highest-scoring team (Detroit). The table highlights Toronto’s strong ranking in scoring runs from balls in play (#3) and its less impressive ranking in scoring runs from home runs (#11). The latter observation is consistent with Table 1’s below-average ISO and home run totals. Player Batting Splits Table 5 contains splits by pitcher handedness. The items of note are as follows: George Springer has performed well at the plate, whether facing righties or lefties. Ernie Clement has pronounced splits. His 63 wRC+ versus right-handed pitchers lags far behind his 231 wRC+ when facing southpaws. His 0.367 xwOBA against lefties suggests that the 0.498 wOBA is not sustainable. Furthermore, only 26% of all MLB plate appearances are against left-handers. Hence, we should not be surprised if Clement’s overall batting declines from these lofty heights. I would not be shocked if Giménez produces better batting box score results for the balance of 2025. With the caveat that MLB’s average xwOBA exceeds wOBA by 12 points, Giménez’s +30 point xwOBA-wOBA difference versus righties and +118 point xwOBA-wOBA delta against lefties suggests better “actual” batting results to come. Another aspect to examine is plate discipline. Hence, I present Table 6. Plate Discipline Concerning plate discipline, the highlights are as follows: On a relative basis, the Blue Jays chase pitches at a high rate. However, their Chase% in all counts, while the eighth-highest, is only one percentage point higher than the MLB Average. On the other hand, Toronto’s contact rate on pitches out of the strike zone is MLB’s best. With two strikes, be it on pitches in or out of the zone, Toronto’s high contact rate largely accounts for the team's MLB-lowest K% (17.7%). Additionally, as of June 30, the Blue Jays have the fewest plate appearances (1,545) and the lowest K% (36.6%) in two-strike counts. The Last Word Concerning batting performance, the Toronto Blue Jays exceeded expectations during the first half of the 2025 season. Despite injuries to key hitters (Santander and Varsho) and Santander’s underperformance, the team ranks in the top five in the AL in wRC+ and OBP. However, their power numbers trail those of most American League ballclubs. When I look at the balance of the 2025 season, I see encouraging signs. I expect Santander to return to form and Varsho to continue his above-average 2025 batting performance. Also, Toronto’s xwOBA exceeds its wOBA by 19 points. Hence, while there might be positive (Giménez) or negative (Clement) reversion at the player level, the xwOBA-wOBA delta does not indicate Lady Luck regression at the team level. Lastly, Ross Atkins stated that Toronto aims to acquire a right-handed bat, whether through internal or external means. Better Blue Jays' batting days are ahead! View full article

Andrés Giménez is known for his elite defence. Since Giménez became an everyday player in 2022, Dansby Swanson is the only infielder to post higher OAA and FRV marks. On the basepaths, of 258 qualified players from 2022-2025, Giménez ranks 25th according to FanGraphs BsR. Another area where Giménez ranks among MLB’s best is getting hit by pitches. Consider Table 1. Starting in 2022, Giménez has been hit by a pitch 68 times, second only to Ty France. Looking at PA/HBP, his 29.46 score (as of June 21) ranks fifth lowest. In other words, only four qualified batters have averaged fewer plate appearances before getting hit by a pitch than Giménez. Against right-handed pitchers, he slots in at number five with his 47 HBP (17th in PA/HBP). When facing left-handers, Giménez has absorbed 21 HBPs, MLB’s highest mark and good for the eighth-lowest PA/HBP (26.43). Whether a righty or a lefty is on the mound, Giménez’s motto has been, Hit Me with Your Best Shot. An interesting nugget is the difference between Giménez's HBP scores in counts with fewer than two strikes and with two strikes. Consider Table 2. With fewer than two strikes against him, Giménez has 22 HBPs, which slots in as MLB’s 22nd-highest number since 2022. However, with two strikes, no player has more HBPs than Giménez. For context, I calculated Giménez’s on-base percentage if those 46 HBPs with two strikes were strikeouts. For the 2022-2025 period, his official OBP was .321. If the 46 HBPs were strikeouts instead, his OBP would be .298. That is a notable OBP reduction. Note that I did not calculate PA/HBP for all hitters within the two strikes/fewer than two strikes split because it was too cumbersome to incorporate FanGraphs' (HBP) and Baseball Savant’s (strike counts) data. For those interested, here is a link to MLB’s all-time leaders in the hit-by-pitch category. So, why does Giménez rank so high in the HBP metric? No, I do not believe pitchers dislike Giménez. Perhaps the answer lies in his batting stance. Welcome to a new feature from Baseball Savant! A user can select a player of their choice and the desired period (from 2023 onwards). Below is a screenshot of Giménez’s batting stance for the 2023-2025 period. I encourage the reader to take advantage of Baseball Savant’s Batting Stance tool. One intriguing element is that users can see how a player’s feet move from his batting stance to the pitch release and then to the bat-ball intercept. Let’s see if the batting stance data explains why pitches hit Giménez at a high rate. Behold Table 3. I selected a small sample of left-handed batters to determine if the batting stance data offered clues regarding why Giménez excels at getting hit by pitches. Unfortunately, there is no apparent explanation. Giménez and Bryce Harper have similar depth in the box, and off plate and between feet distances, but quite different stance angles and PA/HBP records. Except for the distance between their feet, Josh Naylor’s characteristics are like Giménez’s stance details. Furthermore, I performed regression analysis for the 2023-2025 period and found limited correlation between PA/HBP data and the listed stance datapoints. The lack of a meaningful correlation could be due to a small sample size. Perhaps there is no meaningful relationship between getting hit by a pitch and batting stance characteristics. Hmm. Perhaps video can help explain the attraction between Giménez's body parts and pitched baseballs. This first clip is from the June 19, 2025, game against Arizona. The pitcher was right-handed, and there were two strikes: In the case below, the pitcher was a left-hander: The final clip captures one of the times Giménez was hit when he played for Cleveland: These three clips show that Giménez does not shy away from inside pitches; he stands his ground and apparently is unafraid to get hit. Other than Giménez’s willingness to be hit, particularly with two strikes, I can offer no other evidence-based reasons why Giménez has been one of the leaders in the hit-by-pitch department. Perhaps it is a gift, just like it was for a famous ballplayer from the past. The Last Word Giménez is an elite defender and an excellent baserunner. Another noteworthy aspect of his play is that he has a top-tier record when it comes to HBPs. He is particularly “hittable” when the count reaches two strikes. Concerning why pitches hit Giménez at a high rate, there are probably multiple contributing factors. One is an apparent willingness to stand his ground and absorb a pitch. In summary, concerning Giménez’s attitude at the plate, Pat Benatar was prescient with her song, Hit Me with Your Best Shot! View full article

In recent seasons, the Toronto Blue Jays have been a top-tier defensive team. By the Def metric, Toronto was MLB’s best defensive team (19.1 Def) in 2024, and that ranking has remained unchanged thus far in 2025. An interesting question is whether some pitchers benefit more or less from Toronto’s defence. Table 1 below displays the runs saved according to a selection of metrics, as described below: OAA, Catcher Blocking, Catcher Framing, and Catcher Throwing. Please note that any references to a metric refer to the number of runs saved or prevented equivalent to the metric. For example, Toronto’s 2024 OAA was 24, and the runs-prevented equivalent was 22. Below are some observations: 1. Overall, Toronto’s runs saved by the defence are again MLB’s best this season. 2. Regarding OAA, Toronto’s ranking has slipped from fourth in 2024 to eighth in 2025. Notably, the OAA spread between Toronto’s plus-seven score and the fourth highest (10) is small. Given that approximately one-third of the season has elapsed, Toronto’s projected 2025 21 OAA (7 / 0.33) is similar to 2024’s OAA score. Overall, by the OAA measure, Toronto’s 2025 defence is nearly identical to the 2024 ballclub. 3. However, the OAA changes in the components from 2024 are interesting. Concerning the improved infield performance, both Vladimir Guerrero Jr. and Addison Barger are much better this season. Guerrero Jr.’s 2024 OAA runs prevented were minus seven, and Barger’s were minus four. In 2025, their comparable numbers are plus one and two, respectively. 4. Regarding the outfield’s underperformance vis-à-vis 2024, George Springer’s defence has deteriorated in 2025. Last season, Springer posted zero prevented runs. In this campaign, he has a -6 mark. Also, Daulton Varsho has missed considerable time this season, although Myles Straw’s performance (+4) has partially mitigated Varsho’s absence. 5. Toronto’s catchers are better this season than last. The primary reason is that Danny Jansen, other than Catcher Blocking, was below average in 2024. Tyler Heineman is above average in Catcher Throwing, and average at Catcher Blocking and Catcher Framing. Alejandro Kirk continues to be above average in these catcher metrics. The Defence Beneficiaries So, let’s examine how Blue Jay pitchers have benefited or not from Toronto’s defence. I limited the sample to the ten Blue Jay pitchers with the most innings as of June 3, 2025. Consider Table 2 and Table 3. As I noted earlier, this article is focused on the quality of Toronto’s defence when specific pitchers are on the mound. For the sake of simplicity, I have ignored the defensive contributions of pitchers when they are pitching. Those contributions include how well they field their position and their consistency in hitting the targeted spot (missing the target by a wide margin can negatively affect a catcher’s ability to frame pitches). Unsurprisingly, starters benefit more from Toronto’s elite defence because they log more innings and throw more pitches than relievers. This observation aligns with the total number of saved runs by the pitcher. For this reason, I split the pitchers into two groups, starters and relievers. The items of interest include the following: 1. In 2025, Toronto’s starters have benefited from improved infield defence. For the starters listed, the total OAA runs prevented number is plus nine, higher than 2024’s plus three. 2. Concerning outfield defence, the team’s OAA runs prevented score ranks #14. Last season, the total runs saved for the listed starters was +14; this season, it is plus three. The innings pitched by these starters to date are 45% of their 2024 innings. Accordingly, I projected the 2025 total to be 7 (3 divided by 0.45), which is half of 2024’s total. Overall, the outfielders better served Toronto’s 2024 pitchers than the 2025 group. 3. It is noteworthy that Chris Bassitt has not benefited from better infield play. Despite increasing his GB% from 2024’s 40.3 to 46.2 in 2025, the runs saved are zero. 4. Also, on balls in play hit towards the pitcher or other infielders, Bassitt’s 2025 xBA against is 0.190, and the BA is 0.067, a 0.123 differential (0.190 less 0.067). 5. For comparison, Kevin Gausman’s 2025 xBA and BA on similar batted balls are 0.252 and 0.064, respectively. The difference is 0.188. So, due to luck or other factors, Gausman and Bassitt have nearly identical batting average (BA) numbers, yet Bassitt has a much better xBA (0.190 versus 0.252). 6. Perhaps the explanation of Bassitt’s relative lack of quality infield defence is that opposition batters are following the advice of Willie Keeler. 7. Another anomaly is Gausman’s relatively lesser share of Catcher Framing benefits. More work is needed, but I will note that Gausman’s strike rate in 2025 and 2024 were 47.7% and 45.9%, respectively. The 2025 strike rate for Jose Berrios is 54.9%, and 52.5% in 2024. The Running Game For purposes of evaluating a catcher’s ability to defend against stolen bases, Baseball Savant’s Catcher Throwing metric is vastly superior to the Caught Stealing% (“CS%”) datapoint. CS% does not isolate baserunner speed, lead distance, pitch velocity and location, pitcher handedness, and other factors. For the record, Toronto’s CS% was 23.6 in 2024, MLB’s eighth best. In 2025, the CS% is 32.1, MLB’s fifth best. Unfortunately, Baseball Savant does not offer catcher throwing data by pitcher. However, we can examine a pitcher’s contribution to defending the opposition’s running game. For this article, my focus is on the ability of Toronto’s pitchers to restrict the lead distance of opposition baserunners, be it as a base stealer or not. The importance of a reduced lead for a base stealer is obvious. However, the longer a baserunner’s lead in a non-steal situation, the higher the probability that, for example, the runner will be safe at the next base or disrupt a potential double play. The lead distance data does not distinguish between baserunner characteristics, such as whether the runner is a base stealer or how aggressively the runner takes a lead from the base. Furthermore, for purposes of this analysis, I will assume that, if a pitcher’s average baserunner lead is less than the MLB average, the pitcher does a better-than-average job of holding runners. If the average lead is higher, the pitcher does a below-average job of holding runners. Lo and behold, Table 4 and Table 5. Below are some observations: 1. The first thing to note is that when Bowden Francis is on the mound this season, there have been no stolen base attempts. Okay, as one wag noted, why try to steal a base when Francis is pitching when you can wait for the home run? Notably, Francis’s HR/PA% has jumped to 6.7 in 2025. 2. However, last season, when Francis had a 4.2 HR/PA%, slightly higher than MLB’s 3.0 HR/PA%, there was one stolen base attempt in 474 stolen base opportunities. 3. The MLB average stolen base attempt percentage was 1.4 (stolen base attempts divided by stolen base opportunities). Accordingly, based on the MLB average rate, there should have been seven attempts when Bowden was on the mound. 4. The average leads when Francis makes his first move, and when he releases the ball, are better than the MLB Average. Accordingly, it appears that runners do not get a good read when Francis is on the mound. 5. Yariel Rodriguez is terrible at holding runners. The average lead when the pitch is released, be it in stolen base opportunities or stolen base attempts, is much higher than the MLB Average. 6. Generally speaking, in stolen-base opportunities and stolen base attempts, Toronto pitchers are better this season than last at restricting baserunner leads. If you want proof, please compare Table 4 to Table 5; there is significantly more green in Table 4 than in Table 5. The Last Word The Toronto Blue Jays continue to excel at defence. An individual starter benefits more from the stellar defence than a reliever because a starter registers more innings and pitches. There are some anomalies, such as the lesser infield defence experienced by Bassitt compared to the other starters, and Gausman’s lesser share of the Catcher Framing spoils. Lastly, Toronto’s pitchers are generally better this season than last at limiting the leads that opposition baserunners take when on the basepaths. View full article

Bichette has performed well with RISP and in high-leverage situations this season. The MLB Average OPS with RISP is 0.723. In high-leverage situations, the MLB Average OPS is 0.693. Below are Toronto's batting metrics with RISP and in high-leverage situations before last night's game. The RISP table is first.

Baseball-Reference, Spotrac and Cot's Contracts (part of Baseball Prospectus) all show ISE Baseball as his agent. Also, Boras Corp posted messages in 2023 concerning Varsho. For Varsho to have switched to Boras would mean that ISE was Varsho's agent before August 2023, and Baseball-Reference and the other websites did not update their information accordingly. I am doubtful that all three websites have not changed the agent information in almost two years, at the very least. I may be incorrect about Varsho and ISE, but the evidence is more persuasive that ISE is his agent, and not Boras.

On Wednesday, May 21, Will Harris posted a table on Bluesky that showed Bo Bichette had the lowest OPS (.434 as of May 21) among batters with at least 100 plate appearances against left-handed pitchers since 2024. Considering that before the 2024 season, Bichette posted a career .908 OPS and 147 wRC+ against left-handed pitchers, the .434 OPS was surprising. Why has Bichette’s performance against lefties lagged behind his pre-2024 record? Let’s take a look.‬‬‬ For context, in 2024, 27% of all plate appearances occurred when a hitter faced a lefty. Therefore, it is more important that a full-time position player perform well against righties than lefties. Nonetheless, Bichette’s OPS against left-handed pitchers is well below MLB’s comparable 2024-2025 average of .718 OPS. His underperformance is a red flag. I included Bichette’s performance against right-handed pitchers for the analysis because it may offer some insights regarding his numbers facing lefties. Additionally, this study focuses on expected metrics (for example, xSLG) because these statistics eliminate the impact of defence (good or bad) that may distort how well or poorly Bichette has batted. Table 1 shows Bichette’s performance by pitcher handedness. Concerning his metrics when facing right-handed pitchers, except for xISO, Bichette’s 2025 x-stats are superior to his pre-2024 numbers. The difference between the 2025 xISO and the 2019-2023 mark is insignificant. Furthermore, every 2025 x-stat exceeds the relevant box score number (xBA exceeds BA, xSLG exceeds SLG, etc.). Hence, against righties, Bichette is hitting very well this season. Also, Bichette’s batting in 2024 was poor because of injuries and other factors. Regarding performance versus left-handers, my focus is on the 2024-2025 period because the 2025 sample is small (37 plate appearances). Also, the genesis of this article was the .434 OPS against lefthanders since 2024. I used the 2025 data vis-à-vis right-handers because the sample size was sufficient (188 plate appearances). Concerning Bichette’s 2024-2025 batting metrics against lefties, three noteworthy reasons exist for the underperformance: bad luck, poor plate discipline, and difficulty hitting all pitch types, particularly off-speed and breaking pitches. Bad Luck When facing left-handers, Bichette’s 2024-2025 x-stats, as depicted in Table 1, considerably exceed the relevant box score metric. Furthermore, his 2024-2025 xOPS is .732, much better than the highlighted .434 OPS (.421 OPS as of May 27). Therefore, part of the reason why Bichette’s OPS against left-handers is underwhelming is bad luck. We should expect his 2025 box score performance against lefties to improve due to positive regression. Plate Discipline Table 2 shows Bichette’s plate discipline versus left-handers and right-handers. Table 3 depicts plate discipline by pitch type and pitcher handedness. My observations are as follows: Compared to the pre-2024 period, the 2024-2025 Bichette is chasing at a higher rate when facing left-handers but making contact at a lower rate. His In-Zone Swing% is similar to 2019-2023 Bichette, but his In-Zone Contact% is higher. Bichette’s chase and in-zone contact rates on non-fastballs have markedly declined since 2024. Performance by Pitch Types Table 4 shows pitch mix and Whiff% data by pitcher handedness. Tables 5 and 6 depict Bichette's performance against fastballs and non-fastballs, respectively. Concerning pitch mix offered by right-handers, there has been little change in 2025 compared to previous periods. However, against left-handers, Bichette has faced a higher allocation of fastballs in 2024-2025 compared to 2019-2023. Fastballs Bichette’s fastball performance against lefties during 2024-2025 lags behind 2019-2023. However, his 2025 x-stat performance against right-handed pitchers' fastballs is better than the 2024-2025 and 2019-2023 periods. Also, concerning fastball performance against left-handers, his 2024-2025 xOBP and xwOBA marks are lower than the 2019-2023 marks because his 2019-2023 11.2 BB% exceeds his 2024-2025 4.1 BB%. Accordingly, Bichette’s underperformance on fastballs when facing left-handers is not a concern because his performance versus righties demonstrates that he can handle fastballs. Additionally, I expect Bichette’s walk rate to normalize going forward. Off-Speed and Breaking Pitches Bichette’s 2025 x-stats on non-fastballs versus right-handers are similar to 2019-2023. Therefore, as I noted in respect of fastball performance when facing right-handers, this season’s Bichette can hit off-speed and breaking pitches thrown by righties. The question is why Bichette has struggled to hit off-speed and breaking pitches offered by lefties. One possibility is that, against lefties, Bichette is hunting fastballs more in 2024-2025 than in 2019-2023. The supporting evidence is as follows: Compared to 2019-2023, 2024-2025 Bichette has a higher fastball Chase% (35.8% versus 28.8%). His 2024-2025 fastball Swing% (all zones) is 60.5%, higher than 2019-2023’s 56.6% Swing%. The left-hander/right-hander fastball In-Zone Swing% spread has increased since 2024. The spread increased from 6.4 percentage points (80.5% less 74.1%) to 8.2 (78.2% less 70.0%). Put another way, compared to 2019-2023, Bichette’s 2024-2025 In-Zone Swing% versus lefties has declined less than his comparable rate against righties. Bichette's fastball 2024-2025 In-Zone Contact% jumped from 84.4% in 2019-2023 to 96.5%. Look fastball, see fastball, hit fastball. Since 2024, 69% of the pitches offered to him by left-handed pitchers are fastballs, up from 57% in 2019-2023. In other words, if Bichette is seeing a lot more fastballs, it makes sense to look for fastballs. Therefore, if a batter is hunting fastballs, we should expect lower contact rates on non-fastballs because the batter is fooled more often due to the slower speed and more movement on off-speed and breaking pitches. The data support this expectation. When facing left-handed pitchers, Bichette's 2019-2023 non-fastball Chase Contact% dropped from 61.7% to 45.2%, and his In-Zone Contact% declined from 87.7% to 80.0% in 2024-2025. Also, when a pitch fools a batter, weaker contact should occur. And it does! Bichette’s 2024-2025 .245 xSLG is less than half of 2019-2023’s .525 xSLG. In summary, if my hunting-more-fastballs theory is correct, Bichette’s performance against left-handers has suffered. He is making contact on non-fastballs at a lower rate, and his contact is weaker. It would appear that a more balanced pitch-selection approach may put Bichette back on the lefty masher path. The Last Word Since 2024, Bichette has struggled against left-handed pitchers. His OPS is well below the mark he posted before 2024. There are three reasons why Bichette’s performance against lefties lags behind the 2019-2023 period, namely bad luck, less discipline, and, it would appear, hunting fastballs at a higher rate than before. With the helpful hand of Lady Luck, better plate discipline, and less fastball hunting, Bichette’s performance when facing left-handed pitchers should return to his pre-2024 level. View full article

According to Baseball Reference, Varsho is represented by ISE Baseball.

My sense is that Varsho largely tries to pull the ball with two strikes. I wonder if he would be a more effective hitter if he tried not to pull the pitch as much. During his career, with two strikes, his xwOBA is 0.236, and the league average is 0.233.

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