Article: The Blue Jays and the New Efficiency

[Jim Scott]

Is Toronto's focus on defense a new efficiency? A way to add high-floor, high-ceiling players that other teams overlooked or undervalued?

Back in the day, the bullpen was considered of secondary importance. A team might spend big on an elite closer (*whimper,* B.J. Ryan, *whimper*) but the remainder of the ‘pen was reserved for aging starters or pitchers who were never quite good enough for a rotation spot.

In 2014, the Kansas City Royals were looking to contend. But as a small-market team, they could not just buy their way to success. Instead, they had to find value where other teams did not. Thus, the three-headed monster was born. The Royals signed Wade Davis to go with standouts Kelvin Herrera and Greg Holland, giving the back of their bullpen three of the best arms in baseball. Other teams scoffed, saying spending $22 million out of a $110-million total payroll on three bullpen arms was crazy. But Kansas City was crazy like a fox. They went 72-1 when they had the lead after seven innings, and made the Wild Card (by only two games – if they had gone 69-4, they would have missed the playoffs). They rode their elite bullpen all the way to the World Series in 2014, and won it in 2015.

Since then, other teams have placed greater value on the bullpen, and have been looking for the next big efficiency – something that can help a team win but is underappreciated by other teams and therefore undervalued on the market. Is it possible that the Jays have found it? Wins Above Replacement (WAR) has become the catch-all baseball stat. Each major website (and each team) has its own version. The formulae they use to calculate WAR are similar but not identical, which is why we have fWAR (FanGraphs), bWAR (Baseball Reference), and WARP (Baseball Prospectus). One of the largest sources of difference between fWAR and bWAR measures is the metrics the two sites use to award credit for defence. It is an old adage that a run saved equals a run earned, but bWAR (which uses Sports Info Systems' Defensive Runs Saved to measure defense and fWAR (which uses Statcast's Fielding Run Value) can sometimes differ quite a bit in their evaluations of the same playe.

Suppose that the Jays internal defensive metrics hew closer to the grades of DRS, and therefore bWAR.  What does this mean for player value? Well, consider the last three seasons. Which players had the highest total bWAR? If you guessed names like Aaron Judge, Mookie Betts, Juan Soto, and Shohei Ohtani in the top four, you would be right. But would you have guessed Andrés Giménez at number 10, or Daulton Varsho at number 20? (Remember, this is in all of baseball). And if you only look at defensive WAR, the top two players in baseball in that period were (surprise, surprise) Giménez at 8.0 and Varsho at 7.8 (in case you were curious, Ke’Bryan Hayes was third at 6.7).

The Jays’ defensive excellence does not stop there. It is said that a team needs defence most “up the middle” – catcher, shortstop and centre field. So if the Jays were emphasizing defence, you would expect “Captain” Kirk to be no slouch either. No surprise – among full-time catchers, Kirk’s defensive bWAR over those three years is tied for third in baseball.

But defence alone does not win ballgames. Ideally, you would want your elite defensive players to also have the potential to contribute with the bat – though, from an acquisition standpoint, it would help keep the price down if they had not yet achieved that potential, or if they were coming off a down year. And all three of the Jays defensive stalwarts have that upside. As recently as 2022, Kirk was at 129 wRC+, Giménez was at 141(!) and Varsho was at 106. But in 2024, all three struggled – Kirk at a 94 wRC+, Giménez at 83, and Varsho at 99. The Jays are in a good position with these three players. If they only maintain 2024 batting levels, their elite defence ensures solid production: in 2024, Giménez put up 4.0 bWAR, Kirk put up 2.0 in just 398 PAs, and Varsho put up 5.0. But if their offense regresses to the mean at all, then all three could well be All-Stars. It is rare to find a high-floor, high-ceiling player – the Jays have three of them.

The Bottom Line

It is easy to suggest that a team improve by signing all the big-name Ohtanis and Sotos, and extending the Guerreros (or, in my opinion better yet, the Bichettes – but that is another story) but the reality is that players of that calibre have many options and do not come cheaply or easily. For a team (not named the Dodgers) to succeed, they need to resource intelligently and efficiently. And that means finding value where others don’t. That can be difficult, but as an old baseball fan once said, in difficulty there is opportunity.

 

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[LA Transplant]

Interestingly, all three of these guys had by far their best years in 2022 and have declined since in terms of power, average, OBP and, of course, OPS. And yet, in all three cases, their BB to SO ratios haven't changed much. So there's something in their approach at the plate that has changed. No idea what that might be, but I couldn't help but notice that Gimenez was hit by à pitch 27 times in '22 (!), then considerably fewer times in each of the next two years. Does this correlate in any way with his reduced power over those two years? Was he right on top of the plate in '22? Has he moved back off the plate since? 

[Northstar123]

All three of those guys just need a little more offence for them to be great. I don't get Kirk's lack of offence as he has such a good bat. Incredible feel for hitting or used to.

[GNick92]

At catcher, cf and short will work. But you need offense with it. But yeah, if you put a million dollar a year gold glove in those 3 positions, you should have extra cash to add big in major spots. For example, A gold glove .650 SS makes low money but gives you 2-3WAR. Bo is making 17.5m, his average WAR is 4.6. Doing it in 3 positions you have extra 50 million to spend. While losing only 4-5WAR. 

[Brownie19]

[John_Havok]

Yet another "here's a thought that just popped in my head, lets write an article" article. 

 

[Nexii]

Is there any proof that defense-based WAR is cheaper than offense-based? I feel like teams have figured out these market efficiencies already. That being said there are probably defensive metrics teams are researching and valuing that aren't available to just anyone. 

[Brock Beauchamp]

1 hour ago, Nexii said:

Is there any proof that defense-based WAR is cheaper than offense-based? I feel like teams have figured out these market efficiencies already. That being said there are probably defensive metrics teams are researching and valuing that aren't available to just anyone. 

When breaking down individual players, I don't think defense is much cheaper than offense.

I think the interesting model to look at is teams like the Brewers. They're above-average at almost every position and in the most Brewers-y way, they keep overperforming expectations almost every year.

Are they looking at defense as a whole? As an example, it's less about the CF's individual metrics and more about how the LF, CF, and RF metrics combine together. We've certainly (mostly) moved past getting an edge from pursuing elite up-the-middle players but what about looking at how the individual pieces work together as a whole? Is that the current inefficiency?

I don't know.

[ian]

Good article, love the defense those r guys bring up the middle, but to use a cliche the other way, they're not playing catch, they're playing baseball and need to be able hit big league pitching condistently. Lookkng at your war comparisons i have one question is the degree of difficulty of hitting a 100 mph fastball compared to catching a flyball calculated in any way. 

[Spanky99]

lol, hasn't worked out to well, now has it? 

[Terry Mesmer]

>The Royals signed Wade Davis

Jim! Come on! The Royals traded for Davis. And he was not as a reliever at the time. Davis failed badly in the KCR rotation before they moved him to the bullpen.