Bob Ritchie

On May 10, Sportsnet's Ben Nicholson-Smith noted in a Bluesky post that Vladimir Guerrero Jr. has chased less in each of the past three seasons. I updated the data to May 18, and the 2025 trend continues. Let's take a closer look. Table 1 shows that since 2023, Guerrero Jr.'s Chase% has steadily decreased from the previous season each year. In 2022, his 30.5% Chase% exceeded his 2023 28.8% mark, which was higher than 2024's 27.5% Chase% and this season's 21.8%. For context, consider Guerrero Jr.'s Chase% percentile rankings (the lowest Chase% would be the 100th percentile) for the 2022-2025 period. His Chase% percentile ranking has increased consistently from 43rd in 2022 to 85th this season. Notably, Guerrero Jr.'s In-Zone Swing% has consistently declined since 2023. Regarding percentile rankings, his In-Zone Swing% has fallen from 90th to 20th. Unsurprisingly, Guerrero Jr.'s overall Swing% has also declined. His combined swing rate (Swing%) percentile ranking has dropped from 73rd in 2023 to 10th this campaign. Is Guerrero Jr. a more patient/passive batter in all situations than he was a few years ago? Let's turn to Table 2 and Table 3. For context, I present Table 2. As of May 18, Guerrero Jr. has 200 plate appearances. Concerning men on base ("MOB") and runners in scoring position (RISP) situations, he has fewer than 91 plate appearances. Hence, a small sample size warning. Nonetheless, some patterns in various situations have developed since 2022. Also, regarding Table 3, I highlighted numbers that exceeded the MLB average by three or more percentage points and situations where the MLB average surpassed Guerrero Jr.'s number by at least three percentage points. The three-percentage-point cutoff aligns with the approximately three percentage point difference between the 75th percentile Chase% and the median for the 2022-2024 period. Observation time! Chase% Concerning Chase%, Guerrero Jr. has chased at a lower rate with no men on base than the MLB average since 2023. This season, his 16.9 Chase% is considerably lower than the average. However, with men on base, Guerrero Jr. has been close to the average starting in 2022. Regarding RISP situations, his Chase Swing% consistently surpasses the MLB average. Notably, 2025 and 2023 are considerably higher than the average. Before 2025, with fewer than two strikes, Guerrero Jr.'s Chase Swing% exceeded each season's average. However, in 2025, his Chase% is almost five percentage points lower. This low Chase% is consistent with hitting coach David Popkins' batting approach, which I outlined in an earlier article. Guerrero Jr. has chased at a much lower rate with two strikes compared to the MLB average this and last season. In-Zone Swing% Suppose a passive hitter swings at in-zone pitches at a rate lower than the MLB average. Hence, an aggressive batter swings at in-zone pitches at a higher-than-average rate. Therefore, one description of 2025 Guerrero Jr. is that he is a passive batter in non-two-strike scenarios. Before 2024, he was an aggressive batter in all in-zone scenarios. In summary, 2025 Guerrero Jr. is chasing at a relatively low rate, whether in counts with fewer than two strikes or with two strikes. However, his Chase% continues to exceed the MLB average in RISP situations. Concerning In-Zone Swing%, the 2025 version of Guerrero Jr. is a passive batter. This latter observation is consistent with his Heart Zone Swing% with fewer than two strikes. In 2024, Guerrero Jr. swung at 52% of the Heart Zone pitches with fewer than two strikes. This season, his Swing% on these pitches is 38%. The 2025 number is a small sample (42 swings). However, Guerrero Jr. would have had to have swung at those pitches 57 times to achieve 2024's 52% mark, which is a lot more. Therefore, 2025 Guerrero Jr. is passive in counts with fewer than two strikes. From the Popkins' hitting philosophy perspective (slug in slug counts), we should expect lower chase rates. On this front, Guerrero Jr. is executing the noted philosophy thus far in 2025. However, concerning In-Zone Swing%, his rate in non-two-strike situations is below the MLB average. Furthermore, as of May 8, Guerrero Jr.'s Heart Zone Swing% was below the MLB median (I have not updated the data after my May 11 article). Hence, concerning In-Zone and Heart Zone Swing% data, Guerrero Jr. is not executing Popkins' philosophy. Let's move from Swing% to Contact%. Contact% Table 4 shows Contact% numbers in various situations. Concerning out-of-zone pitches, except for 2025 RISP situations, Guerrero Jr.'s Contact% was markedly higher than the MLB average in 2024 and has continued to be thus far in 2025. On in-zone pitches, his 2025 contact rates are close to the MLB average. An interesting 2025 development is Guerrero Jr.'s elevated K% from 2024's 13.8% mark. In 2025, his K% is 17.2% (the MLB average is 22.0%). Guerrero Jr.'s increased strikeout rate (2025 compared to 2024) is due to lower chase contact and in-zone contact rates with two strikes. Furthermore, as a percentage of all strikeouts, his called strikeout rate is higher (26% in 2025 compared to 21% last season). Notably, his 14.8% walk rate in 2025 is higher than 2024's 10.3% (the 2025 MLB average is 8.7%). The Last Word Guerrero Jr.'s 85th percentile ranking in Chase% shows that he chases at a very low rate. However, his In-Zone Swing% is 20th percentile (the highest Swing% is the 100th percentile). Given the low Chase% and In-Zone Swing%, one description of Guerrero Jr. is that he is a passive hitter, whether the pitch is in or out of the strike zone. Another explanation is that he is a disciplined batter on pitches out of the zone and passive regarding in-zone pitches. Furthermore, his relatively low Heart Zone Swing% with fewer than two strikes indicates passivity and not implementing an element of Popkins' hitting philosophy. We will have the rest of the 2025 season to determine the valid description. View full article

If I were to make a guess, a lot of data-retrieval work would go into this article. It was a fun read. Well done!

For sure, Barger and Varsho. Also, Bo, Vlad, Kirk, Lukes, and Springer had notably better numbers. After April 27, there were also fewer PAs from Roden and Wagner, who were well below the median.

On April 28, on Bluesky, MLB.com’s Mike Petriello noted that Toronto’s batters posted the second-lowest Barrel% in 2025. Although Toronto's ranking has since improved to 20th, should the Blue Jays be concerned? Can the team improve their Barrel% performance for the rest of the season? Let’s dig into the topic. According to MLB.com, “The Barrel classification is assigned to batted-ball events whose comparable hit types (in terms of exit velocity and launch angle) have led to a minimum .500 batting average and 1.500 slugging percentage since Statcast was implemented Major League wide in 2015.” Previously, I wrote about the strong, positive correlation (0.84 R-Squared) between slugging percentage and runs. As of May 9, the Blue Jays rank 24th in runs per game with their 3.71 mark, lower than MLB’s 4.35 average. Toronto’s 0.362 SLG slots in at #25, bested by MLB’s 0.391. The correlation between runs and various Barrel metrics (Barrels, Barre%, or Barrels/PA%) is positive, but not strong. The highest R-squared is 0.30. Surprisingly, the relationship between SLG and the noted Barrel metrics is positive, but weak. However, all is not lost. Although the noted Barrel metrics have less predictive value than SLG vis-à-vis runs, Barrel metrics can help examine what has happened thus far in 2025. Shout-out to my friend Lorne, a member of the Actuarial Pantheon, with whom I always consult on statistical matters. Let’s examine Barrel and SLG metrics. Why are the Blue Jays lagging in the Barrel department? I identified two noteworthy reasons: Failure to fully implement one of Toronto’s hitting philosophies Roster construction Failure to Implement One of Toronto’s Hitting Philosophies During spring training, David Popkins, Blue Jays’ new Hitting Coach, described one of Toronto’s hitting philosophies. "Our goal is to slug in slugging counts and be a little more on-base/execution in counts that don't yield slug." I interpret that comment to mean the following: With less than two strikes, Toronto hitters will attack pitches they can barrel up. Otherwise, the batters will not swing at the pitch. With two strikes, the batter sacrifices power to increase contact probability or take a walk. For this analysis, I will not examine situational hitting. A good way to determine if Toronto is applying the noted philosophy is to consider two elements. First, what have Toronto’s hitters done when there are fewer than two strikes, and when there are two strikes? With less than two strikes, a batter can wait for their pitch and barrel the ball. With two strikes, a batter will be in survival mode and focus more on contact than power. The second element is the location of pitches. Instead of examining whether a pitch is in the strike zone, I prefer to look at the attack zones: Heart, Shadow, Chase, and Waste. The chart below depicts the attack zones, courtesy of FanGraphs. I use xSLG rather than SLG for this analysis for two reasons. First, the inputs for xSLG are exit velocity and launch angle. Hence, the impact of defence is not a factor in the result. Second, exit velocity and launch angle are the factors that comprise Barrels, which is a focus of this article. For context, in 2024, MLB’s average SLG was 0.399; the xSLG average was 0.397. Also, I combined the Chase and Waste zones. My rationale is twofold. First, the swing rate on pitches in the Waste Zone was less than six percent. Second, the xSLG on pitches in the Waste Zone was 0.014, and the Barrels are zero. In other words, the impact of standalone Waste Zone metrics is insignificant to the overall analysis. In 2024, the Chase/Waste Zones accounted for 27% of pitches. The Heart Zone shares 29%, and the Shadow Zone 44%. Onto the Blue Jays’ approach. Let’s set a high-performance bar. If Toronto has executed the stated approach well, it should rank in the top five of a given metric. Accordingly, we should expect Blue Jay hitters to do the following: With less than two strikes, there is a top-five or higher Swing% on pitches in the Heart Zone. The inner part of the Shadow Zone is in the strike zone, and the outer part is not. Hence, with less than two strikes, a batter should not swing at pitches in the Shadow Zone. With two strikes, any pitch in the Shadow Zone is either a strike or too close to take. Hence, with less than two strikes, the Swing% should be lower (ranked highest to lowest) than the 25th team in the Shadow Zone and the combined Chase and Waste Zones. Because Toronto is willing to sacrifice power in two-strike counts, Toronto’s batters should have a contact rate on pitches in the Heart, Shadow, and Chase/Waste zones that is at least the fifth-highest. Toronto should have a K% in plate appearances that reach two strikes no higher than 26th among teams (fifth-lowest). For reference, approximately 53% of plate appearances end up in a two-strike count. As of May 8, what has happened? Table 1 has the details. Spoiler Alert: The Blue Jays are not executing Popkins’s philosophy. With less than two strikes, Toronto ranks poorly on Heart Zone Swing% while their Swing% in the other zones is too high. Concerning the Heart and Shadow Zones, Toronto’s numbers are consistent with Popkins’s approach when there are two strikes. The Swing% rates are in the top five in the respective zones. However, the Blue Jays’ relatively high Chase & Waste swing rate is inconsistent with Popkins’s philosophy. Toronto’s Contact% numbers in non-Heart Zones are within the top seven in all counts. Yet, Blue Jay batters have failed to meet the top-five standard in Contact% on pitches in the Heart, particularly with two strikes. Toronto has below-median xSLG and Barrel% numbers on Heart Zone pitches. On the positive side, when Blue Jay hitters are in two-strike counts, their 37.8 K% mark ranks third-lowest. This result is consistent with Popkins’s focus on contact with two strikes. In summary, in counts with less than two strikes, Toronto batters swing at pitches in the Heart, Zone, and slug/barrel, at below-desired rates. With two strikes, Toronto’s xSLG metrics are better than the median in all zones. In all counts, Blue Jay hitters’ chase rates are too high. Roster Construction In theory, with fewer than two strikes, Toronto batters should be able to produce higher SLG numbers if they increased their Swing% on pitches in the Heart Zone, and reduced their Swing% in the other zones. However, roster construction limits their SLG/xSLG and barrel ceilings. In other words, there is not enough SLG or barrel potential on the roster. Consider Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4. Table 2 shows 2022-2024 metrics of Blue Jay hitters with plate appearances over 100 this season, plus Daulton Varsho. Except for Varsho, Table 3 depicts the xSLG and Barrel% for the 2025 season for the listed Blue Jays. Table 4 shows the differences between 2025 and 2022-2024 for each metric for the players listed. Table 3 shows a lot of green (below median performance) regarding xSLG and Barrel%, particularly in the Heart Zone, where xSLG and barrels are at their highest. I used Table 4’s xSLG and Barrel% data as a thought exercise and weighted each player’s numbers by ZiPS DC Rest of Season at-bats. The results are as follows: xSLG for the balance of this season will change little from the Opening Day through May 8 record. Barrel% will decline marginally. Therefore, better xSLG/SLG, and accordingly, run production, would likely occur if one or more of the following happened: Blue Jay batters execute Popkins’s philosophy. Currently, Toronto has the fourth-largest xSLG-SLG difference (0.408 versus 0.362). Suppose xSLG, which ranks 19th, holds steady. An SLG regression towards the xSLG number could result in a run-production bump. Toronto gives more at-bats to the Blue Jays, with higher xSLG numbers. For example, Addison Barger’s 2025 0.466 xSLG is higher than Ernie Clement’s 0.327. Sign a free agent such as J.D. Martinez, who produced a 0.472 xSLG in 2024. I should note that 2025 would be Martinez’s age-37 season. Also, he is strictly a designated hitter, which means more outfield time for defence-challenged Anthony Santander (career -14 OAA and -19 FRV as an outfielder). The Last Word Toronto’s below-median Barrel metrics are consistent with their relatively poor xSLG/SLG and run production numbers. The reasons for the underperformance are twofold. First, contrary to the stated approach to hitting, Toronto does not slug in slugging counts nor barrel the ball. Second, the everyday roster does not profile as a team that slugs or barrels. If Toronto can execute their hitting philosophy better, change the regular lineup, and toss in a little positive regression, the ballclub can alleviate their batter barrel blues. View full article

Now that the Blue Jays and Vladimir Guerrero Jr. have agreed to a contract extension, what might it take to keep Bo Bichette in town beyond 2025? On April 14, the Toronto Blue Jays held a media event to officially announce their 14-year, $500 million contract extension with Vladimir Guerrero Jr. Soon after, media and fan attention turned to another extension candidate, Bo Bichette. So, let's take a deep dive into the factors involved in a potential Bichette extension. Contract Model Like many people, I use an fWAR-based model to estimate contract values. I project performance (fWAR) for a given term and apply a dollar value per fWAR to the projected performance. The critical assumptions are as follows: Age has an impact on performance. Accordingly, based on averages, for ages before 28, fWAR increases by 0.25 per season, and remains the same in the 28-30 age range. Between ages 31 & 37, fWAR is 0.5 lower each season, and 0.75 lower annually after age 37. If a player changes positions during the term of the contract, I may need to adjust fWAR. See FanGraphs for further analysis. The dollars per fWAR is not a linear relationship. Accordingly, I reduce $/fWAR by 20% when a season's fWAR is 2.0 or less. Given that $/fWAR tends to increase over time, I inflate the previous season's $/fWAR by 3%. Will Bichette Play Shortstop? The best defensive middle infield regular on the 2025 Blue Jays is Andrés Giménez, not Bichette. Check out Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3. Before 2024, Bichette's FRV and OAA ranked in the bottom third of all shortstops. Because of injuries, Bichette played just 684 innings at short in 2024, less than the 1,261 innings he averaged in 2021-2023. Accordingly, I put less weight on his FRV and OAA rankings in 2024 due to the small sample size. However, Giménez's 2022-2024 FRV and OAA rankings among second basemen are elite. So, why would Giménez be a better shortstop than Bichette? First, during his career at short, Giménez has posted 8 OAA in 304 attempts, corresponding with 11 OAA/400. In 2024, an 11 OAA would have ranked T7 among shortstops. Second, the lateral movement components of Giménez's OAA are superior to Bichette's. Third, foot speed over short distances is crucial for playing shortstop effectively. Table 3 shows that Giménez's percentile rankings over five-foot increments, from five to thirty feet, are significantly better than Bichette's. In my opinion, Giménez's superior footspeed over short distances lends itself to better shortstop performance. From an arm strength perspective, consider Table 4. Regarding maximum velocity, both Giménez and Bichette have the arm strength to play shortstop. Additionally, both players possess the arm strength to play third base; the average arm strength of third basemen was 85.7 mph in 2024. If I were to offer a contract extension to Bichette, I would condition the offer on his acceptance that he will move to second, or possibly third base. Accordingly, a position change from shortstop would reduce his positional adjustment from 7.5 runs (shortstop) to 2.5 runs (second or third base). Based on 2024's 9.683 runs per win factor, the five-run reduction corresponds to an approximate 0.5 fWAR decrease. However, if Bichette played better defence at second/third than he does at shortstop, the 0.5 positional fWAR decrease could be mitigated by a higher fielding run number. For estimating a contract extension, I will assume that Bichette's fielding run number will not increase by switching from shortstop because his lateral movement projects to be average, at best. The Impact of Bichette's 2024 Season From 2021 to 2023, Bichette averaged 4.5 fWAR per season. In 2024, Bichette posted a 0.3 fWAR in 81 games. Most projections place Bichette's 2025 season in the 3.5 to 3.8 fWAR range. Also, during his career, Bichette is an average baserunner (+1 Baserunning Runs), and his defence is average, at best. Accordingly, Bichette's value-added depends on his bat. He is a career 119 wRC+ batter, which is very good but not great. Given the potential position change and other noted factors, a 2026 4.0 fWAR projection is reasonable. The Impact of the Guerrero Jr. and Juan Soto Contracts It is challenging for teams, players, and MLB observers to estimate the current dollar value per fWAR figure. For a Bichette contract estimate, I need to determine the $/fWAR number for the 2026 season. Here is my attempt. In December 2022, Aaron Judge signed a nine-year, $360 million contract with the New York Yankees. Based on Steamer's 2023 6.9 fWAR estimate, according to my model, the implied 2023 $/fWAR was $8.8 million and $9.4 million for the 2025 season. When the most recent free agent period began, MLB Trade Rumors's estimate for a Juan Soto contract was a 13-year, $600 million deal. Given Steamer's 2025 Soto 6.0 fWAR projection, the implied 2025 $/fWAR was $9.4 million. The $9.4 million figure was the implied rate for MLBTR's Willy Adames's six-year, $160 million contract estimate. Adames signed a seven-year, $182 million deal, corresponding to $10.1 million per fWAR in 2025. That is close to MLBTR's and Judge's 2025 implied $9.4 million. So, does the implied 2025 $10.1 million per fWAR work for the Guerrero Jr. and Soto contracts? No, not even close. Please refer to Table 5. Ultimately, Soto signed a 15-year, $765 million deal. After adjusting for the additional two years and the higher $/fWAR ($10.1 million versus $9.4 million), I arrived at a 15-year, $640 million deal. The implied premium paid by the Mets to land Soto was $125 million ($765 million less $640 million). The premium is understandable. First, suppose the $125 million is paid evenly over 15 years. With a 5% discount rate, the present value of the premium is approximately $86 million, not as astounding as the $125 million sticker price. Second, the bidders included the Mets and the Yankees. Accordingly, a bidding war between teams with deep pockets was likely to push the $/fWAR upwards. According to my model, Toronto paid a $96 million premium to sign Guerrero Jr. to an extension. The Blue Jays were probably willing to pay more than the market $/fWAR for multiple reasons, including their preference to field a competitive team beyond 2025, maintaining or increasing revenues with Guerrero Jr. to cover the Rogers Centre's renovation costs, and other considerations. I acknowledge that the estimated Soto and Guerrero Jr. premiums are projections, not known prices. For example, New York's projected fWAR for Soto could be higher than mine, which would reduce the premium. However, because MLBTR has a good record regarding contract estimates, there were probably abnormal factors that caused Soto's deal to exceed expectations. Also, it is unusual for Year 1 $/fWAR to change significantly from one year to the next. According to my calculation, the $/fWAR increased from $9.4 million to $12.0 million for Soto. Lastly, Soto's $12.0 million $/fWAR is substantially higher than Adames's $10.1 million. These points suggest that the Mets and Blue Jays paid premiums, perhaps not as large as $125 million and $96 million, to secure the players. The special circumstances that led the Mets and Blue Jays to pay significant premiums to Soto and Guerrero Jr. will not apply to Bichette. He is not as valuable to Toronto as Guerrero Jr. Accordingly, I used $10.4 million/fWAR (2025's $ 10.1 million, increased by 3%) for Bichette's contract estimate. Contract Estimates Table 6 shows multiple contract estimates. The variables for the projections are contract length (eight or ten years) and first-year fWAR (4.5, 4.0 or 3.5). Because a starting 4.0 fWAR is reasonable, a 10-year, $283.4 million deal or an eight-year, $267.5 million agreement would be sensible. The tenth year of the contract would be Bichette's age-37 season. The present value of the 10-year deal is slightly higher than that of the eight-year contract. One advantage of the 10-year agreement is that the lower AAV ($28.3 million versus $33.4 million) would result in a lower competitive balance tax number. Will Bichette accept my reasonable contract? I have no idea, but it's fun to speculate. The Last Word Bichette is an average-ish fielder and baserunner. However, he is a very good hitter, which, given Toronto's need to bolster its offence, is worth retaining beyond 2025. Furthermore, the Blue Jays seem to have decided to compete for multiple postseason berths after 2025. The Guerrero Jr. extension is consistent with that goal, as would signing Bichette to a new, but reasonable, contract. View full article

On Saturday, the Blue Jays led 2-0 after six innings but lost 3-2. Were John Schneider’s bullpen decisions reasonable? Chris Bassitt pitched six and two-thirds innings against the Mets on Saturday. Entering the seventh, Bassitt scattered a triple (Jesse Winker) and two doubles (Francisco Lindor and Winker) and posted nine strikeouts and no walks through six innings. In the seventh, he retired the first two batters on weak ground outs (the exit velocities were 84.1 mph and 66.4 mph). The next batter, Mark Vientos, hit a line drive to left field (99.4 mph exit velocity). Bassitt’s outing ended when Schneider turned to Yimi García as Bassitt’s replacement. The next three hitters were at the bottom of New York’s batting order. Those hitters (Brett Baty, Jose Siri, and Hayden Senger) all struck out in the fifth inning. Bassitt had thrown 92 pitches when he left the game, and it was a cold night in New York. Whether John Schneider should have replaced Bassitt at that point in the game is a matter for debate. However, there is a strong case that the manager’s reliever choices were highly questionable. The Coin Flip Jim Scott, a colleague at JaysCentre, often poses the following scenario. Suppose someone offers you a coin-flip opportunity. You can pick heads or tails, and you selected heads. If the coin comes up heads, you win $5; if it's tails, you pay $2. Given that the odds are 50/50 that the coin flip will be heads, you calculate your expected value to be $1.50 (50% of $5 less 50% of $2). Accordingly, you agree to the bet terms. The person who made the offer flips the coin, and it lands on tails. You lose $2. Did you make a good decision? Yes, because your expected value of the bet was +$2.50. Unfortunately, your decision did not work out. I will revisit this concept later in the article. The Recap After Bassitt’s Exit García replaced Bassitt with two outs in the seventh. Baty placed a single in right field with an 80.0 mph exit velocity, and Siri walked on four pitches to load the bases. Starling Marte pinch-hit for Senger and grounded out softly (44.7 mph exit velocity) to end the inning. García threw 10 pitches in total. Brendon Little took the mound to start the eighth. Lindor walked, Juan Soto blooped a single (73.4 mph exit velocity), Pete Alonso struck out, Brandon Nimmo lined out to center (105.1 mph exit velocity), and the Mets scored two runs on Winker’s triple (99.8 mph exit velocity). Schneider replaced Little with Nick Sandlin, who struck out Vientos to close the bottom of the eighth. Sandlin returned to begin the ninth. Baty grounded out (107.1 mph exit velocity), Siri walked and soon advanced to second on a Sandlin wild pitch, and Luis Torrens dropped a soft single into left (71.7 mph exit velocity). Jeff Hoffman entered the game with one out and runners at the corners, but unfortunately for Toronto, Lindor greeted Hoffman with a sacrifice fly that scored Siri. A 3-2 loss for Toronto. Why the Bullpen Decisions are Questionable In high-leverage situations, teams utilize their best relievers differently than they did many years ago. For example, suppose the game is close in the eighth inning and the opposing team has the top of their order due up. Many moons ago, a manager was likely to save his closer for the ninth and use another reliever instead. In 2025, many managers will bring the closer into the game in the eighth to face the opposition’s best hitters in that high-leverage situation. In high-leverage situations from 2022 to 2024, García and Hoffman allowed wOBA of .279 and .211, respectively. The 2024 MLB average wOBA in high-leverage situations was .307. For this reason, I would argue that they are ideally suited to be high-leverage relievers this season. Let’s revisit Saturday’s game. When Bassitt exited, the number seven, eight, and nine hitters were due up. Although Toronto had a slim lead (2-0), the situation was medium leverage, not high. Accordingly, Schneider had options other than Garcia as Bassitt’s replacement. Table time! Please refer to Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows that Chad Green, Sandlin, Little, García, and Hoffman were well-rested for Saturday’s game. Table 2 shows that Green and Sandlin, whose career wOBA splits are better than the 2024 MLB average, were viable options to face Baty. Therefore, Green or Sandlin could have replaced Bassitt and produced the final out. Suppose Schneider selected Green instead of García and Baty was the final out. Toronto could have brought Green back in the eighth inning to face the number eight and nine hitters and have the option to have Green or García face Lindor. Alternatively, García could have started the eighth inning. Assuming Green and García performed well, Hoffman could have taken the mound in the ninth inning to close the game. Alternatively, Hoffman could have entered the game in the eighth, saving García for the ninth. My analysis is not a case of judging a decision by the result. The decision to replace Bassitt with García, Garcia with Little, and Little with Sandlin was suboptimal. The better option would have been Green or Sandlin as Bassitt’s replacement and using García and Hoffman in the eighth and ninth innings. Furthermore, if Schneider brought García into the game in the seventh because Schneider believed that was a high-leverage situation, why not use Hoffman in the eighth? The eighth was high leverage because the score was close and the top of New York’s batting order was on the horizon. Schneider’s error in judgment was as much what he chose to do in the eighth as what he did in the seventh. The Last Word Judging a decision by the result is easy but not the correct approach. One should evaluate the soundness of a decision based on the information available when the person makes the choice. Accordingly, given that information, was the decision optimal? In other words, did the choice make sense? There were many unknowns on Saturday, including how the relievers would perform. Like the coin flip example, Schneider’s bullpen decisions did not work out. However, unlike the coin flip example, Schneider’s decision was not sound. A reasonable decision would be to bring Green or Sandlin into the game in the seventh inning, a medium-leverage situation, thereby preserving García and Hoffman for the eighth and ninth innings. A less optimal choice, but better than Schneider’s decision to have Little enter the game in the eighth, would have been to use Hoffman in that inning. In summary, not every criticism of a decision is a case of 20/20 hindsight. Some decisions were not reasonable when made. View full article

The Kirk signing is a terrific deal. A reasonable total fWAR is 14.5 over the five years. At $9.3 million per fWAR for the 2026 season (it is approximately $9.0 million in 2025, which I inflated 3% annually) and other assumptions (aging, cost of the arb-3 season, etc.), I arrive at a $132.1 million deal. One could argue that because Kirk is a catcher with a particular body type, $132.1 million is excessive. However, even if you knock the value to $100 million, or even $75 million, it is a good deal for Toronto. Kirk probably considers this contract financial security for him and his family. At the end of the term, he will enter his age-32 season as a free agent and earn more money. I can see why Kirk would sign this extension.

The baseball media is mischaracterizing the actual value of contracts with deferred money. Let's get it straight. How often have you read or heard the following? "The present value of Toronto's offer to Vladimir Guerrero Jr. is X million dollars?" I'm here to tell you that those X million-dollar present value statements are incorrect. Why should people care if someone has misapplied the present value concept? Consider last week's report that Toronto's offer to Guerrero was close to $500 million, but the present value was closer to $450 million because of deferrals. As I will illustrate, the present value of Toronto's offer was possibly $321.1 million and considerably less than $450 million. Also, Guerrero's ask was likely much less than the reported $500 million present value figure. Therefore, the ensuing discussion among other media members and fans is significantly distorted because media reports include the present value error. Also, as an accountant, I am offended! (No, not really.) The best way to illustrate the present value error is three-fold. First, explain the present value concept. Second, review MLB's average annual value (AAV) calculation, and third, examine Shohei Ohtani's contract. Present Value How often has someone remarked that "a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow?" This expression is the principle behind the present value financial concept. Present value (PV) is the current value of all future cash flow streams. Consider the table below, courtesy of Initiatewebdevelopment.com. Suppose the interest rate is 8%, and there is neither credit risk nor income taxes. You would be indifferent if a person offered you $100 four years from now or $73.50 immediately. Why? Because you could invest the $73.50 at an annual compound 8% rate and have $100 in four years [$73.50 x (1+0.08)^4]. You can also find the answer in the present value table. Scroll down the Period column until you find the number 4, then along that row to the 8% column, where you will find the number 0.7350. Multiply $100 by 0.7350 to arrive at $73.50. The PV model is a valuable analysis tool. However, some people, including media members, misapply the PV concept. MLB's AAV Calculation For MLB's Competitive Balance Tax purposes, teams need to determine the AAV of each contract. For a given contract, if no deferrals exist, the calculation is straightforward: divide the total contract value by the term. For example, the AAV of a 10-year, $100-million contract with no deferrals is $10 million. If a contract has deferrals, the calculation is more complicated. FanGraphs' Jon Becker explained the AAV calculation for the Ohtani contract clearly. The Ohtani Contract The sticker price of the Ohtani deal was $700 million over 10 years. However, because of MLB practice, a value of the deferred payments is determined for CBT purposes. Accordingly, the PV of the first $68 million, deferred for 10 years, is $44.1 million. As per MLB practice, the same $44.1 million is used for the other nine deferred payments, and the sum of these deferred amounts is approximately $440.8 million. The same $44.1 million figure is used because the other nine deferred amounts are $68 million and are deferred for 10 years. To arrive at the $460.8 million CBT figure, add the $20 million salary paid during Ohtani's playing time. Therefore, for CBT purposes, the AAV is $46.1 million [($460.8 million) / 10). See Table 1 for the details. Many people will refer to the $460.8 million as the PV of the Ohtani deal, but that is incorrect. MLB uses the $460.8 million figure for CBT purposes, but it is not the PV of the Ohtani contract. What is the PV? Recall that the PV definition is the current value of all future streams of cashflows. The PV of all payments ($2 million annually in the first 10 years and $68 million annually in years 11 through 20) is $365.9 million (a 4.43% discount rate). As shown in Table 1, you arrive at the same $365.9 million amount if you calculate the PV of the $460.8 million CBT amount over 10 years. Why 10 years? Because the $460.8 million represents the total if the Dodgers were to pay Ohtani over 10 years. Hence, the PV of Ohtani's deal is $365.9 million, whether you discount the $700 million over 20 years or $460.8 million over 10 years. That constitutes a huge difference. If you're referring to the CBT figure, you're overstating the actual present value of Ohtani's contract by an enormous $94.9 million. In summary, be careful when someone states that the PV of a given contract is $X million. As illustrated above, that person probably unknowingly refers to the amount for CBT purposes, not the PV of the cashflows. Let's bring the PV concept to Guerrero and the reported contract demands and offers. Guerrero Jr. In the first paragraph, I linked to an MLB Trade Rumors article about a recent report on Guerrero's contract demands. According to the report, Guerrero is requesting a $500-million PV contract. Well, guess what? We have another PV misstatement. If Guerrero wants a 14-year deal with a $500 million PV, then a $707 million contract, paid equally throughout the 14-year term, generates a $500.0 million PV (5% discount rate). Given that Guerrero Jr. has stated that his ask was less than $600 million, and assuming 14 years is his desired term, the reported $500 million PV is another example of a PV misstatement. I suspect the $500 million figure refers to the number used for the CBT calculation. Another report had Toronto offering a deal close to $500 million. With deferrals, the reported PV was close to $450 million. Yep, PV misstatement alert! Let's run through an example that approximates Toronto's reported offer. Consider a 14-year, $490-million hypothetical contract. In each of the first seven years, the Blue Jays would defer the payment of $13 million to Guerrero for 14 years. In other words, in Year 1, $13 million is deferred and paid in Year 15, the same amount is deferred in Year 2 and paid in Year 16, and so on. All payments occur over 21 years. The amount for CBT purposes is $445 million, close to the erroneously reported $450 million PV figure. The actual PV of this hypothetical deal is $320.1 million (discounted at 5%). Contract Talk I will jump into the Guerrero Jr. contract estimate game, as shown in Table 2 below. Suppose Toronto would pay the $402.5 million over 14 years, with $13-million deferrals, as described in the $490-million example. Table 2's footnotes explain the calculation details. A contract worth $402.5 million is on the high side because there are some risks to consider. First, the projected performance does not factor in physical decline more than the average age-related deterioration. There are valid concerns regarding Guerrero's durability. Second, the estimate does not reflect a position change from first base to full-time DH, which would reduce his value to the team. Third, the projection assumes consistent year-to-year performance, ignoring the impact of aging. Guerrero's performance has not been consistent. Over the past four seasons, he's put up fWAR totals of 6.3, 3.3, 1.3, and 5.4; none of those figures is within 0.8 WAR of any of the others. If these risks materialize, the projected fWAR total is too high, and accordingly, the money paid by the Blue Jays will be excessive. Bringing the PV Lesson Home Consider Table 3. The first contract is my $402.5-million estimate, and the second is our prior $490-million deal. The third contract exemplifies Guerrero's $500-million PV contract ask. The sticker price is $545 million with the same deferral terms as the other Table 3 contracts. Let's talk PV. The PV of the $545-million deal is $359 million, higher than my $402.5-million deal (a $258.2-million PV). Put another way, the PV of the $545-million contract is 39% higher than the PV of my proposed deal. The $490-million contract has a PV that's 24% higher than my contract estimate. Given the risks I noted earlier, the PV premiums (39% and 24%) are considerable. If I were Ed Rogers, I would be very uncomfortable with a 14-year, $402.5-million Guerrero Jr. contract. The Last Word No matter how one feels about the sticker price of a Guerrero contract, the PV concept is a valuable analysis tool. When used appropriately, it allows the analyst to compare the actual values of contracts with different payment structures. The reader should ignore the typical claims that Guerrero's offer or request has a PV of X. Instead, calculate the correct PV of a given contract or ask an accountant to do it. View full article

My second favourite team are the Cardinals. Maybe I slipped an article draft to the Cardinals' Management before publication. :)

On the assumption that Swanson will miss a considerable amount of time, I think Toronto should immediately replace him with someone experienced in his later-inning role. Neither Macko nor Bloss fits that criterion. Also, Macko is out after knee surgery and is expected to miss at least the season's first month. Tate, who is signed, can fill the Swanson slot. I have no issue with Macko or Bloss vying for a regular bullpen role in non-late-inning/higher-leverage situations.

On Thursday, Erik Swanson will visit a specialist to have his ailing arm examined. Which replacement candidates could the Jays consider if the medical prognosis is a lengthy stint on the IL? Recently, I wrote about Erik Swanson 's importance to the Blue Jays bullpen. Although he struggled in 2024, his performance in the latter part of the season was encouraging. However, on March 10, manager John Schneider announced that Swanson would visit Dr. Keith Meister today. The good doctor is well-known in baseball circles. Last year, he performed season-ending surgeries on Alek Manoah, Ricky Tiedemman, and Brandon Barriera, among others. If Swanson were to miss a substantial portion, if not all, of the 2025 campaign, what options would be available to Toronto? There are some internal candidates, such as Ryan Burr, Tommy Nance, Ryan Yarbrough, and the recently-signed Dillon Tate. However, given Swanson's late-inning, high-leverage bullpen role, only Tate has the experience to replace Swanson in that capacity. None of Burr, Nance and Yarbrough has more than 88 career outings that came after the sixth inning. Swanson and Tate have 196 and 145, respectively. FanGraphs' free-agent tracker shows 15 unsigned free-agent relievers, including several well-known names. I used ZiPS Depth Chart projections for my list and selected the five pitchers with the best 2025 FIP estimates available to play now. Brooks Raley and Keynan Middleton ranked third and fifth in my FIP rankings, but the expectation is that neither will be available for the beginning of the season due to recovery from surgery. Tate ranks fourth on the FIP list after the Raley-Middleton exclusion. Table 1 below shows some key projections. Table 2 is a summary of key 2024 metrics. Let's examine each candidate. Joe Kelly Joe Kelly struggled in 2024. Shoulder issues plagued him, and according to RotoWire, his shoulder is not 100%. The 3.85 FIP estimate is respectable, but his 2024 xwOBA was higher than the average MLB reliever. Despite the 2024 blip, Kelly is an accomplished reliever. Nonetheless, I ruled him out because of his age and injury status. Craig Kimbrel For Craig Kimbrel, 2024 was the tale of two halves. In the first half, he posted a .280 xwOBA (77th percentile) and a 26.3 K%-BB%, better than the MLB average. In the second half, Kimbrel's xwOBA ballooned to .384 (first percentile), and his walk rate ballooned to 15.6%, nearly twice the league average. He was a Baltimore Oriole during the 2024 campaign, but the Orioles released him on September 24. Like Kelly, Kimbrel performed much better in previous seasons. Kimbrel is worth considering as a Swanson replacement, but he would be a distant third choice given his 2024 second-half collapse and age. Phil Maton Recently, Phil Maton has been inconsistent season-to-season. In 2024 and 2022, he recorded .320 xwOBA marks. In 2023 and 2021, Maton generated much better xwOBA scores of .274 and .294, respectively. ZiPS sees him as below average in 2025. I placed Maton fourth on my list mainly due to his inconsistency. David Robertson The group's elder statesman, David Robertson, had a good 2024 campaign, with excellent whiff, home run, groundball, and strikeout rates. Despite his age, Robertson has been healthy, with his only lengthy IL stint occurring in 2020, when he missed the season because of Tommy John surgery. ZiPS expects him to run the best FIP and strikeouts-minus-walk rate among the five relievers. Robertson's low home run rate is attractive because in 2024, the Blue Jays posted the highest rate among all bullpens. There are two negatives to Robertson's candidacy. First, he may be expensive. FanGraphs' estimated deal is one year, $10 million. However, since Opening Day is approaching, Robertson's market price could be lower. The second negative is age. At 40, his performance could fall off a cliff, particularly with no spring training game action. All things considered, Robertson would be my top choice. (A hat tip to Marie Illerbrun for suggesting candidate Robertson to me.) Dillon Tate The Blue Jays announced Tate's signing yesterday, and he is an interesting candidate. In his five-season career, his .300 xwOBA is better than than the league's .315 mark over the same period. His FIP is 3.98 is also more than a quarter of a run better than average. Notably, Tate missed the 2023 campaign due to arm issues. He returned in 2024 with the Orioles and posted a 3.57 FIP in 29 1/3 innings before July 1. Tate stumbled in July, and Baltimore demoted him. Baltimore designated Tate for assignment in August, and the Blue Jays claimed him off waivers on September 1. Tate generated a 3.47 FIP in 3 1/3 innings for the Blue Jays. but, the ballclub granted him free agency on November 22, 2024. Tate is a three-pitch pitcher: sinker, sweeper, and changeup, throwing the sinker just over half the time, the sweeper a third of the time, and mixing a changeup 13% of the time. In 2024, Tate's sinker fell to 92.6 mph, after averaging 94 in 2022. On the other hand, his sinker's average velocity was 91.6 in the first month of the season (121 pitches), 93.4 in May through July (175 pitches) and 92.5 in September (23 pitches). The change in velocity from 2022 to 2024 is not unusual for a pitcher who missed an entire season with arm issues. Therefore, Tate's 2025 sinker velocity could be more like the 2022 version and less like 2024. Throughout his career, Tate has posted below-average strikeout rates. He gets outs by inducing soft contact and by inviting batters to beat his sinker into the ground, but he was better at that in 2022, when he ran a 59% groundball rate, than in 2024, when he was at a (still well above-average) 51%. Furthermore, his edge rate (the percentage of pitches crossing the plate within one baseball's width of the strike zone's edges) dropped from 44% in 2022 to 37% in 2024. Suppose Tate regains some sinker velocity and locates a higher percentage of pitches on the edge of the strike zone. That could help him regain his 2022 form. I would rate Tate second on my list, but not far from to Robertson's perch. Tate should be a little cheaper, and at 31, his age is his favour. The Last Word Swanson is a critical member of the Blue Jays bullpen. However, given the question surrounding his availability to pitch, the Blue Jays may need a replacement for Swanson. Tate, is a reasonable choice. Robertson profiles as a better candidate, but the difference between the two is not significant. View full article

From family emergencies to injury to underperformance, everything went wrong for Erik Swanson in 2024. Can he turn it around? On November 16, 2022, the Blue Jays traded Teoscar Hernández for Erik Swanson and prospect Adam Macko. In his debut season with the Blue Jays, Swanson made 69 appearances and ran a 2.97 ERA and 3.04 xERA (which analyzes a pitcher's exit velocities and launch angles to predict their expected ERA). His 32% whiff rate put him in the 79th percentile of all pitchers. In short, Swanson was an essential member of Toronto's 2023 bullpen. Unfortunately, 2024 went very differently. Swanson ran a 5.03 ERA, and his 5.18 xERA was even worse. His whiff rate fell all the way to the 28th percentile, and he put up -0.7 fWAR. What Went Wrong in 2024? Two spring training developments affected Swanson's preparation for the 2024 campaign, and very likely his performance. The first and most significant event concerned his four-year-old son, Toby. On February 25, Toby was hit by an SUV and airlifted to a hospital. He recuperated in a pediatric intensive care unit and was released from the hospital on March 7. Naturally, Swanson took some time away from camp to be with his family during the ordeal. The second development was an injury. Soon after Swanson returned to camp, he suffered forearm stiffness. The injury and the absence limited Swanson to just two spring training appearances, in which he faced seven batters and threw 32 pitches. He started the season on the IL, making three rehab outings before his first appearance with the Blue Jays on April 17. Things didn't go well. Swanson ran a disastrous 9.77 ERA over his first 17 appearances, and the advanced stats didn't see much to like either. He ran a 7.34 FIP and a 55.8% hard-hit rate. The Blue Jays optioned Swanson to Buffalo on May 28. Things didn't get better. In 17 appearances with the Bisons, Swansons ERA and FIP were both up over 10.00. Nonetheless, he returned to an MLB mound on July 20. He ran a scary 4.95 FIP the rest of the way, but thanks to some serious luck, such as a 100% strand rate and a .185 BABIP, his ERA over that stretch was down to 2.55. Swanson's profile also changed significantly in 2024. His splitter lost some of its sink and some of its arm-side run, but more importantly, he stopped hitting the zone with it, frequently locating the pitch off the plate to his arm side. It stopped performing well, and he utilized it significantly less. The most dramatic change was to his slider. In 2023, the pitch averaged nearly 10 inches of induced rise, but in 2024, the pitch had nearly no rise at all. It essentially functioned like a gyro slider. The projection system ZiPS sees Swanson running a 3.91 ERA and 4.14 FIP in 2025, making him essentially a league-average reliever. However, there is a cautionary note. Swanson has had a setback at the current Spring Training. He experienced right elbow discomfort and will likely start the season on the IL. What Can Go Right In 2025? To answer the question above, we need to examine Swanson's 2024 more closely. The first positive sign was Swanson's improved xwOBA after his July 20 return from Buffalo. The chart below has the details. Before July 20, Swanson faced 70 batters. From the 71 plate appearances point on the chart, his rolling xwOBA moved steadily towards and ultimately below the MLB average xwOBA through to the end of the 2024 campaign. This trend is a positive sign for 2025. Swanson's performance improved after his second Buffalo stint. Although his numbers were not as good as the ones he put up in 2022 and 2023, they were much better than the pre-July 20 period. What changed? The answer lies in the pitch data. Pitch Data Table 1 shows the critical metrics for Swanson's three-pitch arsenal: four-seam fastball, splitter, and slider. Notably, the average velocity and spin rates of the 2024 pitches were similar to the velocities and spin rates of the same pitch types in 2022 and 2023. Compared to the pre-July 20 timeframe, Swanson's fastball produced better xSLG and Whiff% results, and the xISO related to his slider was better after July 19. Swanson's split-finger fastball was a more effective pitch after July 19. The xSLG, xISO and Whiff% numbers were similar to his 2022 and 2023 results. Let's take a closer look at the splitter. Why is my primary focus on the splitter? According to Baseball Savant's Run-Value metric, it has been Swanson's best pitch in recent years. His splitter's RV/100 (Run Value per 100 pitches) was +2.9 and +2.3 in 2023 and 2022, respectively. In 2024, the split-finger fastball's RV/100 was -2.9. On the good news front, Swanson's splitter generated a +2.5 RV/100 after July 19. For Swanson to succeed in 2025, he needs an effective splitter. The Attack Zones The Attack Zone chart below details Baseball Savant's zones in and around the plate. Except for the Shadow Zone, the other zones do not require an explanation. However, the Shadow Zone is worth examining. The Shadow Zone is the width of two baseballs. I split the Shadow Zone into an inner zone and an outer zone; the inner zone resides within the strike zone, and the outer zone does not. I created the inner and outer zones to dive deeper into why Swanson's splitter was more effective after July 19. There are two reasons of note. First, Swanson's split-finger fastball generated lower xSLG numbers in the Heart Zone and both sectors of the Shadow Zone. Second, after July 19, Swanson located a higher percentage of pitches into the outer rather than the inner section of the Shadow zone. Hence, batters connected on more pitches in an area (the outer zone) where it is more challenging to make good contact. Tables 2 and 3 show the particulars. Other possible factors contributing to Swanson's better performance in the post-July 19 period include pitch sequencing and more reps. In summary, Swanson's improved performance after his return, mainly due to a more effective splitter and, to a lesser extent, the four-seam fastball, bodes well for 2025. How Will This Impact the Blue Jays? Among MLB reliever corps, Toronto's 2024 bullpen ranked near the bottom in many metrics. The Blue Jays' crew was 28th in WPA and 30th in FIP and fWAR. For Toronto to contend for a playoff spot in 2025, they will need better bullpen results. Toronto's signing of Jeff Hoffman and the re-signing of Yimi García should bolster the reliever squad. However, Toronto would benefit significantly from a return to form by Swanson. Why? Because Swanson was an essential member of Toronto's 2023 bullpen. He was primarily a set-up man (74% of his outings started in the seventh and eighth inning), and he appeared in the ninth inning in 13 of his 69 (19%) appearances. If Swanson can return to his 2023 form, he would provide Manager John Schneider with another high-quality, late-game option in the bullpen. The 2025 Blue Jays undoubtedly count on Swanson's improved performance. The Last Word Swanson likely wants to put the 2024 season in the rearview mirror. However, his numbers improved after returning to Toronto for the balance of the 2024 season. In particular, his split-finger fastball, his most important pitch in recent years, was very effective after he departed Buffalo in July. On the assumption that Swanson's current injury woes will not materially affect his performance, Swanson should be a key member of Toronto's bullpen, as he was in 2023. View full article

Baseball Savant has a breakdown of where Vlad struggles. In 2024, he was noticeably below average when he had to move in to field a ball (-6 OAA). Also, in my opinion, quickness is more important than 90 ft Running Speeds when evaluating a first baseman's fielding ability. Accordingly, Baseball Savant data shows that Vlad is not quick in shorter distances. https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/leaderboard/outs_above_average?type=Fielder&startYear=2021&endYear=2024&split=yes&team=TOR&range=year&min=q&pos=3&roles=&viz=hide&sort=2&sortDir=desc https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/running_splits?type=percent&bats=&year=2024&position=3&team=&min=5

Yes, the ZiPS DC model shows Rodriguez, Bloss, Manoah and Macko as starters 6 through 9. Unfortunately, Shi Davidi reported today that "Canadian lefty prospect Adam Macko has a meniscus tear in his left knee, said Blue Jays manager John Schneider. Macko felt something during a weekend side and has an appointment Wednesday. He's looking at a probable surgery, added Schneider." Certainly, Burr and Lauer are options.

In 2024, Toronto’s rotation was in the middle of the pack. ZiPS offers hope for better starting pitching in 2025. Let's return to the halcyon days of 2023, when the Blue Jays starting rotation performed very well. The group posted a 3.85 ERA and a 12.6 fWAR in 895 innings, which ranked second, fourth, and fourth among American League teams, respectively. However, the 2024 staff did not perform as well, as evidenced by their 3.95 ERA (which ranked ninth), 10.6 fWAR (also ninth), and 862 innings pitched (sixth). Although their 3.95 ERA was similar to 2023's 3.85 mark, it is misleading because the offensive environment changed. In 2023, the Toronto rotation ran a 91 ERA-, meaning it was 9% better than league average; in 2024, it was 99, just 1% better. So how will Blue Jay starters perform in 2025? I will use ZiPS DC projections to answer that question, focusing on two critical aspects of starting rotations: quality and depth. Model Talk Many attribute the quote above to George E. P. Box, a British mathematician. It underscores the idea that while no model can perfectly predict the future, some can provide valuable insights. This idea is particularly relevant to our discussion. The ZiPS DC model is a widely respected and comprehensive forecasting model that considers various performance metrics and historical data to project future player performance. Quality Baseball fans are accustomed to arguing about whether a pitcher should be categorized as a number one starter, number two starter, or even lower. The answer depends on the definition of each role. I address the issue by applying a metric-based framework. For a given metric, I define a number one starter as one whose metric (ERA, for example) is in the top 20% of starters. A number two is a starter who posted an ERA that fell into the next 20% of starters, and so on. I used ERA as my metric of choice for the analysis to follow. Table 1 shows the percentile breakpoints/thresholds for 2023 starters, and Table 2 concerns 2024. In 2023, five of Toronto's starters were either a one or a two, which explains, in part, why the Blue Jays' 2023 starter group had the second-lowest ERA among AL teams. Last season, according to this model, a starter with an ERA of 3.36 or lower was a number one. Between 3.36 and 3.77 made a pitcher a number two. A number five had an ERA higher than 4.99. Table 2 reflects the slots for Toronto's 2024 pitchers. Only Bowden Francis qualified as a number one. The Blue Jays had one number two (José Berríos), two number threes (Kevin Gausman and Chris Bassitt), and two number fours (Yusei Kikuchi and Yariel Rodríguez). Toronto's 2024 starter crew had less concentration in one and two slots than the prior season and, accordingly, posted an inferior overall ERA. 2025 Projection The ZiPS DC forecast predicts that Blue Jay starters will outperform the 2024 group. Table 3 provides the details. The projected ERA distribution is narrow. Toronto's fifth-best ERA (3.94) is just 0.11 points away from Tampa's second-lowest ERA (3.83) and 0.12 points lower than Kansas City's tenth-best ERA (4.06). The key takeaway is that the ZiPS DC model projects the Blue Jays' starting rotation to perform better. Let's delve into the specifics. Table 4 shows the projected ERAs of Toronto's starters and how those pitchers slot into the starter framework. The ZiPS DC forecast estimates better ERA seasons than 2024 for Gausman, Max Scherzer (3.61 versus 3.95), and Rodríguez. According to the projection, Alex Manoah (3.70 in 2024), Berríos and Francis should see higher ERAs than they produced last season. In summary, the ZiPS DC model projects the Blue Jays' starting rotation (on a relative basis) to outperform last season's crew and potentially rank among the top five American League rotations in 2025. This projection should fuel excitement among Blue Jays fans about the potential strength of Toronto's starters and the team's overall performance in the upcoming season. Depth Last season, MLB teams used an average of 13 different starters. Thus, the average team required another eight starters in addition to the five on the Opening Day roster. Accordingly, some MLB observers will determine how good the depth of a team's 2025 starting rotation will be by the quality of starters six through 13. However, the need for eight additional starters (13 less the top five) is somewhat misleading for three reasons: the distribution of starts, the average performance level from starters outside of the top five, and opener usage. The Distribution of Starts While the average MLB team will likely use approximately 13 starters in 2025, the distribution of starts is not even. Consider Table 5. In 2024, on average, five pitchers made 76% of all starts, and nine appeared in 94%. Therefore, four pitchers covered the other 6% (approximately 10 games). Suppose the quality of a pitcher decreases as one reaches further down into the organization. Therefore, a team will mitigate the reduced performance level of starters six through 13 because those pitchers will not start as many games as the top five, which is the superior starter group. I will address performance levels in the next section. Concerning the 2024 Blue Jays, five hurlers made 85% of the starts, and nine racked up 99% of the outings. In total, the Blue Jays used ten starters last season. Do you remember Paolo Espino and his 9.00 ERA? Performance Levels The second reason the average number of starters figures can be misleading is that performance levels are different between starter groups. Table 6 shows ERA figures for various groups. In 2024, the MLB average starter ERA was 4.15. However, the average ERA for the top five was 4.02, 4.68 for the next four, and 4.71 for the other starters. Concerning playoff teams, the numbers are 3.72, 4.68, and 5.27, respectively. Accordingly, a team would be satisfied if starters six through nine and 10 to 13 produced ERAs lower than 4.68 and 4.71, respectively. Therefore, the ERA expected from starters six to 13 should be higher than the average MLB starter ERA. Hence, it is okay if starters outside the top five are inferior. The ERA of the top five Blue Jays starters was slightly higher than the MLB average for a top five (4.07 versus 4.02). Still, the other four starters generated a 3.00 ERA, MLB's second-lowest in the six to nine groupings. Those pitchers were Francis (2.92), Manoah (3.70), Ryan Burr (3.38) and Trevor Richards (0.00). Opener Usage Teams can minimize the number of starters called up from the minors by using openers and swingmen such as Rodríguez. Therefore, having 13 pitchers start games does not necessarily mean that a ball club must look deeply into its minor league teams. A ballclub may have spot starters in the bullpen. Given the reasons noted above, a team's task of starting 13 different pitchers is not as daunting as it may seem. Onto the final projection! 2025 Starter Groups' Projection The reader can find Toronto's ZiPS DC projection here. In Table 7, I arranged Blue Jays' starters into the Top Five, Next Four, and Top Nine. The 2025 forecast should encourage Blue Jays fans. According to the ZiPS DC model, Toronto's Top Five slots in as the equivalent of a number two starter, the Next Four as a number three, and the Top Nine as a number two. (Toronto is projected only to need nine starters this season). Given the ZiPS DC projections, the 2025 Blue Jays should have a deep, high-quality starting rotation. The Last Word Toronto's 2024 starting rotation did not perform as well as the 2023 crew. However, ZiPS forecasts that the Blue Jays' 2025 starter group may rank in the top five of American League teams. Furthermore, Toronto's pitching depth should be a competitive advantage. Overall, the Blue Jays' starting rotation holds promise for the upcoming season. View full article

Marcus, nice to see you. The charts and tables have found a new home! Jim Scott also joined the Jays Centre team. I expect he will post an article in a week or so.

Thanks, Terry! It is nice to be scribbling again.

Thanks for reading. That is a lot of money! :) Finding playing time for both Alonso and Bregman would be a real challenge. In addition to the plate appearances from the players I noted (Clement, Barger, and Springer), you would have to reduce the plate appearances of others (for example, Wagner, Schneider, more from Springer, etc.) by approximately 700.