Bob Ritchie

On November 26, news broke that the Toronto Blue Jays signed free agent Dylan Cease to a seven-year, $210 million contract, pending the results of a physical. If completed, the deal would be the most significant financial commitment that Toronto has made to a free agent. According to multiple websites, including DiamondCentric, FanGraphs, and MLB Trade Rumors, the top three MLB-proven free-agent starters were Cease, Framber Valdez, and Ranger Suárez. From Toronto’s perspective, what separated Cease from Valdez and Suárez? Let us start with the basics. Cease is a seven-year MLB veteran with career ERA, xERA, and FIP marks of 3.88, 3.66, and 3.67, respectively. Valdez has eight MLB seasons on his resume and has posted career ERA, xERA, and FIP metrics of 3.36, 3.76, and 3.51, respectively. Suárez has generated ERA, xERA, and FIP numbers of 3.38, 3.61, and 3.54 during his eight-year MLB career. Those xERA and FIP numbers would make any of these starters attractive to MLB teams. Let us focus on the seasons post-2021, when all three pitchers became full-time members of a starting rotation. Accordingly, behold Table 1. I used ERA- and FIP- instead of ERA and FIP to account for park factors and run-scoring environments across different seasons. I was unable to find an xERA- equivalent. One can note a slight difference in FIP- between these starters during the 2022-2025 period. According to xERA, Cease (3.40) has pitched better than Valdez (3.69) and Suárez (3.74). If one considers ERA-, Cease does not look as attractive as Valdez or Suárez. Cease’s 2025 112 ERA- and 2023 107 ERA- raise a Spockian eyebrow. However, BABIP is a factor. Cease’s career BABIP is .295. Yet, in 2025 and 2023, his BABIPs were .320 and .330, respectively. Those elevated BABIP numbers suggest that Cease experienced a bit of bad luck or poor defence behind him. Regarding defence, the fielders behind him in 2022 and 2024 posted OAA numbers of +1 and -2, respectively. In 2023 and 2025, Cease’s defence generated OAA marks of -7 in both years. It is impossible to quantify the impact of luck on Cease’s elevated BABIP, but the OAA numbers show that poor defence probably boosted his 2025 and 2023 ERAs. For comparison purposes, Valdez’s 2025 BABIP was .297, and Suárez's was .317, both of which were 15 points higher than their career marks before 2025. Cease’s 2025 BABIP was 30 points higher than his pre-2025 career BABIP. Also, the 2025 defences behind Valdez and Suárez posted OAA marks of +7 and 0, respectively. Therefore, all factors considered, Cease’s 2022-2025 ERA-, FIP-, and xERA scores are comparable to those of Valdez and Suárez. A quick word on Stuff+, Location+, and Pitching+. Please take a look at Table 2. In 2025, Cease and Valdez were above average according to Stuff+, and Suárez produced the best Location+ mark among starters. All three excel at the factors considered by Pitching+. Based on these models, Cease, Valdez, and Suárez were, overall, particularly good in 2025. Okay, what is the first separator? Glance upon Table 3! Cease and Valdez have been exceptionally durable. Since 2022, Cease’s 130 starts are the second most in MLB, Valdez’s 121 starts are the 11th highest, and Suárez's 104 starts rank 34th. Regarding innings, Valdez is #2, Cease #7, and Suárez #31. Suárez has not been as durable as Cease or Valdez. In 2022, 2024, and 2025, he was on the IL due to back issues, totalling 87 days. In 2023, Suárez had two stints on the IL: 45 days with an arm ailment and 15 days because of a hamstring injury. Durability is the first separator between Cease and Suárez. Gaze upon Table 4, as we have another separator: Cease's strikeout rate over the past four seasons is 29.2%, much higher than Valdez's (23.9%) and Suárez's (22.0%). Among all pitchers, in 2025, Cease’s K% ranked in the 89th percentile, whereas Valdez and Suárez both ranked in the 55th percentile. A metric related to K% is Whiff%. Concerning 2025 Whiff%, Cease ranked in the 95th percentile among all pitchers, while Valdez was 59th and Suárez 24th. For the Blue Jays, who emphasize a low K%, high contact rate, and OBP when it comes to hitting, seeking the opposite attributes in a pitcher would be logical. Hence, Cease’s high-ranking K% and Whiff% would make him stand out for Toronto compared to Valdez and Suárez. Okay, we must talk about Cease’s BB% because it is high (in the 20th percentile in 2025). Cease’s BB% ranking pales in comparison to Suárez's (86th percentile) and even Valdez's (40th percentile). However, there are two positives of note. First, pitching coach Pete Walker has a history of helping pitchers lower their BB%. Remember Robbie Ray, a high K% and BB% starter? From 2018 to 2020, Ray posted a 30.7 K% but a 13.1 BB%. However, after working with Walker, Ray generated a 32.1 K% and 6.7 BB% on his way to the 2021 AL Cy Young Award with Toronto. Second, despite the high BB%, Cease’s 2025 K-BB% was 19.9%, which ranked 24th among the 166 starters with at least 60 innings. Valdez and Suárez ranked 69th and 40th, respectively. Therefore, Cease’s higher K-BB% would be attractive to a team like the Blue Jays that seeks a high K% (net of BB%) from their starters. Concerning K% and BB%, a final comment. Table 3 shows that, in terms of average innings per 2025 start, Valdez and Suárez had noticeably longer outings than Cease. A likely reason for Cease’s shorter outings was his average of 4.23 pitches-per-plate appearance (“P/PA”). The P/PA marks of Valdez and Suárez were 3.61 and 3.74, respectively. There are two likely reasons for Cease’s higher P/PA. First, one cause could be his high K%. According to Baseball Savant, in 2025, among the 170 starters who faced at least 250 batters, Cease had the 10th-highest K%. Notably, seven of these 10 starters had P/PA rates above the median (3.88). Second, of the 25 starters with the highest BB% (Cease was #24), 19 had P/PA numbers higher than the median. Accordingly, given Cease’s higher K% and BB% rates, we should expect shorter outings from Cease compared to Valdez and Suárez. I guess Toronto can accept shorter outings, given all the other positives Cease brings to the table. Yet, if Walker can work his magic with Cease, a lower BB% should lead to longer outings. Another element of Cease’s performance is his ability to positively contribute to controlling the running game. A hat tip to Sportsnet’s Chris Black (@DownToBlack) for highlighting Cease’s effectiveness in this area. During the 2022-2025 period, according to Baseball Savant, Cease ranked second in Net Bases Prevented (“NBP”) with a score of 25. Valdez (-14) was 482nd of 503 pitchers, and Suárez (8) was 60th. This past season, Toronto’s pitchers (starters and relievers) generated a -11 NBP, which ranked 22nd. Among Toronto’s notable starters in 2025, Kevin Gausman and Chris Bassitt each posted -5 NBPs, Eric Lauer a -3, and Max Scherzer a -2. Bowden Francis and José Berríos had +3 NBPs, and Shane Bieber posted +1. Therefore, Toronto’s addition of Cease should improve the team's effectiveness at limiting the running game of other teams more than either Valdez or Suárez. The Last Word When the free agency period commenced this offseason, Cease, Valdez, and Suárez were at the top of the class. All three starters have produced excellent FIP-, xERA, and Pitching+ numbers in their careers. Yet, it is understandable why Toronto would prefer Cease over Valdez and Suárez. Compared to Valdez, Cease is two years younger; has better K%, K-BB%, and Whiff% numbers; and is superior at neutralizing the running game. Judged against Suárez, Cease has been more durable; has a better K%, K-BB%, and Whiff% profile; and has proven more effective at controlling the running game. It is clear why Cease stood above Valdez and Suárez in the eyes of the Blue Jays. View full article

Garcia is recovering from elbow surgery, and 2026 will be his age-35 season. He had two elbow-related stints on the IL in 2024: Toronto (June 24 to July 19) and Seattle (August 20 to the end of the 2024 season). In 2025, Garcia was twice on the IL: May 24 to July 2 (shoulder) and July 5 to the end of the season (ankle). Garcia has pitched only 30 innings since the 2024 trade to Seattle, and not well (ERA: 4.50, xERA: 5.30, FIP: 4.88). My preference would be for Toronto to plan for Garcia to be unavailable or ineffective in 2026. If he can be effective, then it would be a bonus.

During his November 6 media availability, a reporter asked Ross Atkins about Jeff Hoffman’s role as Toronto’s closer. “The great thing about Jeff is he’s not married to that,” Atkins said. “I think he would be open to anything that makes us better.” In the same media event, Atkins indicated that Toronto was open to improving the team through any means. So, if Toronto is open to adding a bona fide closer in the free-agent market, who are some closers worth considering? Hoffman had a disappointing 2025. On the positive side, among all pitchers, his Whiff% and K% were both in the 83rd percentile. However, his xERA, BB% and Barrel% percentile rankings were 57th, 26th and 1st, respectively. Furthermore, surrendering home runs was an issue, not only in Game 7 of the World Series but also during the regular season. Hoffman’s 2025 regular-season HR/9 was 1.99, tied for the second-highest among 144 relievers with at least 50 innings pitched. Therefore, although I am confident that Hoffman will be better next year, one can understand why Toronto would consider adding a closer to its 2026 bullpen. I identified four free-agent closers as options for the Blue Jays: Edwin Díaz, Raisel Iglesias, Robert Suarez, and Devin Williams. These relievers were the first four closers listed on MLB Trade Rumors' (“MLBTR”) list of the top 50 free agents. Before I delve into the 2025 results of these closers, let’s review how they performed in the three seasons before. Consider Table 1. The listed relievers had impressive resumes before the 2025 campaign. All of them posted 89th percentile or higher wOBA marks, and Díaz, Iglesias and Williams generated xwOBA scores in the 95th percentile or higher. Also, one can see why Toronto was interested in Hoffman, given his percentile rankings in K%, K-BB%, wOBA, xwOBA, and Whiff%. Hoffman, although not elite during the 2022-2024 seasons, was particularly good. Now to the most recent season! Table 2 shows some 2025 pitching metrics for the noted pitchers. Except for BB%, Díaz was elite in 2025. His xERA/xwOBA was 99th percentile, as were his K-BB% and Whiff%. Furthermore, Díaz's Barrel/PA% was at the 96th percentile. In other words, his opponents swung and missed at an elevated rate. However, when they connected, those batters barreled the ball at an exceptionally low rate. Iglesias, although not elite like Díaz, was very good in 2025. Other than his barrel rate, Iglesias was much better than the median reliever last season. His xERA/xwOBA, K-BB%, and Whiff% were in the 78th percentile or better. However, he did record a high Barrel%. Suarez has had an interesting journey to MLB. The Venezuelan-born player pitched in Nippon Professional Baseball from 2018 to 2021. He made his MLB debut with the Padres in 2022 in his age-31 season and posted a 3.27 xERA and a 3.22 FIP. Fast forward to 2025, wherein Suarez posted some impressive and some concerning numbers. His wOBA was 96th percentile. However, his xERA/xwOBA was 57th. Also, batters barreled up his pitches at a high rate (Barrel% in the 29th percentile), and they did not swing and miss at a high rate, given his 33rd percentile Whiff%. Williams had a noteworthy 2025 for the Yankees. From a headline perspective, he posted a 4.79 ERA and lost his job as closer. However, under the hood, he performed well last season. Williams generated an xERA/xwOBA in the 80th percentile, and his Whiff%, K% and K-BB% were 94th percentile or better. However, his BB% was high (32nd percentile), and his Barrel/BBE% was 25th percentile. Table 3 has more 2025 numbers to consider. The highlights are as follows: Except for Hoffman, the listed closers posted particularly good to excellent FIP numbers. Of the 144 relievers with at least 50 innings, Díaz's 3.73 WPA was fourth highest, and Suarez’s 3.16 WPA tied for sixth best. For Iglesias, Williams, and Hoffman, their WPA scores ranked 53rd, 105th and 117th, respectively. Regarding Save%, even elite closers (Díaz and Suarez) blow saves. Hoffman, who had some notable blown save opportunities, posted an average Save%. Furthermore, in terms of xwOBA splits by batter handedness, all four closers had better numbers against right-handed hitters than left-handed batters. Still, none had xwOBA stats that exceeded the MLB average when facing left-handed batters. In summary, these free-agent closers are worthy candidates for a role as Toronto’s closer for the 2026 season. Let’s talk contracts! Concerning contract estimates, I will put my calculator aside and rely on MLBTR and FanGraphs. Behold Table 4! The first matter to note is that Díaz is the only closer to receive a qualifying offer from his previous team. Second, Toronto is a competitive balance taxpayer. Accordingly, if the Blue Jays signed Díaz to a contract, they would “lose their second- and fifth-highest selections, as well as $1 million from their international bonus pool for the upcoming signing period” (per MLB.com). Another issue to note is that, except for Williams, the MLBTR and FanGraphs contract estimates are similar. Apparently, MLBTR believes the market will look past Williams' high 2025 ERA, demotion from the closer role, and the non-receipt of a qualifying offer. On the other hand, FanGraphs appears to think the market for Williams’ services will be more muted than MLBTR does. A word or two on risk. First, relievers can exhibit significant performance volatility from one season to another due to small sample sizes, injuries, and other factors. For example, in 2022, the relievers in the top three in saves were Emmanuel Clase, Kenley Jansen and Liam Hendriks. After 2022, Clase and Jansen posted xERA figures that were at least 0.87 runs higher than their 2022 marks. Specifically, during the 2023-2025 period, Clase generated a 2.84 xERA and Jansen a 3.40 xERA. Unfortunately, Hendriks pitched only 18 innings after 2022. Also, although it is not a reliever risk per se, Clase is currently under indictment in a gambling scandal that may end his MLB career. Accordingly, projecting a reliever’s future performance level is not an easy task. The second point concerning risk is age. These four free-agent closers are in their 30s. Hence, the impact of aging is an issue. Accordingly, I present Table 5. For information regarding Stuff+ and Pitching+, please take a look at the FanGraphs website. Based on the Pitching+ numbers, unlike Díaz and Iglesias, Williams and Suarez have not displayed a worrying deterioration in their respective pitching process. Lastly, courtesy of Spotrac, a history of recent injuries for the closers: Díaz underwent knee surgery and did not play during the 2023 season. Also, he had a shoulder impingement in 2024 and was on the IL (May 29 to June 13). Atlanta placed Iglesias on the IL in 2023 (March 30 to May 5) with a shoulder strain. In 2022, Suarez had a stint on the IL (June 7 to August 6) with a knee ailment. During the following season, the Padres placed him on the IL (March 30 to July 20) with elbow inflammation. Williams landed on the IL in 2024 (March 28 to July 28) due to stress fractures in his back. The Last Word If I had to sign one of these closers, I would opt for Williams. He is the youngest of the group, his Pitching+ history does not suggest a near-term performance decline, and his 2025 showing was not as poor as his 4.79 ERA suggests. If MLBTR has overstated his market value, there may be a worthwhile opportunity to sign him to a shorter, less expensive deal. Díaz has been elite. However, a four-year, $82 million contract is too rich (and risky) given signs of performance decline (Stuff+ and Pitching+). Also, the loss of draft picks and international pool money is a sizeable additional cost. Iglesias would be a nice add as a set-up reliever, but he does not appear to be a noticeable upgrade over Hoffman. Suarez is tempting, but a three-year deal will take him to his age-37 season, which is very risky. Also, his elevated 2025 xERA gives me pause. If Toronto considers adding a closer for the 2026 season, Díaz, Iglesias, Suarez, and Williams are worthy free agent candidates. There are, of course, other options available to Toronto, including other free agents and the trade market. Let the articles flow! View full article

Toronto, as a competitive balance tax payor, would not receive a first-round pick as compensation. They would receive a pick after the fourth round is concluded https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/qualifying-offer

Before the American League Division Series between the Toronto Blue Jays and the New York Yankees began, I examined how the Blue Jays compared with recent World Series teams. The analysis consisted of two parts. The first part of the analysis was titled, How Does the Blue Jays’ Offence Stack Up to That of Recent World Series Teams?. The second part was titled, How Does the Blue Jays’ Pitching and Defence Stack Up to That of Recent World Series Teams? Fast forward to today, Game One of the American League Championship Series. Hence, it is time to examine how the Toronto Blue Jays measure up against the Seattle Mariners. I organized the analysis of Toronto’s and Seattle’s batting and baserunning as follows: Key batting metrics (wRC+, runs, home runs, and others) Distribution of runs scored between home runs and balls in play Hitting performance by pitcher handedness, including runners in scoring position Batting order balance and hitting by inning segments Baserunning The analysis of Toronto’s and Seattle’s pitching and defence is structured as follows: Distribution of runs allowed Starting pitchers Relievers Defence As I noted in the previous articles, compared to the regular season, the following observations concerning the postseason are essential to keep in mind: Runs per game are lower. Home runs per game are similar. Runs per home run are alike. The share of runs via home runs is higher. Batting and Base Running Table 1 shows the key batting metrics of the Blue Jays and Mariners. Toronto ranks much better in runs, K%, and OBP, whereas Seattle has generated more power (home runs and ISO) than Toronto. In many areas (home runs, ISO, and K%), Seattle resembles the Yankees, which ranked first in home runs and ISO, and 25th in K%. However, concerning each team’s leading home-run hitter, Seattle had a higher percentage of home runs attributable to Cal Raleigh (25%) than New York had with Aaron Judge (19%) or Toronto with George Springer (17%). Therefore, given Seattle’s higher reliance on Raleigh’s home run production than Toronto’s dependence on Springer’s, if Toronto’s pitchers could curtail Raleigh’s home run output, it would reduce Seattle’s home run hitting advantage over Toronto. However, in his career, Raleigh has hit a home run against Toronto every 8.4 at-bats, a better rate than his overall 14.1 AB/Home Run rate. It will be a challenge, but possible, for Toronto to limit Raleigh’s home run output. Table 2 shows the distribution of runs scored. That is, what percentage of runs scored is the result of home runs, and what percentage is attributable to balls in play, balks, and other non-home run plays. For simplicity’s sake, I will lump all runs not arising from home runs to be runs from balls in play (“BIP”). Based on the conclusions from my previous article, compared to the 2025 regular season, the number of runs scored per game will likely be lower in the ALCS, and the runs per home run and home run rate will remain materially the same. Therefore, teams that have a higher share of runs scored via home runs will likely score more runs in total compared to teams with a lower share of runs scored attributable to home runs. Why? Because runs from BIP per game are likely to decline, which makes sense because postseason teams typically have good pitching staffs. Consequently, to score runs from BIP, teams need to string non-homer hits together, which is more difficult when facing good pitching. Accordingly, given Seattle’s elevated percentage of runs scored attributable to home runs (50% versus Toronto’s 39%), the Blue Jays may find it more difficult than Seattle to score runs, all things being equal. However, all things are not equal. Toronto’s run total was four percent higher than Seattle’s. In other words, Toronto’s offence was more potent than Seattle’s in the run-scoring department. Table 3 shows the wRC+ marks of the Blue Jays and Mariners by pitcher handedness. The upper part of the table reveals that, in all situations, Toronto and Seattle do not have significant splits. However, the table’s lower portion shows two facts. First, Toronto has performed well in RISP situations and has insignificant handedness splits. Second, Seattle has not hit as well as Toronto in RISP situations, and the Mariners have been below average when facing left-handers with runners in scoring position. Accordingly, Seattle’s 91 wRC+ in RISP situations may provide Toronto with opportunities to use its left-handed relievers in critical situations successfully. However, it is worth noting that RISP numbers tend to be volatile due to small sample sizes. For batting order and wRC+ performance by innings, please take a look at Table 4. The numbers show a slight difference between the Blue Jays and the Mariners, whether by batting order or by innings (before the seventh or after the sixth). The last item on the offensive front is baserunning. Table 5 shows that Toronto and Seattle are below average. Toronto is better at taking extra bases, but Seattle is more proficient at stealing bases. Pitching and Defence Table 6 displays the distribution of runs allowed by the two teams. There is a slight difference in the percentage of runs allowed via home runs between Toronto (46%) and Seattle (43%). However, because the Mariners score runs from home runs at a higher rate than the Blue Jays (50% versus 39%), Toronto projects to allow more runs than Seattle, all things being equal, which, as noted, they are not. Regarding starting pitchers, I anticipate that each team will use four starters in the ALCS. Accordingly, I presented the unweighted average of the 2025 regular season numbers of two starter groups for both teams. Behold Table 7! For Toronto, the first three starter locks are Kevin Gausman, Shane Bieber, and Trey Yesavage. I expect either Chris Bassitt or Max Scherzer to be the fourth starter. Regarding Seattle, I expect Luis Castillo, Logan Gilbert, and George Kirby to be part of their rotation. The Mariners are likely to add either Bryce Miller or Bryan Woo to the noted trio. As Table 7 shows, a group’s numbers are dependent on who the fourth starter will be. For example, if Toronto adds Scherzer instead of Bassitt, Toronto’s ERA jumps from 88 to 96. In Seattle’s case, the average ERA- would be 110 with Miller and 92 with Woo. Notably, Woo recently suffered a pectoral injury and has not appeared in an MLB game since September 19. However, before his injury, Woo posted a 76 ERA- and an 86 FIP-. He may return for the ALCS. Miller posted a 148 ERA- and a 130 FIP- during the regular season. Notably, Miller generated a 108 ERA- and a 54 FIP- in four and a third innings against the Tigers. Overall, I would give Seattle’s projected starting rotation a slight advantage over Toronto’s. First, Bieber and Yesavage did not pitch many innings during the regular season. Bieber had 40 innings, and Yesavage had 14. However, to the extent Seattle has an advantage regarding starters, Kirby, Gilbert, and Castillo pitched in Friday’s game against the Tigers. Kirby threw 64 pitches, and Gilbert and Castillo had 34 and 15, respectively. Perhaps Gilbert and Castillo, who appeared as relivers on Friday, will encounter abnormal fatigue due to Friday’s appearances. Regarding bullpens, Table 8 provides the necessary information. The Toronto and Seattle bullpens have performed similarly. However, one clear advantage for Seattle is their closer, Andrés Muñoz, who posted ERA-, FIP-, and K-BB% marks of 45, 60, and 21.7, respectively, in 62 innings. Toronto’s closer, Jeff Hoffman, recorded ERA-, FIP-, and K-BB% scores of 107, 116, and 19.9, respectively, in 68 innings. On the bright side, Toronto’s bullpen has not pitched since October 8, whereas Seattle’s reliever corps last pitched on October 10. Furthermore, Toronto’s relievers have pitched seven fewer innings than Seattle’s (20 versus 27). Hence, the Blue Jays’ bullpen may be a little more rested than the Mariners. A final thought regarding pitchers: if the trend depicted in the chart below continues, each team’s bullpen will pitch as many, if not more, innings than their respective starting rotations. Accordingly, Toronto may mitigate its apparent disadvantage in starting rotations due to more reliever usage in the ALCS than in the regular season. One area where Toronto is clearly better than Seattle is team defence. As Table 9 shows, Toronto’s defence is superior in the noted areas: infield, outfield, and catching. Summary time! Summary - Batting and Base Running The key points from the analysis are as follows: Concerning run scoring, not striking out, and getting on base, the Blue Jays are better than the Mariners. Seattle generates more power but is more dependent on home runs from its home run leader (Raleigh) than Toronto (Springer). Because Toronto is more reliant on scoring runs from balls in play, the Blue Jays may be challenged to score runs than Seattle because the Mariners have generated 50% of their runs via home runs. Neither team has pronounced wRC+ splits by pitcher handedness. However, Seattle has struggled against left-handers with runners in scoring position. Neither team runs the bases well. Summary – Pitching and Defence The critical points from the analysis are as follows: Although there is minimal difference between the percentage of runs allowed via home runs by Toronto and Seattle, there is, in theory, upward pressure on Toronto’s runs allowed metric because the Seattle offence scores more runs via home runs at a higher rate than Toronto. Seattle’s projected starters have a slight edge over Toronto’s. However, if Woo is not on the ALCS roster or falters because of inactivity, Toronto projects to have a smidgen of an edge. The bullpens of the two ballclubs are both good. However, Seattle’s closer (Muñoz) is elite, and Toronto’s (Hoffman) is not. The Blue Jays’ defence is elite, and Seattle’s is worse than the Yankees.’ The Last Word Given the circumstances, I give the edge to Toronto primarily because of better overall hitting, run scoring, and superior defence. View full article

As the first game of the American League Division Series approaches, media members and others will comment on how the Toronto Blue Jays compare to other 2025 postseason teams, including the Yankees. Such analysis is interesting. However, it would be thought-provoking to examine how Toronto compares at the macro level with the teams that have recently played in the World Series. This examination consists of two parts. In the first segment, How Does the Blue Jays’ Offence Stack Up to That of Recent World Series Teams?, I discussed how Toronto’s offence measures up with World Series teams for the 2014-2024 period. In the second part of the examination, I focus on the Blue Jays’ pitching and defence and assess how the club compares with the World Series participants from 2015 to 2024. Please note that for this analysis, I excluded 2020 for the reason I outlined in my previous article: The abbreviated, 60-game schedule was not representative of a typical MLB season. In the analysis that follows, I also omitted 2014 because FanGraphs’ splits leaderboard did not include the relevant data from before the 2015 season. I organized the analysis as follows: Distribution of runs allowed Pitching (starters and relievers) Starting pitchers Relievers Defence As I noted in the previous article, compared to the regular season, the following observations concerning the postseason are essential to keep in mind: Runs per game are lower. Home runs per game are similar. The share of runs via home runs is higher. The relevant charts are below. Table 1 shows the distribution of runs allowed. That is, the percentage of runs allowed that is the result of home runs, and the percentage attributable to balls in play, balks, and other non-home run plays. For simplicity’s sake, I will lump all runs not arising from home runs to be runs from balls in play (“BIP”). Based on the conclusions from my previous article, compared to the 2025 regular season, the number of runs allowed per game will likely be lower, and the runs per home run and home run rate will remain materially the same during the 2025 postseason. Therefore, teams that had a higher share of runs allowed via home runs during the regular season will likely allow more runs in total compared to teams with a lower share of runs allowed attributable to home runs. Why? Because runs from BIP per game are likely to decline, which makes sense because postseason teams typically have good pitching staffs. Consequently, to score runs from BIP, teams need to string non-homer hits together, which is more difficult when facing good pitching. Accordingly, given Toronto’s slightly elevated percentage of runs allowed attributable to home runs (46% versus the 42% average), the Blue Jays' pitching (starters and relievers) appears to lag the recent World Series teams. However, a deeper dive into Toronto’s starters and bullpen is required. Table 2 shows how Toronto’s pitching (starters and relievers) measures up against recent World Series teams. The numbers are not kind to the Blue Jays. Toronto’s 2025 wOBA, ERA-, FIP-, and HR/9 rankings are near or in the bottom third of MLB teams. The average rankings in these metrics for the World Series ballclubs are near or in the top third in their respective seasons. Not good. Onto Table 3! Oops, not good. Except for K%-BB%, Toronto’s starters rank in the bottom third of MLB teams. We need another table. Behold Table 4! Okay, better news. I constructed Table 4 as follows: Concerning the World Series teams, I included the season stats of the three starters with the most innings pitched in the postseason. I assumed Kevin Gausman, Shane Bieber and Trey Yesavage will rack up the most starter innings for Toronto during the 2025 postseason. For all teams reflected in the table, I used a simple, unweighted average of the noted metrics. I settled on three starters per team because, as noted in my article, The Blue Jays' Top Three Starters Need A Boost At The Trade Deadline: Here Are Options, for the 2014-2024 period, 83% of all postseason starts for World Series teams were attributable to three starters. Table 4 shows that the listed metrics of the Gausman-Bieber-Yesavage trio align with the average of recent World Series teams. Undoubtedly, there are caveats concerning Bieber and Yesavage, given the small sample size in 2025. However, at least on paper, Toronto’s trio measures up favourably with the World Series ballclubs. Concerning relievers, consider Table 5. Based on wOBA, FIP-, HR/9, and K-BB%, Toronto’s bullpen is in line with the average regular-season metrics of World Series teams. There are cautionary matters to note: The composition of a bullpen changes throughout the season. Many teams add to their relief corps ahead of the trade deadline. For example, Toronto added Seranthony Domínguez and Louis Varland before the 2025 trade deadline. Teams often bolster postseason bullpens by moving pitchers from the starting rotation into the relief corps. Accordingly, the team metrics for the whole of the regular season may not accurately reflect the quality of the bullpen in the postseason for the noted World Series teams. A final word on pitching. As the chart below shows, relievers have increased their share of innings pitched during the postseason since 2015. In 2024, starters accounted for 48% of innings pitched, much less than the 61% of total innings hurled by starters during the 2015 postseason. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise if Toronto’s relievers pitch a greater share of innings in the 2025 postseason than their 42% share of regular-season innings suggests. Furthermore, fans of the Blue Jays should be encouraged that Toronto’s bullpen, which struggled in August with a 4.62 FIP and 4.55 xERA, rebounded with a 3.60 FIP and 4.02 xERA in September. The final element to examine is defence. Table 6 has the goods. Not much needs to be said other than Toronto’s defence compares favourably with World Series teams after 2017. Please note that Baseball Savant’s Fielding Run Value data starts with the 2018 regular season. The Last Word Toronto’s defence is elite, be it among 2025 MLB teams or recent World Series teams. However, at first blush, Toronto’s pitching does not compare favourably with recent World Series teams. Toronto’s relatively higher percentage of runs allowed attributable to home runs is cause for some concern. Also, whereas the average World Series team (2015-2024) ranks in or near the top third of pitching staffs, Toronto’s is closer to the bottom third of 2025 pitching staffs. However, an examination of likely starters reveals that the metrics of the Gausman-Bieber-Yesavage trio align with those of the average World Series team. Furthermore, the bullpen’s metrics are comparable to those of the average bullpen from recent World Series teams. In summary, Toronto’s pitching compares favourably with the average World Series team from the 2015-2024 period. View full article

Well done, Terry!

As the 2025 regular season winds down, media members and others will comment about how Toronto measures up against other 2025 postseason teams. Such analysis is interesting and, for sure, timely. However, I thought it would be thought-provoking to examine Toronto’s 2025 offence at the macro level and see how it measures up against the offences of the teams that have recently played in the World Series. The period I studied spans from 2014 to 2024, except for 2020, which I excluded because the 2020 campaign consisted of only 60 games. The Blue Jays-World Series ballclubs comparison should provide insights into Toronto’s batting and baserunning strengths and weaknesses relative to MLB’s 2025 postseason. The aspects of Toronto’s offence covered are as follows: Key batting metrics (wRC+, runs, home runs, and others) Distribution of runs between home runs and balls in play Hitting performance by pitcher handedness Performance with runners in scoring position Batting order balance Hitting by inning segments Baserunning Speaking of balance, there is a table for each of the bullet points above! Please note that each table contains averages and medians for the indicated period. If the period stated on a table is not 2014-2024, it is because the data did not include seasons before 2016 or 2015. Onto the tables! Table 1 shows key batting metrics for the Blue Jays and the noted World Series participants. The 2023 Diamondbacks are the outlier with their, at best, middle-of-the-pack numbers. Concerning the Blue Jays vis-à-vis wRC+, runs and OBP, the 2025 squad lines up nicely with the teams listed and the average and median rankings for the 2014-2024 period. However, the 2025 Blue Jays trail the non-Arizona teams in home runs and ISO, whether in terms of numbers or rankings. Another way to examine power (ISO) and home runs, particularly, is to look at how teams score runs. That is, how many runs are the result of home runs, and how many runs are attributable to balls in play, balks, and other non-home run plays. For simplicity’s sake, I will lump all runs not arising from home runs to be runs from balls in play (“BIP”). Behold Table 2. As of September 15, 38% of Toronto’s runs have come via home runs and 62% from BIP. In percentage terms, Toronto’s run production due to home runs lags the median by five percentage points and by seven percentage points compared to the average of World Series teams shown (from the 2019 Astros to the 2024 Dodgers). Is Toronto’s relatively low percentage of runs arising from home runs a disadvantage? Yes, because, as FanGraphs’ Jay Jaffe noted in the article, "No-Hitters Are Great, but the Long Ball Still Wins in October", the share of runs due to home runs increases in the postseason compared to the regular season. Let us take a deeper dive. I updated the data in Jaffe’s article for the 2023 and 2024 postseasons. The sources for my numbers were Baseball Savant, FanGraphs and Baseball Reference. The reader should note that my percentage of runs due to home runs (RHR%) is slightly different from Jaffe’s. For the 2015-2022 period, my regular season RHR% is, on average, 1.8 percentage points higher than Jaffe’s. My postseason RHR% is 0.2 percentage points lower than Jaffe’s. These differences are insignificant. It is table chart time! There are three charts: Runs Per Game, Home Runs Per Game, and Percent of Runs Via Home Runs. The chart data support the observations reached by Jaffe, which I also share. The observations are as follows: Compared to the regular season, run scoring per game is lower in the postseason. Scoring runs in the playoffs is more difficult because batters typically face better pitchers in the postseason than in the regular season. Home runs per game have tended to be higher in the postseason compared to the regular season. For the 2015-2024 period, home runs per game were higher in the playoffs in seven of the ten seasons examined. The share of runs attributable to home runs is higher in the postseason than in the regular season. Recent history suggests that the upcoming postseason run scoring will decrease, while home runs per game will remain at least equal, resulting in fewer runs scoring from balls in play. Please note that the runs per home run do not vary much for a given year’s regular and postseason. Accordingly, the conclusion that the share of runs attributable to home runs is higher in the postseason than in the regular season still holds, despite a variance in runs per home run between the regular and postseason. So, what does this mean for Toronto? As of September 21, Toronto leads the American League in runs from BIP (482). Compared to the six non-Toronto American League teams currently in or tied for a playoff spot, the Blue Jays’ 482 mark is much higher than the 403 average BIP runs of the six noted teams. Therefore, Toronto could be more vulnerable to a run-scoring decline because of its relatively high reliance on runs from BIP. Let us get back to the positive news! Consider Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. The highlights are as follows: Concerning wRC+ by pitcher handedness, Table 3 shows that Toronto is well-balanced versus right-handers (fourth best) and left-handers (third best). Those rankings stack up well against recent World Series teams. Table 4 shows that Toronto’s RISP wRC+ ranks well, be it overall, versus right-handers or left-handers. Furthermore, Toronto’s 2025 RISP wRC+ rankings line up nicely against recent World Series ballclubs. A word of caution. Batting numbers in RISP situations are volatile in small samples. Furthermore, small samples are characteristic of the postseason. Therefore, consider the Table 4 data as descriptive rather than predictive. Many MLB observers have commented upon the high quality of the Blue Jays’ batting order depth, and Table 5 supports that view. In all three batting order segments (#1 to #3, #4 to #6, and #7 to #9), Toronto ranks no worse than eighth among 2025 MLB teams, which compares favourably to the 2015-2024 World Series participants. Regarding wRC+ data by inning segments, Table 6 is the place to see. In the first six innings of the game, Toronto’s 110 wRC+ slots into the seventh spot. Even better, after the sixth inning, the Blue Jays’ 121 wRC+ is MLB’s best. Additionally, Toronto’s noted rankings are in line with those of World Series teams during the 2015-2024 period. Another cautionary note. My interpretation of Toronto’s wRC+ after the sixth inning is not that the Blue Jays are clutch. Instead, Toronto’s excellence in the seventh or later innings demonstrates that the Blue Jays perform well against relievers. Performance after the sixth inning should be a Blue Jays’ strength because relievers share a greater load of the pitching workload in the postseason than in the regular season. The final aspect to examine is baserunning. Table 7 shows that Toronto does not run the bases well, whether stealing bases or taking extra bases in non-stealing situations. For context, Detroit has the highest Baserunning Runs total (8) of the American League teams in contention for a postseason berth. However, baserunning has often not been a strength of several teams that played in the World Series. Hence, Toronto’s baserunning appears to be only a slight disadvantage in the postseason. The Last Word Toronto has had a successful season at the plate in 2025. As of September 17, their wRC+, runs scored, and OBP rank third, fourth and first, respectively, among MLB teams. Furthermore, the Blue Jays have performed well against right-handers and left-handers, be it in RISP or non-RISP situations. Also, Toronto hitters have performed well before the sixth inning and after, and the batting order is deep. Additionally, all these rankings compare favourably with those of recent World Series teams. One area where Toronto does not compare as well is in the power department. Recent history shows that runs via home runs make up a higher percentage of runs scored in the postseason compared to the regular season. Given that run scoring declines in the postseason, teams that are more reliant on runs from BIP can struggle to score. In other words, because pitching in the postseason is better than in the regular season, it is more difficult for teams to string non-homer hits together to score runs. However, Toronto’s home run total and ISO rank as MLB’s 12th highest. Being #12 is not a disaster. It just means that Toronto’s ranking in the power department, which is not as elite as it is in other areas (such as wRC+, OBP, pitcher handedness balance, and other aspects of hitting), may impact Toronto’s run scoring more than teams that are elite in the power department. All things considered, Toronto’s offence compares favourably with teams that have made recent World Series. View full article

As of September 10, according to the Fielding Run Value metric (“FRV”), the Toronto Blue Jays have MLB’s best defence with a +40 FRV. However, Toronto’s relative ranking slipped after June. By June 30, Toronto’s defence posted a 36 FRV in 748 innings, 17 FRV units better than the next best team (Atlanta). During the July 1 to September 10 period, Blue Jay defenders recorded a +3 FRV in 539 innings, which is MLB’s 15th-best. Boston and Texas have the best FRV marks after June (+22 FRV). So, why has Toronto’s defence deteriorated after June? Let us dive into the topic. Table 1 is an FRV summary of the pre-July and post-June periods for Toronto and a selection of teams either chasing Toronto for the East Division title (Yankees and Red Sox) or teams recently leading the other American League divisions (Tigers and Astros). The bottom section of the table contains FRV data per 500 innings, which equalizes the time in the field, thereby making comparisons easier. The area of Toronto’s defence that has deteriorated the most is the infield. Before July, Toronto’s infielders generated the fourth-highest FRV (+8 FRV per 500 innings) among MLB teams. However, Blue Jay infielders have produced the second-worst infield defence (-10 FRV per 500 innings). Among Toronto infielders, only Ty France and Andrés Giménez have produced positive FRV numbers after June. However, four players have performed poorly once the calendar turned to July: Addison Barger, Bo Bichette, Ernie Clement, and Vladimir Guerrero Jr. The items to note are as follows: Unfortunately, Baseball Savant does not break down FRV range data (fielder comes in, moves to his right, etc.). Therefore, I used OAA for the analysis. A word of caution: Defensive metrics often fluctuate from one month to another. Barger produced a -4 OAA in July and August (182 innings). When moving to his left, his pre-July OAA was +1; it was -2 after. Defensively, Bichette is a below-average shortstop. From 2021 to 2025, among shortstops with at least 2,700 innings, his -23 FRV ranks 31st of 32 shortstops. Concerning OAA, Bichette posted a -4 by the end of June. In July, he was awful. His -9 OAA was horrible. Concerning his movements to a batted ball, the August OAA details are as follows: in (-4), right (-1), and left (-5). That is balanced fielding! Let’s admit it. Bichette is too slow to play a competent shortstop. In 2021, his Sprint Speed ranked in the 75th percentile; in 2025, his ranking is in the 20th percentile. Bichette's 2025 Sprint Speed ranks 51st among shortstops; he ranked 26th in 2021. His 2025 30ft Running Split is in the 11th percentile; it was 46th in 2021. Bichette is neither fast nor quick. Clement has played very well in the field (+9 FRV for the season). However, he recorded eight of his nine FRV total by the end of May. As a third baseman, he posted a +4 OAA in 220 innings by the end of May, and a +2 OAA in 364 innings after. At second base, Clement recorded a +5 OAA in 139 innings before June, and zero in 183 innings after. Perhaps Clement is a little worn out. As of September 11, his 530 plate appearances exceed his next highest season total (452 in 2024) by 78 (17%). Clement has played more in 2025 than he has in any other MLB season. Clement's notable OAA changes in his detailed range metrics were moving to his right (+5 OAA less after June) and left (+4 OAA less after June). Guerrero Jr. was below-average in July, as evidenced by his -3 OAA. After July, his OAA is zero. For the season, Guerrero Jr.’s -3 OAA ranks 26th among 38 qualified first basemen. Concerning FRV, among first basemen with at least 500 innings, Guerrero Jr. slots in at 17 of 28. Notwithstanding the great throws and crowd-pleasing over-the-head catches of pop-ups, Guerrero is a slightly below-average defender, which he has been since June. Concerning noteworthy OAA range data, Guerrero Jr.'s OAA when moving to his right was +1 before July, and -2 after. What does it all mean? Toronto’s infield defence cratered after June, due largely to Bichette and Clement. For the balance of the season, assuming Barger’s return to form, Bichette’s stay on the Injured List (however long it lasts), Clement’s above-average play at short (+1 OAA in September in 36 innings), Giménez’s superb defence (+7 FRV, tied for MLB’s second-highest score among second-basemen), Guerrero Jr.’s close to average defence, and the additions of France (first base) and Isiah Kiner-Falefa (second or third base), Toronto’s infield defence should be better than it was in the July-August period. Concerning the outfield defence, please take a look at Table 4. My takeaways from the data are as follows: To the extent that John Schneider can limit George Springer’s outfield time, the better. Springer has been below-average in the field this season. Springer’s reduced time in the outfield after June is the main reason Toronto’s outfield’s FRV per 500 increased from +3 to +6. Davis Schneider, Barger, and Nathan Lukes are either slightly above or below average. Among centerfielders with at least 400 innings in centerfield, on a per 500 innings basis, Daulton Varsho and Myles Straw have posted +7 FRV scores, tied for third best. As shown in Table 2, despite an improved FRV/500 after June, Toronto’s outfield defence slipped from fifth best to sixth (per 500 innings), which was still particularly good. For the balance of the season, and assuming Springer’s outfield time is minimal, I expect Toronto’s outfield defence to be a team strength. Onto the catchers! In 2025, Toronto’s catchers have excelled. As depicted in Table 2, Blue Jay catchers ranked first in FRV before July, and third after June. Want some details? Behold Table 5! For the season, Alejandro Kirk has a FRV score of +19, second only to San Francisco’s Patrick Bailey (+27 FRV). Tyler Heineman slides into number eight with his +8 FRV. Kirk’s post-June Catcher Framing and Catcher Blocking scores (per 500 innings) are like his pre-July scores. Heineman’s Catcher Framing prowess declined after June, as evidenced by his pre-July +7 FRV slipping to +3 after June (all FRV numbers are per 500 innings). Both catchers underperformed in the Catcher Throwing Department after June. Let us dig into this area some more. During recent Blue Jays’ broadcasts, commentators have noted that Kirk has not thrown out a baserunner in 20 or so steal attempts. Caught Stealing% (“CS%”) is a terrible statistic because even people who use CS% acknowledge the importance of the pitcher in a team’s attempt to limit an opponent’s running game. Thankfully, Baseball Savant developed the Catcher Throwing metric, which is “based on several inputs at the time the pitch crosses the plate, most notably: runner distance from second, runner speed, pitch location, pitcher/batter handedness, and awareness of pitchouts or delayed steals. It’s the Statcast translation of the long-time saying “you steal off the pitcher, not the catcher.” Concerning pop time, both Kirk and Heineman are better than they were in 2024. Kirk's 2025 Pop Time is 1.94 seconds, better than 2024's 2.00. Heineman's 2025 1.91 Pop Time is a tick quicker than 2024's 1.92. So, why did Toronto catchers underperform (according to Catcher Throwing) after June compared to before July? Unfortunately, Baseball Savant’s Catcher Throwing data does not include monthly breakdowns. In the case of Heineman, the drop from +2 Catcher Throwing to zero could be due to small sample size noise. Concerning Kirk, in addition to the small sample size, the answer may lie within the table below. An examination of the breakdown (right side of the image) reveals that 2025 Kirk has not benefited from teamwork (bounced throws, great tags, and missed slides) as he did in 2024. Perhaps Kirk’s Catcher Throwing before July benefited from teamwork, but not so much after. Notwithstanding Catcher Throwing, I expect Toronto’s elite defence from the catcher position to continue as the 2025 season unfolds. The Last Word For the 2025 season to date, the Blue Jays have a top-tier defence. However, the performance of Toronto’s defenders as a group slipped to middle-of-the-pack during the July 1- September 10 period. Although there were modest performance changes from the outfielder and catcher groups, the defensive weakness after June was the infield. The notable culprits are Bichette, who posted a -8 FRV/500 after June, worse than his pre-July -2 FRV/500, and Clement, who generated a -1 FRV/500 after June and a 7 FRV/500 before. Yet, I expect Toronto’s infield defence to regain its form, not to mention the outfield and catcher units maintaining their performance level, for the balance of the season. View full article

After spending the early part of the 2025 MLB season in Buffalo, Addison Barger earned a promotion to the MLB roster in April. Before August, Barger generated an impressive 123 wRC+ and a 0.241 isolated power (ISO) in 324 plate appearances. However, he struggled in August, as evidenced by his lacklustre 60 wRC+ and 0.136 ISO in 96 plate appearances. His August performance raises the obvious question: Is the real Barger the one from before August or the one from after July? Naturally, there is a table in your future. Please take a look at Table 1. Before August, Barger posted striking numbers. His 0.505 SLG exceeded the MLB average by 101 points, and his xwOBA bettered the MLB average by 36 points. It is noteworthy that Barger’s pre-August batting was not fueled by good fortune, as evidenced by the positive xwOBA-wOBA difference. However, August was unkind to Barger. His xwOBA slipped to 0.289, and his SLG was 0.333, both marks below the MLB average. On the positive news front, Barger’s 22.9% strikeout rate (K%) declined from the pre-August 25.3%. What has changed for Barger? Let us dig into the topic by considering the following areas: Plate appearances by count Pitch mix Plate discipline Batted ball direction Contact quality Spoiler alert: The Barger blues should end. Concerning the first four noted areas, please take a look at Table 2. The highlights are as follows: Compared to the pre-August period, the August count distribution was favourable to Barger. There were slight increases in the percentage of plate appearances that found Barger either ahead or even in the count. Notably, Barger’s K% declined from 25.3% to 22.9%, despite more plate appearances that reached two strikes (59% versus 53%). From a pitch mix perspective, there was a slight change in August compared to the pre-August period, but not enough to explain Barger's underperformance. Regarding plate discipline, Barger’s chase rate (Chase Swing%) increased in August to 33.5% from the pre-August 31.9% rate. However, I do not view the 1.6 percentage point increase to be significant, at least not enough to explain the post-July wRC+ and slugging percentage (SLG) declines. Although his chase contact rate (Chase Contact%) declined in August from 56.1% to 51.6%, I do not believe this change was significant because of the small sample size. In August, Barger swung at 64 out-of-zone pitches and made contact 33 times. If he made contact 36 times, his August chase contact rate would have been 56.3%, similar to the March-July period. There was little change in Barger’s batted ball direction numbers in August compared to the pre-August period. Okay, so what explains Barger’s lacklustre August box score numbers? The answer lies in the hard-hit rate (Hard Hit%) and exit velocity numbers. I know, many MLB observers roll their eyes when someone mentions a player’s hard-hit rate. However, in 2025, the average SLG and ISO on hard-hit balls (a batted ball with a minimum exit velocity of 95 mph) are 0.941 and 0.459, respectively. On all other non-bunt batted balls, the average SLG and ISO are 0.247 and 0.034. Hence, hitting a ball hard matters! So, I'd like for you to look at Table 3. Before August, Barger’s overall power numbers were impressive. His xISO and xSLG were 0.242 and 0.522, respectively, both above the relevant MLB average. His hard-hit rate was 55.3%, and his exit velocity (EV) averaged 93.4 mph. However, in August, Barger generated a 37.7% hard-hit rate and an 87.5-mph average EV. Concerning fastballs and offspeed pitches, that EV reduction is significant. How does a batter increase exit velocity? Driveline notes four factors: bat speed, mass of the bat, pitch speed, and hitting the ball on the bat’s sweet spot. My focus is on bat speed and the sweet spot. As it so happens, two of the newer metrics introduced by Baseball Savant are fast-swing rate (bat speed) and squared-up rate (a close approximation of hitting the sweet spot). Back to the topic at hand. Barger’s reduced August exit velocity, and corresponding xISO and xSLG numbers, are consistent with his reduced squared-up rate. Consider Table 4. Barger’s 76-mph average bat speed in August was higher than his pre-August 75.7 mark. For the season, his bat speed ranks in the 93rd percentile. Accordingly, as to why Barger averaged a lower August exit velocity, the issue was not bat speed. It was his squared-up rate. Before August, on all pitches, Barger’s squared-up rate on contact was 33.2%, a little better than the 32.9% MLB average. However, in August, his squared-up rate was 23.3%. In other words, compared to the March-July period, Barger found the bat’s sweet spot at a much lower rate. Given that his bat speed did not decline after July, the reduced squared-up rate would explain the hard-hit rate reduction and the corresponding decline in his power numbers (xISO and xSLG). At the pitch-type level, the reduced squared-up rates in August compared to the pre-August period on fastballs and offspeed pitches are consistent with the respective xISO and xSLG numbers shown in Table 3. Regarding breaking pitches, the pre-August xISO and xSLG numbers are inferior to the respective August numbers, despite August’s tick-lower squared-up rate (31.3% versus 30.8%). This apparent inconsistency (higher power numbers with a lower squared-up rate) may be due partly to launch angles. Barger's average launch angle on breaking pitches in August was 12 degrees, which is in the line drive range. Before August, it was nine degrees, which is in the groundball range. The MLB average xISO and xSLG on line drives are 0.256 and 0.894, respectively. Regarding groundballs, the MLB average xISO and xSLG are 0.028 and 0.279, respectively. In summary, Barger’s August performance slip was consistent with a lower squared-up rate. In other words, compared to the March-April period, Barger found the bat’s sweet spot less frequently in August. One reason he was less successful at hitting pitches on the bat’s sweet spot could be swing mechanics. If that is the cause, one reason for optimism would be a sprinkling of David Popkins’ magic batting dust. If Barger’s slump continues, one change I would make would be to move him out of the lineup’s second spot in the batting order to the sixth spot or lower. Such a move may take pressure off him and reserve the number two slot for a batter who is currently producing better box score numbers. The Last Word Before August, Barger’s 123 wRC+ ranked third among Toronto batters with at least 200 plate appearances. His 0.241 ISO was the best on the team, and his 0.505 SLG trailed only George Springer’s 0.506 mark. The calendar turned to August, and he produced lacklustre box score numbers, including a 60 wRC+. Changes in plate appearances by count, pitch mix, plate discipline, and batted ball direction do not explain Barger’s performance decline. Barger’s poor August performance was consistent with a lower squared-up rate. In other words, Barger was less successful in locating pitches on the bat’s sweet spot than he was during the March-July period. One explanation for that reduced squared-up rate could be a change in swing mechanics, which can improve with time, work and instruction from Toronto’s hitting coaches. This article was written prior to games on September 3. View full article

Since 2018, Jose Berrios has been one of MLB’s most reliable and consistent starting pitchers. Except for the pandemic-shortened 2020 season, he has posted 32 starts in each campaign between 2018 and 2024, and this season, Berrios is on pace for, yep, 32 starts. In the 2018-2024 period, the fewest number of innings pitched by Berrios in a 162-game season was 2022’s 172. Concerning ERA, except for the noted 2020 campaign (56th percentile) and the awful 2022 (13th percentile), Berrios’ ERA percentile ranking has ranged between 64th and 79th, which is the ERA slot range for a number two starter. Hence, Berrios has been a consistent starter over the years. What is happening this season? Overall, Berrios’ 2025 performance has slipped. The season began well: In his first 17 outings, he recorded a 3.26 ERA and a 1.06 HR/9 in 102 innings (six innings per start). In his nine most recent starts (from July 2 to August 17), Berrios has posted a 5.68 ERA and 5.62 FIP in 44 1/3 innings (4.92 innings per start). His 2.03 HR/9 in this period is markedly higher than the 1.24 MLB average for a starter. For the season, his 4.00 ERA ranks in the 51st percentile among starters with at least 50 innings. Mad Men’s Pete Campbell best summarized Berrios’ 2025 season to date. Is Berrios’ 2025 campaign a tale of two parts? The first 17 starts and the next nine? Does fatigue explain much of the post-June underperformance, or are there some underlying issues that have persisted throughout the 2025 season? Let us dig into the topic. Table 1 shows that the 2025 Berrios version is a slightly below-average starter. Except for ERA, all the 2025 numbers are worse than the MLB average for a starter. It is noteworthy that Berrios’ 2024 struggles versus right-handed hitters continue this season. His 2025 .339 wOBA is higher than both 2024’s .311 and his .297 career mark. Those elevated wOBA figures are due in part to higher home run rates compared to his pre-2024 career. For the 2016-2023 period, Berrios surrendered a home run to right-handed batters once every 35.3 at-bats. In 2024 and 2025, the comparable rates are once every 26.2 at-bats and 17.5 at-bats, respectively. The MLB average AB/HR is 29.4. Hence, based on the two most recent seasons, Berrios’ mastery over right-handed hitters is no longer. Are there signs of in-season fatigue? If fatigue was a major contributor to Berrios’s recent underperformance, we should see a steady rise in the monthly xwOBA numbers. Why? Because fatigue could cause batters to make better and more frequent contact on Berrios’ pitches. xwOBA, more so than wOBA, can capture a change in batted ball characteristics. Table 2 shows that for a given pitch, the monthly xwOBA figure bounces around quite a bit. The xwOBA on his sinker was elevated in June and August, but July’s was like the first two months of the season. Berrios’ slurve’s monthly xwOBA has followed the better-than-average then worse-than-average cycle since the beginning of the 2025 campaign. The xwOBA on his four-seam fastball has exceeded the MLB average every month. The xwOBA data does not show a consistent monthly increase. Fatigue does not explain why Berrios has been below average this season, nor his poor post-June metrics. Are there other reasons that might explain Berrios’ decline? Is there a table with answers? Yes, Table 3! Compared to 2024, as highlighted in Table 3, Berrios’ sinker, four-seam fastball, and cutter have lost velocity. His 2025 sinker has averaged 92.1 mph, 1.3 mph slower than 2024. From May onwards, the sinker’s average monthly velocity has been at least 1.1 mph slower than the 2024 offering. A 1.1 mph velocity decline from the previous season is significant. Furthermore, the average velocity of the four-seam fastball and the cutter is at least 1.2 mph slower than the 2024 comparable pitch types. That is also a considerable reduction in velocity. Notably, Berrios’ pitches have had meagre spin rate changes (less than 3%). One reason Berrios has not pitched as well as he has in the past is the sizeable decline in pitch velocity. Let us take a closer look. FanGraphs’ website includes Pitching+, Stuff+, and Location+ data. For an explanation of these three models, please refer to this. Table 4 shows the noted Berrios data for the past five seasons. The highlights are as follows: Stuff+, which includes velocity and other pitch characteristics, shows the erosion of Berrios’ stuff since 2021. In 2021, his sinker’s Stuff+ was 110. For context, Jacob deGrom’s 2025 sinker has a 110 Stuff+ score. That is a good sinker. However, the Stuff+ score for Berrios’s sinker has steadily declined, and his 2025 Stuff+ grade is 89. The Stuff+ scores on all his pitches have declined since the 2021 campaign. Overall, his 2025 Stuff+ score is 89, which is below average. One consistent Berrios attribute is that he locates his pitches well. His 102 Location+ score is better than average. All his 2025 pitches are either a tick below average (99) or are better than average. Notably, the Berrios changeup’s 112 Location+ score surpasses the 111 posted this season by some fella named Paul Skenes. Back to the negative. Pitching+, which FanGraphs’ Owen McGrattan described as an assessment of “the overall quality of the pitcher’s process,” does not show Berrios in a good light. Each of Berrios’ pitches is below average according to their respective Pitching+ scores. Overall, Berrios’ 93 grade is sub-par. Furthermore, since 2021, the collective quality of Berrios’ offerings has deteriorated. Okay, the quality of Berrios' 2025 pitches is below average. Yet, how does one explain the first 17 starts that generated a 3.26 ERA, and the next nine outings yielded a 5.68 ERA? There are two answers: defence and regression. High-quality defence should suppress a pitcher’s ERA. Before July 1, Toronto provided excellent defence behind Berrios, as evidenced by the nine Fielding Run Value (“FRV”) score. However, after June 30, Toronto’s defence was below average when Berrios was on the mound (-3 FRV), which would put upward pressure on a pitcher’s ERA. Please note that Baseball Savant does not provide FRV pitcher-specific data by batter handedness. The second explanation of Berrios’ poor box score results after June is regression. Put another way, Lady Luck looked favourably upon Berrios before July but has since cast an unfavourable eye upon him. Berrios’ pre-July xwOBA numbers are remarkably like the post-June scores. However, the xwOBA-wOBA deltas are pretty different. For example, before July, Berrios’ overall .343 xwOBA exceeded his .303 wOBA by 40 points. However, after June, his .344 xwOBA was surpassed by the .373 wOBA. That is a 69-point swing, which is significant. A similar pattern exists concerning the pre-July and post-June splits by batter handedness. Therefore, because the pre-July and post-June expected results are similar, Berrios is pitching the same throughout 2025. What changed after June are the box-score results (ERA, wOBA, etc.), partly due to regression/luck. Indeed, other factors may have contributed to Berrios’ post-June underperformance. However, the deterioration of defensive support and regression are among the factors. What does all of this mean for the balance of the 2025 regular season and postseason? Berrios’ underlying metrics (xwOBA, Pitching+, and others) are not easily improved in-season. Unless Lady Luck switches course or Berrios takes pitch sequencing to another level, Berrios is likely to perform at a below-average level for the rest of 2025. If one defines a number three starter as average, then Berrios projects to be a number three or four starter for the balance of this season. Furthermore, based on 2025 performance, Berrios is a probable candidate to be removed by John Schneider from the postseason starting rotation. The Last Word Concerning the number of starts, innings, and ERA-percentile rankings, Berrios has been a remarkably consistent pitcher during his career. However, Berrios has struggled this season. His stuff has deteriorated from previous levels, and his underlying metrics (xERA, FIP, and others) are below-average. Furthermore, the underlying metrics were below average before his recent (post-June) box-score struggles. Berrios’ pre-July 3.26 ERA has risen to 4.00 (as of August 17), not because of fatigue but due to below-average defensive support and regression/reversal of good luck. In summary, if one expects second starter performance from Berrios during the balance of 2025, there are reasons to be concerned. View full article

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A frequent conversation among armchair field managers is whether John Schneider uses some relievers more than he should, to the point that those bullpen arms underperform due to fatigue. Two of the names that appear the most in those discussions are Jeff Hoffman and Brendon Little. Has Schneider used these two relievers excessively? How does the Blue Jays' bullpen usage compare to the Houston Astros, one of the better American League bullpens? Let’s find some tables! My bullpen usage examination will consider two aspects of reliever management: the average number of days between appearances and the average number of outings per month. I selected Houston's bullpen as the comparison because it leads the American League in xERA and WPA. Table 1 is the first chart on the agenda. The data presented is the five current Toronto relievers with the most innings pitched as a Blue Jay in 2025. Please note that I excluded Chad Green, who Toronto designated for assignment on July 29 and released on August 3, who ranks fifth in innings pitched among Blue Jay relievers. The Houston average is for its five relievers with the most innings. I also present the numbers for Josh Hader, Houston’s closer, and Bryan Abreu, the Astro with the most holds (25). These two relievers are comparable to Hoffman (Toronto’s closer) and Little, who leads Toronto with 24 holds. The average number of days between outings for Toronto and Houston is similar. The exception is Toronto’s listed relievers have averaged 18 outings on one day’s rest, whereas Houston’s bullpen arms have averaged 14. Regarding the closers, Hoffman has 15 appearances on zero days’ rest, five more than Hader. On less than two days’ rest, Hoffman has 31 outings, six more than Hader. It is noteworthy that Hader is on the 15-day Injured List with a shoulder strain, and reporters expect him to be on the sidelines beyond the 15 days. He has not pitched since August 8. After August 8, Hoffman has appeared four times: one on six days' rest, two on one day's rest, and one on zero days off. Therefore, before August 9, Hoffman had 49 outings, and 28 on less than two days' rest. Thus, according to Table 1, there is not much difference in usage between Hoffman and Hader. Regarding Little and Abreu, Little has 26 outings on one day of rest, higher than Abreu’s 16. Yet, Little’s 34 outings with less than two days’ rest are not significantly more than those of Abreu’s 30. With days of rest less than four days but more than one, Abreu’s 19 appearances are equal to Little’s 19. In other words, Little’s workload in terms of rest days is not dissimilar from Abreu’s. One aspect of Hoffman’s usage is that he has, on five occasions, pitched four times in five days. In 2025, Hader has not pitched four times in five days. Except for Boston’s Aroldis Chapman, I did not examine other American League closers concerning four appearances over five days. Chapman has pitched four times in five days on two occasions. Hence, Hoffman’s concentrated usage over five days is unusual. However, I would be reluctant to criticize Schneider for Hoffman’s usage in the noted five-day stretches. The fourth game details are as follows: The first time Hoffman appeared for the fourth time in five days was April 2, and he entered the game after relievers Little, Green, and Yimi Garcia. Given that it was early in the season, Hoffman was well-rested. He pitched an inning and gave up one run in Toronto’s 4-2 win over Washington. The second instance was on May 10 when he replaced Mason Fluharty in the ninth inning. If Little appeared, it would have been his third appearance in four days, and one day after going one and two-thirds innings on May 9. Rodriguez had pitched one and one-third innings on May 7 and two innings on May 8, and would not have been available on May 11 for his one and one-third innings. Garcia and Green were well-rested. Hoffman struck the three batters he faced and earned the save in Toronto’s 6-3 win over Seattle. On June 10, Hoffman, Fluharty, and Green appeared. Hoffman pitched one-third of an inning and surrendered a solo home run in Toronto’s 10-9 victory over St. Louis. Garcia was on his May 24 to July 1 tenure on the Injured List. Rodriguez pitched one and one-third innings on June 6 and again on June 9, and would not have been available for his June 11 outing. Hoffman appeared in the July 3 game against the Yankees. He was Toronto’s fourth reliever (Braydon Fisher, Green, and Justin Bruihl were the other relievers) in the 8-5 win for the Blue Jays. Hoffman surrendered a hit in a scoreless, one-inning appearance. If Rodriguez pitched, it would have been his third outing in three days. A July 3 outing for Little would have been four games in five days. In the July 22 Yankees game, Hoffman entered the game in the top of the ninth and surrendered a game-winning home run. Fluharty and Bruihl preceded Hoffman in this game. If Rodriguez or Little were used instead of Hoffman, it would have been four outings in five days for either. Overall, in 18 innings, over the five times that he made four appearances in five days, Hoffman’s 0.274 xwOBA is lower than the .319 MLB average. His 3.85 FIP is better than MLB’s 4.05 FIP. During the first three games of the four outings in five days, his average xwOBA and FIP are .209 and 2.78, respectively. Hence, on average, Hoffman has pitched well in the first three games of the four-game block. His Game Four average xwOBA and FIP scores are .472 and 7.24, respectively. Concerning rest after the game fours, Hoffman had two days’ rest on three occasions and two six-day respites. The key takeaways from the noted Hoffman usage are as follows. First, Schneider is no doubt aware of the likelihood of the game four underperformance by a reliever. However, other than possibly the May 10 game, Schneider’s use of Hoffman on April 2, June 10, and the two July games was reasonable. He did not have better options at the time when he made his calls to the bullpen. Second, Hoffman was given ample relief from relief work after the Game Fours. Having to use Hoffman in four games in five days was less than ideal, but reasonable. Another way to look at reliever usage is the number of outings by month. Lo and behold, Table 2! The average number of outings for Toronto’s five relievers by month is like Houston’s. Concerning Hoffman and Hader, their monthly totals are alike, as are those of Little and Abreu. Let us explore a potential connection between monthly usage, days of rest, and performance for Toronto’s relievers. Is there a table to view? No! There are two! Please refer to Table 3 and Table 4. Concerning Hoffman, there is no apparent connection between monthly usage, days of rest, and performance. His performance has been inconsistent month-to-month despite similar usage and rest. In the case of Little, the claims that his “performance has declined because of an extreme workload” are unfounded. First, as I noted earlier, Little’s workload is similar to Abreu’s. Also, at the end of July, Little was on pace to pitch in 72 innings, almost identical to 2024’s 63 innings and 2023’s 73. Therefore, the data indicate that Schneider has not overworked Little. The second matter to note is how consistent Little’s xwOBA has been month-to-month: his monthly xwOBA has been lower than the MLB Average. Regarding Table 4, there is no strong relationship between monthly usage, rest, and performance for Rodriguez, Fisher, or Fluharty. One should refrain from drawing any conclusions from the August data due to the small sample size. It is noteworthy that Fisher’s performance has been remarkably consistent for a rookie. Additionally, Fluharty, after a rough June and four July outings with Buffalo, returned to an MLB mound on July 22. In July, his .205 xwOBA (MLB only) was his best month to date. One can question, for example, why Hoffman remained in the game after the third or fourth walk surrendered to the Dodgers on August 10. There are other moves made or not made that one can call into question. However, the focus of this article is strictly on usage in terms of rest days and the number of outings by month. In summary, the days of rest and monthly usage data do not support the view that Schneider has mismanaged his bullpen. The Last Word Toronto's bullpen has performed well this season. The Blue Jays’ reliever corps ranks sixth in xwOBA among American League teams. The Seranthony Domínguez and Louis Varland trade-deadline acquisitions bolstered Toronto’s bullpen. Regarding managing the relievers in terms of rest and number of outings by month, Schneider has operated the bullpen well. On average, the distribution of rest days and the number of outings by month mirrors that of Houston, arguably the best bullpen in the American League. The relievers of primary focus, Hoffman and Little, have usage patterns similar to those of Houston’s Hader and Abreu. Overall, Toronto’s bullpen is well-rested for the push to clinch the American League East Division title. View full article

On MLB’s trade deadline day, Toronto acquired Louis Varland and Ty France from the Minnesota Twins in exchange for Alan Roden and Kendry Rojas. In the article, "Louis Varland (and Ty France) Are Good Players Who Came at a Sizable Cost," Simon Li examined the price paid by Toronto to acquire Varland and France. I reviewed Varland’s impact on Toronto’s bullpen in the piece, "How Will Seranthony Domínguez and Louis Varland Impact the Blue Jays’ Bullpen?". However, many observers reacted to the Blue Jays’ acquisition of France with puzzlement. Let us see what France brings to the table. France is a 30-year-old first baseman with seven seasons of MLB experience. His best MLB campaign was in 2021 when he posted a 3.2 fWAR and a 129 wRC+. However, as Table 1 shows, France’s wRC+ has deteriorated since 2021. Additionally, except for 2022, his ISO has been lower than the MLB average for the noted seasons. Concerning 2025 handedness splits, he has a 100 wRC+ versus left-handed pitchers and a 94 against right-handers; neither wRC+ score suggests a capable platoon player. There's more. His sprint speed ranks in the fifth percentile, and his GIDP% is 10.7%, higher than the 9.4% MLB average. Geez, is there any good news? Yes! Except for 2024, his OBP has exceeded the MLB average in each year during the 2021-2025 period. In 2025, his first base defence has been above average (tied for third with a +5 Fielding Run Value). Additionally, as I noted in the article, "Andrés Giménez: Hit Me With Your Best Shot," starting in 2022, no player has been hit by more pitches than France. In summary, France appears to be a slow-footed, defence-first player who gets on base at a better-than-average rate but does so with below-average power, grounds into double plays at an excessive rate, and does not offer excellence against lefties or righties. That does not sound appealing. Please don't worry, there are more tables to come. The key metric in the Case for France is xwOBA minus wOBA. Among the reasons why xwOBA can exceed wOBA are batter foot speed and bad luck. Concerning foot speed, slow runners can, for example, turn what xwOBA considers a likely double into a single (which would be the wOBA input). France and Alejandro Kirk (second percentile sprint speed ranking) are among the slowest runners on any MLB roster. All else being equal, a slow runner will have a positive xwOBA-wOBA differential. Regarding bad luck/randomness, there are elements of a play that a batter cannot control, including the quality of defence faced and hitting or not hitting pitches right at fielders. A run of bad luck will increase a player's xwOBA-wOBA differential. Therefore, we should not be surprised to see positive regression occur in the future for batters with a recent run of bad luck. Table 2 shows sprint speed, wOBA and xwOBA over the past five seasons for France, Kirk, George Springer, and old friend, Teoscar Hernández. The data shows that regardless of foot speed, be it the slow-poke Kirk or the speedier Teo, batters can have positive or negative xwOBA-wOBA differentials. Admittedly, the data for these four batters make for a small sample. However, because it makes sense intuitively, it is reasonable to conclude that a positive xwOBA-wOBA difference can, in part, be due to foot speed. However, part of the difference can also be attributable to bad luck, in which case regression can occur. Hence, we should not be surprised if France shows better “actual” results in the future than his current wOBA indicates. How impactful has bad luck been on France’s 2025 results? Suppose France’s xwOBA-wOBA delta is due solely to bad luck. His 2025 xwOBA-wOBA difference is 34 points [(0.342 – 0.308) x 1000]. In wRC+ terms, France's 0.308 wOBA translates into a 95 wRC+, while a 0.342 corresponds (approximately) with a 120 wRC+. That 25-point wRC+ difference is significant. I have assumed that France’s expected stats indicate better “actual” performance for the balance of the 2025 season. Accordingly, let us examine how Toronto could use France. Consider Table 3. When facing right-handed pitchers, France’s 0.333 xwOBA translates into a 113 wRC+, and his 0.155 xISO (xSLG–xBA) is league average. The more interesting component of France’s batting is how he has performed against left-handed pitchers. His 0.363 xwOBA corresponds to a 134 wRC+, and his xISO is 0.234, well above the 0.156 MLB average ISO. Those two metrics are attractive. How do France’s xwOBA stats compare to those of other Blue Jays? Consider Table 4. Against left-handed pitchers, France’s xwOBA ranks as the third highest among the listed Blue Jays. This grade makes France a valuable bat for Toronto. He could pinch-hit for Addison Barger or Joey Loperfido when a lefty is on the mound. Another option for manager John Schneider would be to have France play first base or be the designated hitter when Toronto faces a left-handed starter. Additionally, France and his 0.333 xwOBA could start at first base against a right-handed starter in games when Vladimir Guerrero Jr. has the day off. Toronto’s acquisition of France was reasonable. His expected batting metrics suggest that he is an above-average batter with power when facing left-handed pitchers. Also, his first base defence is superior to Guerrero Jr.'s; the latter has a -1 Fielding Run Value, tied for tenth highest among qualified first basemen. It appears that Toronto prefers having France play first base rather than playing someone such as Ernie Clement out of position. Additionally, France is an insurance policy in case one of Toronto’s less-experienced position players falters as the 2025 season progresses. So, let’s go, Ty! Not so fast. Toronto’s acquisition of France creates a roster issue. Andrés Giménez is nearing the end of his stint on the injured list and, accordingly, Toronto will soon have to make a spot for him on the 26-man roster. The likely candidate to leave the roster is Buddy Kennedy. However, Springer will also need a place on the roster when he returns from the seven-day injured list. That means that one of the outfielders (Barger, Loperfido, Davis Schneider, Nathan Lukes, or Myles Straw) or France is a candidate for removal from the roster. I assume the Blue Jays will not want to reduce the number of pitchers from 13 to 12 when they add back Springer. Of the listed candidates, Barger, Loperfido, Schneider, and Lukes have minor league options. Therefore, Toronto can send them to Buffalo without putting them on waivers. Concerning Straw and France, neither of whom has any remaining minor league options, Toronto would have to designate either for assignment to clear a space on the 26-man roster for Springer. From a roster management perspective, if Toronto wants to make space for Springer but not risk losing a player to a waiver claim, then Toronto should send one of the players with minor league options to Buffalo. However, all four have played well this season. It would be a tough decision to make. On the bright side, rosters expand from 26 to 28 on September 1. Therefore, the Buffalo-bound outfielder could be back in Toronto in a few weeks. Alternatively, Toronto could make way for Springer by designating France for assignment, hoping he clears waivers and bringing him back in September. This France decision would be difficult, made more challenging because France, based on his expected batting metrics and defence, should prove to be a valuable contributor to Toronto’s 2025 fortunes. The Last Word Initially, Toronto’s acquisition of France at the trade deadline was puzzling. His box score batting metrics are near-average, and his wRC+ has been in decline since his 2021 breakout season. However, France’s expected batting metrics suggest better performance in the future, particularly against left-handed pitchers. However, from the No-Good-Deed-Goes-Unpunished School of Baseball Management, having France on the 26-man roster with the impending return of Springer creates a roster-move decision for Toronto. Let us see how the roster juggling unfolds! View full article

Before the July 31 trade deadline, the Toronto Blue Jays acquired two relievers, Seranthony Domínguez and Louis Varland. The additions were needed because the Blue Jays’ bullpen, as I showed in Table 4 of the article, Trade Deadline Options to Bolster the Blue Jays’ Bullpen, lagged the xERA performance levels of the Astros, Red Sox and Yankees. The question to answer is whether Toronto bolstered the bullpen enough? I divided this article into three sections: A Domínguez and Varland overview How do Domínguez and Varland change the profile of Toronto’s bullpen? Did Toronto bolster the bullpen enough? A Domínguez and Varland Overview Domínguez, who was born in the Dominican Republic, was signed by the Phillies in 2018. He is a 30-year-old reliever with seven years of MLB experience. Concerning career leverage situations, 311 (26%) of the 1,211 batters faced were in high-leverage outings, and 425 (35%) were medium-leverage. By comparison, David Bednar, the newly acquired Yankee, has faced 415 (34%) batters in high-leverage situations and 323 (26%) in medium-leverage outings. Domínguez has had postseason success, particularly in Philadelphia’s 2022 run to a World Series appearance with a 1.69 ERA, 0.02 FIP and a 0.32 WPA in 10 2/3 innings. Overall, his postseason record in 17 2/3 innings is a 1.02 ERA, 0.78 FIP and a 0.60 WPA. He will be a free agent after the 2025 season. Varland, who was born in St. Paul, Minnesota, was drafted by the Twins in the 15th round of MLB’s 2019 June Amateur Draft. In 2022, at the age of 24, he made his MLB debut as a starter. In 2023 and 2024, Minnesota used him as a starter (17 outings) and a reliever (16 appearances), which summed to 117 2/3 innings. This season, he has appeared in 52 games (50 innings) as a reliever only. Varland is under team control until 2031. As a reliever, in his career, 18% of the batters faced by Varland occurred in high-leverage situations and 38% in medium-leverage outings. In 2025, Varland has been most frequently in medium-leverage outings (41% of batters faced) and low-leverage situations (38%). Enough of the verbiage, it's table time! Table 1 shows pitch data of Domínguez and Varland. The highlights are as follows: Domínguez has a five-pitch arsenal with the four-seam fastball as his primary offering (43%). When facing right-handed batters, 93% of his pitches are the four-seamer, sweeper, and sinker. Against left-handed hitters, 94% of his offerings consist of the four-seam fastball, splitter, and curveball. His fastball velocity is in the 94th percentile. Like Domínguez, Varland has a five-pitch arsenal, highlighted by the four-seam fastball (45%) and knuckle curve (38%). Against right-handed batters, Varland makes more use of his sinker and slider than he does versus left-handed hitters. When he faces lefties, Varland mixes in his changeup. Varland’s Pitching+ metrics are outstanding. For a description of Pitching+, please refer to FanGraphs. Overall, his pitches have a 116 Pitching+ score, which ranks #27 of 451 pitchers with at least 20 innings pitched. That 116 mark is tied with Paul Skenes. In other words, Varland has electric stuff that he locates well. Table 2 shows a sample of other key metrics for Domínguez and Varland. The vital stats are as follows: Domínguez is a strikeout pitcher, as evidenced by his 32.0 K%, with an elevated 13.3 BB%. Varland has a strikeout rate a tick better than average but a much-better-than-average BB% (76th percentile ranking). Both relievers have performed well in high-leverage situations, but Domínguez has excelled. Concerning batter handedness, the two pitchers have slightly elevated xwOBA scores when facing left-handed batters, which may present matchup challenges for Manager John Schneider. How Do Domínguez and Varland Change the Profile of Toronto’s Bullpen? Table 3 has the answers! The “Toronto’s bullpen before Domínguez and Varland” descriptor refers to the Blue Jays’ overall bullpen metrics as of July 30, 2025. With Toronto’s acquisition of Domínguez and Varland, and compared to the average of the Garcia and Green numbers, the profile of the Blue Jays’ reliever corps should, based on the average of the 2025 Domínguez and Varland data to date, change as follows: Lower HR/9, BB%, Barrel% and Location+ scores. Higher GB%, K%, K%-BB%, Whiff%, Stuff+, and Pitching+ numbers. Additionally, as noted in Table 1, the four-seam fastball average velocities of Domínguez and Varland are 97.7 mph and 98.1 mph, respectively. For the season to date, the average four-seam velocity of Toronto’s bullpen is 95.0 mph. Concerning the sinker, Toronto’s average velocity is 93.4 mph. The corresponding velocities of Domínguez and Varland are 97.9 mph and 96.9 mph, respectively. In summary, Toronto’s acquisition of Domínguez and Varland has altered the bullpen’s profile. The changes to be witnessed include more strikeouts, swing-and-miss and velocity, and fewer home runs. Did Toronto Bolster the Bullpen Enough? By the trade deadline, the New York Yankees added Bednar, Jake Bird, and Camilo Doval to its bullpen. Bednar (85th xERA percentile ranking) would have been a good acquisition for Toronto. However, MLB observers have opined that New York’s bullpen is now so much better than Toronto’s. I disagree, and I have a table to support my position! I constructed Table 4 as follows. First, for each team shown, I ranked their top eight relievers by innings (from most to fewest). So that you know, the xERA and WPA percentile rankings presented are the equally weighted average of the percentile rankings of the eight relievers. For example, I calculated the simple average of the xERA percentile rankings of Houston's eight relievers, which is 76. Second, I determined the impact of trade acquisitions upon a team’s bullpen by dropping the relievers with the lowest xERA percentile rankings and adding each acquisition's xERA and WPA percentile rankings. The total of eight relievers per team was maintained. In the case of Toronto, I included the xERA and WPA percentile rankings of Domínguez and Varland and eliminated Yimi Garcia and Chad Green. For New York, I dropped the three relievers with the lowest xERA percentile rankings and added the xERA and WPA percentile rankings of Bednar, Bird, and Doval. Please note that I have updated the Detroit, Houston and Boston post-deadline numbers. However, because my focus is on the Toronto-New York comparison, this article does not contain the details of the Detroit and Boston trade deadline acquisitions. Also, for the record, Houston did not make a deadline trade for a reliever. Table 4 shows that Toronto’s deadline bullpen additions (and deletions) were more impactful than New York’s. In terms of average xERA percentile rankings, the Blue Jays boosted its bullpen xERA from 59 to 72 (a 13-point delta). The Yankees enhanced their bullpen’s average xERA percentile rankings from 65 to 74 (a nine-point change). Concerning the average WPA percentile rankings, Toronto and New York added 11 percentile ranking points by the trade deadline. Overall, based on the revised average of the xERA and WPA percentile rankings, Toronto's bullpen is slightly better than New York's (74 versus 71). "It's tough to make predictions, especially about the future." — Yogi Berra As always, Yogi is correct. We do not know how the incumbents and new relievers of any team’s bullpen will perform for the balance of the 2025 regular season or the postseason. However, MLB observers have overlooked how good Domínguez and Varland have performed this season. These two relievers should boost the performance level of Toronto’s bullpen. Additionally, if Garcia can get healthy and improve upon his 91 Location+ score (well below his 105-career mark before 2025), the Blue Jays’ reliever corps will be even better. The Last Word The Toronto Blue Jays bolstered their bullpen with the acquisitions of Domínguez and Varland. These two relievers should have a positive impact on Toronto’s bullpen performance metrics, including better HR/9, GB% and K% numbers. Furthermore, from an xERA and WPA perspective, the Domínguez and Varland additions have put Toronto’s reliever corps on par, if not slightly better, with New York, a ballclub close to Toronto in the American League East standings. Now, we wait to see the balance of the 2025 campaign unfold! View full article