Sam Charles

When Toronto committed four years and $60 million to the former Nippon Professional Baseball star before the 2026 season, the organization believed it was acquiring a dependable middle-of-the-order bat capable of supplying right-handed power, producing 25 to 35 home runs annually and helping stabilize a lineup that needed another run producer. After one season, that signing and its rationale look like a good call. Kazuma Okamoto finished his rookie campaign with 33 home runs and a .762 OPS while showing enough underlying offensive quality to suggest there may be another level still available as he becomes more accustomed to major league pitching. FanGraphs prospect analyst Eric Longenhagen projected Okamoto as roughly a 2.0 to 2.5-WAR player annually when Toronto signed him and suggested there was a chance he could ultimately outperform the value of his contract. If his strikeout rate comes down even modestly, it isn't difficult to envision his overall offensive production taking another step forward. That strikeout rate remains the biggest question surrounding his long-term outlook. Okamoto struck out in 28.8 percent of his plate appearances during his first major league season, a dramatic jump from the exceptionally low 11 percent mark he posted during his final season in Japan. There were stretches where he looked uncomfortable at the plate. At times, he appeared caught between approaches, reacting late to velocity at the top of the strike zone and struggling to stay balanced against breaking pitches beneath it. Some at-bats ended with awkward defensive swings. Others featured called strike three on pitches he may not have encountered frequently during his NPB career. In those moments, he resembled a player still processing the adjustments necessary to succeed against the deepest collection of pitching talent in the world. Then there were other stretches where none of those concerns seemed to exist. When Okamoto was locked in, he swung freely and confidently. The powerful swing that made him one of Japan's premier sluggers was evident. He drove fastballs with authority, punished mistakes and showed a willingness to attack pitches early in counts when opportunities presented themselves. During those periods, he looked like exactly the hitter the Blue Jays believed they were signing. The back-and-forth and ups-and-downs became one of the defining characteristics of his rookie season. Rarely did Okamoto look completely overmatched, but at the same time, he never seemed totally at ease. There was a noticeable difference between his worst stretches and his best ones, but both versions existed throughout the season. For decades, teams evaluating NPB talent have wrestled with the challenge of projecting how offensive performance will translate to Major League Baseball. The differences extend beyond pure talent. MLB pitchers generally throw harder and benefit from more analytical preparation. There is less room to hide weaknesses and fewer opportunities to consistently face below-average pitching. Hitters coming from Japan frequently encounter difficulties with elevated fastballs and sharp breaking pitches below the zone. Pitch sequencing is often more aggressive, while the physical and mental demands of a 162-game schedule can create additional challenges. Learning those patterns takes time, particularly for players arriving in their late 20s or early 30s. Before arriving in Toronto, Okamoto established himself as one of the most accomplished power hitters in Japan. Across parts of 11 seasons with the Yomiuri Giants, he compiled a .277/.361/.521 slash line while producing six consecutive 30-home run campaigns beginning in 2018. During that stretch, he emerged as one of NPB's most consistent offensive performers, reaching a career-high 41 home runs in 2023 and regularly ranking among the league leaders in power production. Since 2019, only Munetaka Murakami has hit more home runs in NPB than Okamoto. His final season in Japan may have provided the strongest indication that he was prepared for a new challenge. Although an elbow injury limited his playing time, he delivered a .327 batting average, a .416 on-base percentage and a .598 slugging percentage while striking out in only 11 percent of his plate appearances. His offensive value in Japan stemmed from a combination of power, plate discipline and contact ability. Evaluators believed those skills would eventually allow him to adapt to major league pitching, even if there was likely to be turbulence during the transition. The encouraging aspect of his rookie season is that many of the underlying indicators remained strong despite the decline in batting average and rise in strikeouts. Okamoto hit .232 with a .310 on-base percentage and a .452 slugging percentage in his first MLB campaign. According to Baseball Savant, he posted a 90.6 mph average exit velocity, a 13.1 percent barrel rate and a 44.1 percent hard-hit rate. His barrel percentage ranked in the 89th percentile among major league hitters. If he can make slightly more contact without sacrificing that power profile, the offensive returns will improve quickly. While he did strike out a lot, Okamoto did demonstrate patience at the plate. He posted a 9.3 percent walk rate and maintained a chase rate close to league average (even with some of those uncomfortable swings). Often, players struggling with swing decisions or pitch recognition see significant increases in chase rate. Okamoto seemed to avoid that problem. His issue was not expanding the strike zone recklessly. It was making enough contact against the highest-quality pitching he had ever faced. One of the biggest advantages pitchers possess during a player's first season is familiarity. Opposing teams learn a hitter's weaknesses quickly, while the hitter spends months gathering information about pitch shapes, release points and sequencing patterns throughout the league. As that catalogue of experience grows, offensive adjustments often follow. There were already signs of that process occurring during parts of Okamoto's rookie campaign. During several slumps, he appeared willing to make cautious adjustments rather than stubbornly sticking with unsuccessful approaches. Those changes did not eliminate his strikeout issues entirely, but they often helped him get out of slumps. That willingness to adapt may ultimately be one of the most important takeaways from his first season. From the Jays' perspective, the contract was never built around superstar expectations. The organization signed Okamoto believing he could become a reliable source of middle-of-the-order production while supplying consistent power. Through one season, he appears well on track to meet that objective. Defensively, advanced metrics graded him below average in several categories, but that was never expected to be the foundation of his value. His importance rests almost entirely on his bat and his ability to lengthen the lineup. Looking ahead, a realistic outcome may be a hitter who settles into the .245-to-.260 batting average range while continuing to provide 30 or more home runs annually. If the strikeout rate declines even slightly, his on-base percentage could improve significantly and an OPS north of .800 becomes a realistic possibility. The ceiling may not be MVP-calibre in the way it occasionally appeared during his peak years in Japan, but that was never the expectation. The Blue Jays simply need a dependable run producer capable of hitting in the heart of the order, punishing mistakes and providing consistent power throughout a long season. After his first year in the majors, Okamoto has already shown he can be that player. The next step is becoming a more complete version of that hitter. Given the quality of his contact, his willingness to adjust and the flashes he displayed throughout a promising rookie campaign, there is legitimate reason to believe his best seasons in Toronto may still be ahead of him. View full article

The Toronto Blue Jays entered baseball's last great labour war as defending champions. They emerged from it as a franchise whose greatest era was suddenly over. Thirty-two years later, the Blue Jays and their fans are approaching another labour deadline, and the history of 1994 offers a reminder that a work stoppage does not affect every club equally. Sometimes it arrives at exactly the wrong moment. There is a temptation, whenever baseball's owners and players begin drifting toward another labour confrontation, to think about the dispute primarily in league-wide terms. Salary caps. Luxury taxes. Revenue sharing. Free agency. Competitive balance. For the Toronto Blue Jays, there is another way to think about it. Think about timing. Because Toronto has been here before. In August 1994, the Blue Jays were the two-time defending World Series champions. They still possessed Roberto Alomar, Joe Carter, John Olerud, Devon White and much of the identity of the club that had conquered baseball in 1992 and 1993. Then baseball stopped. When it returned in April 1995, Toronto discovered something uncomfortable: a championship window can close. The current MLB collective bargaining agreement expires at 11:59 p.m. ET on December 1, 2026. The two sides remain divided on consequential economic issues, most notably the owners' pursuit of a salary cap, which has encountered strong resistance from the MLB Players Association. Commissioner Rob Manfred has publicly said MLB wants a deal and intends to play in 2027, but reporting around the negotiations has described an owner-imposed lockout after the season as a serious possibility. When a labour dispute collides with a team’s competitive window, there isn’t much that can be done. The Jays weren’t great in 1994. Their record was 55-60 when the players walked out in August 1994. The Jays who returned in 1995 operated under a different general manager, Gord Ash, after Pat Gillick resigned following the 1994 season. Several championship veterans were approaching the end of their Toronto careers. The franchise was simultaneously dealing with ownership changes. The Jays would go on to have six losing seasons between 1995 and 2004. They only had four losing seasons the following 10 years. Today, the Jays are operating at an enormous financial commitment heading into whenever next season will begin. Current public payroll estimates put Toronto's 2026 cash payroll at roughly $275 million to $294 million, depending on methodology, with an estimated competitive balance tax payroll north of $315 million. That spending indicates that Ross Atkins and the front office, along with Rogers, feel like this team is in a competitive window. The league's pursuit of a salary cap is one of the principal fault lines in the current negotiations. MLB presents payroll restraint as part of the solution to competitive balance concerns, while the players view a cap as a mechanism for suppressing labour costs. Toronto is a wealthy organization operating in a major market that has chosen to spend heavily in pursuit of a championship. Under today's rules, ownership can decide how aggressively it is willing to push payroll, accepting progressively heavier competitive balance tax consequences in the process. If a salary cap comes into play, that will most likely change the way organizations build their teams. If owners impose a lockout after the CBA expires, free agent signings and trades involving major league players would cease for the duration, just as they did during the 2021-22 lockout. That creates the possibility of a busy period immediately following the 2026 season. Teams could have a relatively brief window to make decisions before the labour agreement expires, followed by a transaction freeze of unknowable length. All teams, including the Jays, will basically be preparing for two versions of 2027. One under familiar rules and another under rules that have yet to be negotiated. In 1995, Ash inherited a club whose championship past seemed to obscure the cracks in the foundation. The roster was aging, and reinforcements weren’t ready. Instead of rebuilding, Ash decided to test the core. The acquisition of David Cone was effectively a bet that enough championship DNA remained to make another run possible. By July, the standings had delivered their verdict, and Cone was traded to the Yankees. By the following winter, Alomar, White, Paul Molitor and Al Leiter were among the significant players leaving Toronto. The Jays then shifted focus to the future, with players such as Shawn Green, Carlos Delgado and Shannon Stewart. Almost unnoticed amid a brutal 1995 season, the Jays used the 17th overall selection in that year's draft on a high school pitcher named Roy Halladay. The 1994 work stoppage also impacted attendance. Despite the strike-shortened seasons, fans came out. But the combination of labour bitterness and a rapidly deteriorating team changed the relationship between the franchise and its audience. The team went from nearly three million fans (averaging 39,257 per game) to 1.6 million (20,221 per game) in 2002. In 1994, the ultimate consequence was catastrophic for the sport, as the World Series was cancelled. The run of labour peace that followed lasted until owners imposed the 99-day lockout before the 2022 season. The Blue Jays can’t control whether MLB and the MLBPA reach an agreement. They can, however, control how prepared they are for the possibilities. If the current dispute produces only an offseason lockout and baseball starts on time, the interruption may ultimately be remembered much like 2021-22. If it consumes regular season games, however, Toronto will have lost something that cannot be restored through compensatory draft picks or clever accounting. It may lose its window. View full article

There's a reason baseball plays 162 regular season games. Over six months, flaws are exposed, depth is tested and the most complete teams usually rise to the top. Heading into 2026, the Toronto Blue Jays appeared poised for another playoff run and perhaps some redemption after their Game 7 World Series loss the previous year. Instead, they finished 79-83 and last in the American League East, a stunning reversal from their 2025 pennant-winning season. The offence collapsed. Toronto scored just 648 runs, the fewest in Major League Baseball. The Jays also ranked last in home runs (152), 26th in on-base percentage (.310) and 29th in slugging percentage (.381). The pitching staff held up considerably better, finishing among the league's better run-prevention units despite a relentless wave of injuries. The 12 playoff teams who reached this year’s postseason did so through different methods. Some relied on stars, some on depth and others on elite player development. There is no single formula for success, but there are lessons to be learned. The Blue Jays do not need to become the Dodgers, Brewers or Rays. Instead, they’ll undoubtedly study what those teams did to build rosters capable of winning. Toronto's 2025 club had a clear identity. It got on base, made contact and created pressure throughout the lineup. In 2026, much of that disappeared. The Blue Jays remained difficult to strike out and finished ninth in batting average, but the contact often produced little damage. They finished last in runs, last in home runs and near the bottom of the league in slugging percentage. The best teams in baseball weren't dependent on a single strength. The Dodgers paired elite offensive talent with frontline pitching. The Yankees combined power with strong run prevention. The Brewers won with depth, versatility and outstanding pitching. Tampa Bay, as they normally do, relied on organizational depth and player development. Even teams with obvious flaws generally possessed enough strengths elsewhere to compensate. When the Blue Jays' offence disappeared in 2025, there was no fallback. Unless Brett Bateman's energy counted as an emergency offensive strategy, the club rarely had an answer when its primary strengths vanished. Championship contenders are rarely perfect, just like the 2025 Jays. Those teams are simply built to withstand adversity better than everyone else. The Dodgers remain the gold standard for a reason. Their roster is loaded with impact players capable of changing a game at any moment. Concentrating elite talent raises both a team's floor and its ceiling. When one star struggles, another often fills the void. That approach also costs a lot of money. The Blue Jays already spend like a large-market team. They do not need to match Los Angeles player for player, but they do need more impact from the top of their roster. At the same time, the Brewers demonstrated that depth can be a competitive advantage. Milwaukee entered October following the best regular season in franchise history with a roster built on versatility and quality pitching. It probably doesn't hurt that visiting hitters occasionally seem convinced the roof at American Family Field has Gold Glove-calibre range. Toronto's depth looked adequate entering the season, but injuries exposed just how thin that margin can be. At least 28 players spent time on the injured list. No team can completely prepare for that level of attrition. However, the best organizations continually replenish talent and avoid becoming overly dependent on a small group of players. The lesson is not to choose between stars and depth. The lesson is that contenders need both. No organization illustrates depth better than the Rays. Tampa Bay won the AL East with a 98-64 record despite operating under dramatically different financial constraints than Toronto. Year after year, the Rays identify value, develop players and replace departing contributors without dramatically changing their competitiveness. The Blue Jays do not need to adopt Tampa Bay's financial model, but there is value in emulating its ability to continuously generate contributors. Contending teams need inexpensive players capable of filling meaningful roles. They need prospects who can step into the lineup. They need a development pipeline that reduces the need to solve every problem through free agency. To their credit, Toronto appears to be moving in that direction through recent drafts and acquisitions. The challenge now is continuing to create opportunities for those players. The Yankees offered another important reminder this season. Although they reached October as a wild-card club, they possessed one of the strongest run differentials among American League playoff teams. They backed that up by dominating Boston in the opening round. Over a full season, run differential tends to reveal how strong a team actually is. Good teams do not spend six months surviving one-run games and bullpen escapes. They consistently outplay opponents and build separation on the scoreboard. Toronto finished with a minus-46 run differential, scoring 648 runs while allowing 694. The Blue Jays pitched well enough to remain competitive in many games, but they simply did not score enough. Pitching can keep a team afloat, but offensive shortcomings eventually catch up. The Cubs and Guardians demonstrated opposite versions of the same lesson. Cleveland reached the postseason despite offensive limitations because its pitching staff provided a strong foundation. Toronto can relate to that. Despite the disappointing season, the Blue Jays still finished with a respectable 3.90 ERA. Dylan Cease was especially outstanding, posting a 2.40 ERA with 239 strikeouts in 169 innings. The Cubs arrived in October with one of baseball's better offences but legitimate questions on the mound despite the addition of Kevin Gausman. Those concerns quickly surfaced during their brief postseason appearance. The takeaway for Toronto is straightforward: No single strength can cover every weakness indefinitely. Putting the ball in play cannot permanently offset a lack of power. Great pitching cannot fully compensate for one of baseball's weakest offences. Strong bullpens cannot rescue every close game. The deeper teams advance into October, the more complete they tend to be. The playoff field offered many different models for success, but several consistent themes emerged. First, Toronto needs another legitimate middle-of-the-order hitter. Second, the organization needs Vladimir Guerrero Jr. to return to being a foundational offensive force. Third, adding at least one dependable starting pitcher should remain a priority. Cease gives the Blue Jays an ace, but the injuries of 2026 demonstrated the danger of relying on optimistic health projections. Fourth, Toronto needs a deeper and more versatile bench capable of surviving inevitable injuries. Fifth, the club should continue giving younger players meaningful opportunities to earn roles. Sixth, roster additions should complement existing strengths and weaknesses. Another contact-oriented hitter would only reinforce an existing imbalance. This lineup needs more power and more on-base ability. Finally, the Blue Jays should preserve what worked. Run prevention remained respectable despite extensive injuries. Cease emerged as a frontline starter. Okamoto delivered 33 home runs. Several younger players showed promise. The task is to repair the roster, not demolish it. The Blue Jays fell from fourth in MLB in runs scored in 2025 to last in 2026. They lost more than power. They lost on-base ability, lineup depth and the capacity to absorb underperformance. Injuries then attacked the pitching depth that might otherwise have kept them competitive. This year's playoff teams showed there is more than one route back to contention. The most important lesson from October is not that the Blue Jays need to become the Dodgers, Brewers or Rays. It is that championship teams are built to remain dangerous when things go wrong. Toronto's 2026 team wasn't. Its next roster must be. View full article

The Blue Jays spent last winter believing in the team that nearly won the World Series. The greater mistake may have been continuing to believe after the team sputtered out of the gate. Toronto finished 79-83, a rough reversal for a club that spent aggressively over the winter and entered the season expecting to contend. The problem wasn't one decision. It was a pattern. The front office and coaching staff repeatedly chose patience over disruption, trusting that established players, clubhouse chemistry and the memories of 2025 would eventually pull the club back into contention. The Jays are just the 10th MLB team in history to bookend a World Series appearance with losing seasons. The Rangers did it most recently in 2023. Sure, Toronto eventually traded Kevin Gausman, Daulton Varsho and Jeff Hoffman, but not until the trade deadline. George Springer and Ernie Clement remained. So did Shane Bieber and Max Scherzer. There were moments when it looked like the Jays would sneak into the playoffs, but they frequently acted as though the 2025 version of the team would rematerialize. It never did. Now, Springer will walk with nothing in return. Clement looked more like a journeyman than an All-Star during the second half. Trading him (and his team control) at his peak value ahead of the trade deadline might have provided a strong prospect haul. The Jays may have finished second in 2025, but they were not the second-best team in baseball from a talent and performance perspective. They managed to play mistake-free baseball for the most part while peaking at the right time. Toronto's 2025 position players led baseball with 44 Fielding Runs Above Average, and the Jays finished second in the American League in runs. Springer, Vladimir Guerrero Jr., Bo Bichette and Alejandro Kirk all produced a wRC+ of at least 115 and more than 3.0 fWAR, while Ernie Clement also topped three wins largely through his defensive value. It was almost magical how it came together. The team chemistry was out of this world. Every front office tries to replicate chemistry and the good vibes that come with winning, but the formula isn’t easy to unlock. The Jays didn’t take anything for granted in the offseason. Toronto committed hundreds of millions in new guaranteed money over the winter, more than any of their AL East rivals. They added Dylan Cease, Kazuma Okamoto and Tyler Rogers. Cease was supposed to offset Chris Bassitt. On the field, there is no question he eclipsed Bassitt. Whether he filled Bassitt's leadership role in the clubhouse is harder to determine. Okamoto had a fantastic rookie season, but he didn’t completely fill the void left by Bichette’s departure. In fact, the absence of Bichette in the lineup might have negatively impacted the types of pitches that Guerrero saw in 2026. Few expected Springer to repeat his 2025 performance. His line last season was .309/.399/.560 with 32 home runs and a .959 OPS. In 2026, he came back to earth: roughly .249/.321/.405 with 15 home runs in 517 plate appearances. There was still value there if the Jays could find a buyer. On July 30, the Jays were in last place in the AL East, 5.5 games from the final Wild Card and sitting at approximately a seven percent chance of reaching the postseason. Springer was a pending free agent, exactly the type of veteran a selling team normally attempts to convert into future value. General manager Ross Atkins provided a revealing explanation afterwards: "It was important for him to be here. We wanted him here as we continue to push forward." Some suggested that he stayed to keep advertisers happy. Perhaps both explanations can be true. Springer did possess 10-and-5 rights, giving him the ability to veto a trade. The franchise did a good job sending off Springer and Scherzer appropriately during the final game of the regular season, but one or both might have returned pieces capable of providing immediate or long-term help. Would an analytically disciplined organization have recognized that Clement's underlying offensive profile made his first-half production an opportunity to sell high? At the end of July, Clement was having a genuinely good season. Through 103 games, he was hitting .297 with eight home runs, 25 doubles and a 109 wRC+. He had also made his first All-Star team. Who would have guessed he’d hit .150 in September? He finished around .261/.286/.366, but underneath those numbers sat a .258 xwOBA, .241 xBA and .318 xSLG. His average exit velocity was just 84.3 mph, his hard-hit rate was 20.7 per cent and his barrel rate was 2.1 per cent. Was it realistic, given the start of the 2026 season, that either Springer or Clement would return to 2025 form? Good organizations aren't disloyal. They are ruthless about recognizing when the market values one of their players more highly than their own projections do. Tyler Heineman didn’t play all that much, but he was far from the backup who flirted with a .400 average early in 2025. Instead of bringing up Brandon Valenzuela early or finding another option, the Jays elected to give Heineman some space to rediscover his form. By May 3, with Kirk injured, Heineman was batting .176 with a .398 OPS and still had not collected an extra-base hit. Meanwhile, Valenzuela had been called up and had already homered in two of his previous three starts. Veteran leadership, pitcher preparation, game planning, communication and clubhouse influence largely go unseen by fans, but did the Jays wait too long to replace him out of loyalty? Teams know much more about those things internally than outsiders do, but there comes a point where respect for invisible value becomes an excuse for ignoring visible performance. The organization's preference for patience wasn't limited to personnel decisions. It showed up in the lineup, too. Cito Gaston found success putting out largely the same lineup, day after day. The rosters he had might have been a bit more consistent than the 2025 squad, but maybe not. John Schneider’s refusal to drop Guerrero in the lineup seemed at odds with his willingness to move everyone else around. Through late September, the first baseman carried a .260/.332/.356 line and only nine home runs across 609 plate appearances, good for a .688 OPS. His Statcast batting run value was minus-6. If he had been anyone else, he might have been batting sixth or seventh in the order. Schneider is a player’s manager, and he seems to have a good sense of what his players need, but his loyalty to the idea that Vladdy would return to form seemed overly optimistic and misguided. Guerrero's .331 xwOBA was considerably stronger than his actual results. His .280 xBA ranked in the 90th percentile. His 44.3 per cent hard-hit rate was in the 72nd percentile, his average bat speed in the 92nd percentile and his strikeout rate in the 92nd percentile. Dropping Guerrero in the order might not have fixed him, but it would have acknowledged that a different strategy was at play. It wasn’t just Guerrero's problem, either. As a team, the Jays grounded into the second-most double plays in baseball, with 129. The Athletics grounded into 130 double plays, while the Dodgers finished the regular season with 127. The difference between those teams and the Jays is that they consistently scored more runs. Even in 2025, the Jays had periods when they didn’t score. Atkins has always structured his rosters with pitching and defence at the centre. An offence built on contact but without much slugging either finds other ways to generate runs or it doesn't. In 2026, Toronto didn't. The Jays started the season with seven or eight viable starting pitchers and limped to the finish line with three or four at best. The bullpen was fantastic but overworked. A manager cannot rest his bullpen if his starters do not provide innings. Loyalty can help build a clubhouse. Sentimentality can prevent a front office from changing it when necessary. Being a franchise that values its players makes a difference when it comes to culture, but retaining players for that same rationale is a recipe for inconsistency. Do the Jays tear it all down and start over? Uncertainty surrounding next season because of labour negotiations won’t help. Do they try to re-sign Gausman? Do they pick up Myles Straw’s option? What do they decide to do with Anthony Santander? Can they get anything for Andrés Giménez in a trade? A championship-calibre organization should celebrate its heroes. It just can't let those memories fill out tomorrow's lineup card or dictate today’s strategy. View full article

The problem with success is that it is often taken for granted. It took more than thirty years for the Jays to return to the World Series, yet fans expected another return in 2026. Even without the injuries and underperformance, I'm not sure the 2026 Blue Jays had enough firepower to battle for the division. They would, however, have had a legitimate shot at a Wild Card spot, especially considering the lacklustre competition in the American League this year. As this season fades away, we evaluate the ’26 Jays and their minus-47 run differential. No need to gloss over a season that never took flight. The team had lots of hype. The players and coaching staff seemed confident, but with the Rays and Yankees starting out strong, the Jays were left to chase them all season. That chase was, for the most part, short-handed. Few Blue Jays seasons have tested an organization's pitching depth quite like this one. Toronto headed into the season with at least seven starting pitchers. It opened with Trey Yesavage, Shane Bieber and José Berríos already injured. Then Cody Ponce suffered a serious ACL injury almost immediately. Max Scherzer had a nerve issue which sidelined him early. So, here is the near-final report card. Stats from before games on September 23. Starting Pitching Grade: B The Jays had to cycle through starters, openers, bulk pitchers and emergency options just to cover innings. As of late September, 15 different pitchers have had starting assignments. Dylan Cease was a big offseason signing, and he did not disappoint. There were a handful of starts throughout the season where his velocity was down and his control was off, but for the most part he was elite. In 29 starts and 169 innings, Cease produced a 2.40 ERA, 2.55 FIP and 5.5 FanGraphs WAR. His 34.9 percent strikeout rate easily offset his 11.4 percent walk rate. Although traded at the deadline, soon-to-be free agent Kevin Gausman was a strong contributor. His 3.51 FIP, 23.5 percent strikeout rate and 6.7 percent walk rate were worth 2.6 fWAR in 127 1/3 innings. Unfortunately for Gausman, the Jays offense rarely supported his 4.38 ERA. Yesavage had a slow ramp-up into the season and, despite knee surgery, still managed 95 2/3 major league innings with a 3.67 ERA. His 4.13 Fielding Independent Pitching (FIP) and 11.7 percent walk rate indicate that he didn’t have the same control as in 2025, but he remains an important part of the rotation moving forward. Spencer Miles was an unexpected success. Miles has accumulated 94 2/3 innings between eight starts and relief work with a 2.57 ERA, 2.65 FIP and 2.0 fWAR. The not-so-pretty parts of the rotation were Scherzer, who provided a 6.07 ERA and 5.48 FIP over 72 2/3 innings; Patrick Corbin, who posted a 5.51 ERA and eventually went to the bullpen; and Bieber, who returned but wasn’t vintage Bieber, producing a 4.37 ERA and 5.14 FIP. Yet evaluate the rotation against what Toronto was forced to endure injury-wise, and a B seems fair. It wasn't the plentiful and dominant rotation the Blue Jays imagined in March. It was something almost as valuable: a rotation that repeatedly survived losing the pitchers it was built around. Relief Pitching Grade: A- Toronto's relievers kept the season functioning. We’ll get into whether they were overworked or not, but for the most part, when called upon, the bullpen was more than solid. The most remarkable performance belongs to Louis Varland. FanGraphs credits him with a 1.29 ERA, 1.86 FIP, 31.3 percent strikeout rate, 55.5 percent ground-ball rate and 3.0 WAR over 77 innings. Tyler Rogers has provided precisely the durability Toronto hoped for, pitching 70 innings across 73 appearances with a 1.80 ERA. Sure, there were four blown saves, but he was pinpoint for the majority of his appearances. His 63.7 percent groundball rate provided the Jays with a completely different type of weapon. Mason Fluharty has appeared in 81 games, and Braydon Fisher in 74. Rogers has made 73 appearances and Varland 70. Jeff Hoffman, who was traded at the deadline, was not as bad as fans may remember him. A 3.94 ERA was accompanied by a 34.9 percent strikeout rate, 8.4 percent walk rate and 2.49 FIP. The bullpen arms needed to be resilient, and they were. Even the numerous call-ups throughout the season showed signs of promise. By June 2, Toronto had five relievers already on pace for at least 75 appearances. Heading into the final series of the regular season, the bullpen has logged over 600 innings. There are only six other teams in the MLB that have worked their bullpens that hard. MLB notes that no team has ever had five pitchers make 75 appearances in the same season. The bullpen deserves the A-minus. It probably deserved a lighter workload too. Defense Grade: C This might be the most interesting part of Toronto's report card because the team's defensive identity has become increasingly uneven. FanGraphs still credits Toronto with a positive 16.6 defensive runs overall, but that total obscures some enormous individual differences. Andrés Giménez has been credited with 19.6 defensive runs and Alejandro Kirk with 11.8. Brandon Valenzuela has contributed another 13.1. Baseball Savant credits Kirk with an 11 Fielding Run Value, including elite blocking and excellent framing. At the other end of the spectrum are some very damaging performances. George Springer is at minus-12.8 defensive runs according to FanGraphs (keep in mind he mainly served as DH, which leads to a substantial positional penalty). Yohendrick Piñango is at minus-6.6. And then there is Jesús Sánchez. FanGraphs credits Sánchez with minus-12.2 defensive runs during his 99 games as a Blue Jay. Baseball Savant rated him at minus-9 Fielding Run Value and minus-8 Outs Above Average, with his OAA ranking in the bottom five percent of MLB. For most of the season, the defense was strong, but the weak spots were painfully weak. Offense Grade: D The Blue Jays didn't hit well enough this season for their offense to be a difference maker. FanGraphs has Toronto at a 95 wRC+ as a team. The Jays have hit .248/.310/.382 with 149 home runs through 157 games. FanGraphs calculates their overall offensive contribution at minus-38.6 runs. Baseball Savant points out that Toronto's hitters collectively produced a .305 wOBA against a .317 MLB average. Their .297 expected wOBA is well below MLB's .314 mark. The Blue Jays have a 34.1 percent hard-hit rate against a league average of 38.6 percent and only a 5.8 percent barrel rate compared with 7.7 percent rate league-wide. Kazuma Okamoto has provided the lineup's most obvious source of traditional power, hitting 33 home runs with a .458 slugging percentage and 114 wRC+. His 13.2 percent barrel rate is more than twice Toronto's team rate. Kirk was excellent when healthy, batting .283/.355/.423 with a 117 wRC+. Brett Bateman's late-season emergence was another bright spot, with a .320/.394/.413 line and 133 wRC+ over his first 172 plate appearances. Nathan Lukes was consistent and had a strong stretch at the plate after addressing his vertigo issues. Springer remained an above-average hitter with a 107 wRC+. Most analysts will point the blame for a poor team offense at Vladimir Guerrero Jr. Vladdy has hit .263/.336/.359. He has only nine home runs in 596 plate appearances, a .096 isolated-power figure and a 97 wRC+. Baseball Savant sees better underlying contact than the results, giving him a .335 xwOBA compared with an actual .309 wOBA, but even the expected numbers are a long way from the offensive dominance Toronto required from him. Nearly half his batted balls have been on the ground, his average launch angle is just 8.3 degrees, and his barrel rate is only seven percent. His inability to produce damage placed a huge burden on the rest of the lineup. The Jays have a better team strikeout rate than MLB overall, 19 percent according to FanGraphs, so this was not some undisciplined lineup simply flailing at pitches. Toronto even made contact at a better rate than the league average according to Statcast. The offense just didn’t produce enough runs. There were too many below-average bats and not enough elite ones to compensate. Coaching Grade: C John Schneider and his coaching staff faced an almost impossible pitching puzzle early. The Blue Jays opened the season without three intended starters. Ponce then suffered his ACL injury. Schneider consequently leaned extremely heavily on his bullpen. Managing as if every game were the playoffs. Some of that overuse of leverage arms was effectively unavoidable. Some of it probably wasn't. The team’s poor start meant they were chasing the standings. One of the biggest jobs for Schneider and his coaching staff is evaluating match-ups and doing the best they can to find advantages within them. There are positives on the coaching ledger. Young players seemed to integrate well. Yesavage has continued his transition into a major league starter. Miles has been used creatively. Valenzuela and Bateman have contributed immediately. But there is another side to coaching: getting more from an underperforming lineup. Toronto received a 95 team wRC+ and dramatically below-average quality of contact. Guerrero never became the transformational offensive force the team needed. Several regulars remained below average for extended periods. Coaches cannot hit for players. They cannot prevent injuries. What they can do is build a winning culture and prioritize the things that make a difference. If you’re looking for examples, look at the Red Sox, who replaced the majority of their coaching staff early, which dramatically changed their season. Based on a broad evaluation, an average grade seems reasonable. Front Office Grade: B This grade may look generous, given a sub-.500 record, but much like the coaching staff, the front office never seemed to rest for the entirety of the season. They were forced to adapt like everyone else in the organization as injuries and underperformance persisted. Offseason moves looked to address most of the pitching concerns from 2025, but the position-player half of the roster construction deserves scrutiny. A team with this many light-hitting regulars was vulnerable the moment its star hitters stopped carrying the offense. Toronto's .382 slugging percentage and 149 home runs are not going to cut it. The offense lowers the front office’s grade to below an A. Minor Leagues and Development Grade: B For most of Mark Shapiro and Ross Atkins’ reign, one of the central questions surrounding the Blue Jays organization was about a depleted minor league system. FanGraphs entered 2026 ranking Yesavage Toronto's No. 1 prospect with a 60 Future Value grade, describing him as a potential No. 2 starter with No. 1 upside. Valenzuela has accumulated 2.0 fWAR in just 264 plate appearances, driven heavily by his defensive value. Bateman has generated 1.7 fWAR in only 172 plate appearances while hitting .320/.394/.413. Piñango held his own offensively during his time with the big league squad. Sean Keys and Charles McAdoo also received major league opportunities. Entering the year, FanGraphs ranked Arjun Nimmala as Toronto's No. 2 prospect with a 50 FV grade, followed by Jake Bloss, JoJo Parker, Ricky Tiedemann and Johnny King among an improving group of young players. Nimmala was traded at the deadline for José Soriano. But compared with where this organization was a few years ago, the direction is positive. In fact, the system actually helped the major league club survive 2026. Overall Grade Grade: C+ The final evaluation of the 2026 Blue Jays has to consider an underachieving team that also had to absorb more than its share of adversity. A close-to-.500 record and negative run differential isn’t what was expected from a team that was outs (or inches, depending on how you remember it) away from a championship. Jays fans can celebrate that Cease performed like an ace. Yesavage demonstrated that he is still legit. Miles emerged to become a consistent contributor. Varland turned into one of baseball's best closers. Fisher and Rogers supplied reliability. Kirk remained one of baseball's most valuable catchers when healthy. A group of young position players received opportunities that might otherwise never have existed. 2026 just wasn't the season Toronto expected. View full article

Heading into 2026, outfielder Brett Bateman was much easier to envision as a useful major league role player than as the kind of hitter who might eventually lead off for a team fighting for a playoff spot. With Pete Crow-Armstrong making a case to be a legend for the Chicago Cubs, Bateman was stuck in the farm system with no apparent route to the majors. Seven weeks with the Jays, and he looks like an irreplaceable cog in Toronto’s engine. Not every game has been perfect, but Bateman has looked and played like a confident, mature MLB player. He works counts, has speed on the basepaths and in the outfield, and has recently shown signs of some pop in his bat. Bateman entered the season ranked as the No. 21 prospect in the Chicago Cubs organization by MLB Pipeline. He was an eighth-round pick in 2023 out of the University of Minnesota and entered his fourth professional season still looking for a shot. He hit nearly .300 in A ball in 2023. That earned him a promotion to High A, where he hit .283/.401/.352. A mid-season promotion to Double A finished off his 2024 season. Over the course of two seasons in Double A, he hit about .250/.350/.275. That was enough to continue his progression, landing in Triple A to start this season, where he was hitting .312/.430/.421 before the trade. Speed and defence have always been Bateman's calling cards. Baseball America gave his speed a 60 grade on the traditional 20-to-80 scouting scale, while his fielding received a 70. Those tools gave him an obvious route to the majors because he could handle centre field and contribute on the bases even if his bat did not develop into a significant source of offence. Offensively, Baseball America graded his hit tool as a 55 and his power at 30. He had hit just six home runs in the minor leagues before reaching Toronto, although three came at Triple-A Iowa this season. That lack of power was a big reason there was skepticism about whether his offensive profile would be enough to make him an everyday player rather than a fourth outfielder. The ingredients of a legitimate major league player were there: speed, defence, strike-zone discipline, contact ability and a history of getting on base. Toronto acquired Bateman and shortstop Ty Southisene from Chicago for Kevin Gausman on August 2. Bateman spent only two games with Triple-A Buffalo before the Jays selected his contract on August 7. Plenty of players have shown those skills in the minors, but were never able to replicate them at the big league level. Bateman has so far been a rare exception. Adjustments by opposing pitchers have yet to slow him down. Heading into September 21, the 24-year-old was batting .322/.393/.416 with 26 runs scored, two home runs, 11 RBI and three stolen bases while serving as the regular leadoff hitter. That is slightly above his career minor league production. Bateman has already accumulated 1.6 FWAR, with value coming on both sides of the ball. His immediate rise is by virtue of a confluence of things. The Jays needed someone to replace Daulton Varsho. While Myles Straw and Nathan Lukes have done an admirable job, neither has provided a consistent jolt of energy like Bateman. Can he remain a .300 hitter into the future? Some would suggest his numbers are inflated by a .411 BABIP (batting average on balls in play). By comparison, Lukes has a .290 BABIP in his four seasons with the Jays. Statcast’s expected metrics (which measure exit velocity and launch angle for every batted ball) project him as roughly a .260 hitter with very low slugging. While his contact and power numbers are ok, it is his plate discipline and contact skills that are his differentiators. His whiff rate is just 17 percent, while his squared-up rate is nearly 30 percent. If his BABIP normalizes to .310-.320, that probably drops his slash line to the range of .260/.330/.335. Not bad, but certainly not what he’s shown over his first six weeks. There isn’t an MLB front office that doesn’t leverage its analytics and scouting department to make the best deals it can find. Trades and acquisitions are all based on data projections with a little gut instinct thrown in. It is nearly impossible to extrapolate the importance of a pitcher against a position player when it comes to their team’s success. Gausman is 4-2 since joining the Cubs. Since Bateman made his MLB debut, the Jays went on a run (16-9) but have since regressed to a .500 record. Meanwhile, Southisene hit .262/.380/.327 with the High-A Vancouver Canadians, who recently won the 2026 Northwest League Championship. Player development is a tricky thing. The Cubs had plenty of time to think about how they could best deploy Bateman within their organization. They determined there just wasn’t a spot for him in their major league lineup this season and instead flipped him for Gausman. Whether Bateman settles in as an everyday leadoff hitter or a valuable complementary piece, he has already exceeded expectations. He sparked the Jays to make a late-season run, bringing energy and a great approach at the plate. For a player who looked like the secondary piece in the Kevin Gausman trade, that's a pretty good return on investment. View full article

There are really two answers to the question of whether a .500 season would constitute success for the Toronto Blue Jays. The first is simple. No. This was not supposed to be an 81-win baseball team. At the same time, there are so many reasons that it could have been much worse. Toronto entered 2026 as the defending American League champion after winning 94 games in 2025 and coming so close to a World Series title. Some players left or weren’t re-signed, while the team spent some money for the likes of Dylan Cease, Tyler Rogers and Kazuma Okamoto. Judged against that standard, finishing 81-81 would be a disappointment. Based on what actually happened to the Jays this season, including injuries and underperformance, getting back to .500 in a sense would be a success. Toronto enters September 21 at 77-79, meaning it will need to go 4-2 over its final six games simply to reach 81-81. The Jays sit fourth in the AL East, 18.5 games behind Tampa Bay, and their playoff odds have nearly disappeared. The front office built a roster that they expected would return the Jays to the postseason. FanGraphs' ZiPS preview noted that the organization had committed $336 million in guaranteed money to new players during the winter, nearly $100 million more than the rest of the AL East's free agent spending combined at that point. At this stage of Toronto's competitive cycle, it felt like success needed to involve postseason baseball. Instead, the Blue Jays enter September 21 with a 77-79 record, 629 runs scored and 671 allowed, producing a minus-42 run differential. Based on these results, the analysis suggests the team should be an even worse 73-83. At the 150-game mark, the Jays had only 147 home runs, placing the team 26th among MLB clubs, while its .698 OPS wasn't close to contender-level power. Baseball Savant had Toronto at an 87.5 mph average exit velocity, compared with an MLB average of 88.8. Only 34.1 percent of batted balls by Jays hitters qualified as hard-hit, compared with 38.6 percent league-wide. Meanwhile, their 5.9 percent barrel rate trailed the MLB rate by nearly two percent. Content was part of the secret sauce of last year’s team. The team continues to make contact. Its team whiff rate was only 22.4 percent, better than MLB's 25.0 percent rate. Their actual team wOBA was .306, but their expected wOBA was even lower at .297. Their actual .385 slugging percentage exceeded their .366 expected slugging percentage. At the centre of these challenging numbers is Vladimir Guerrero Jr. Entering the weekend, Guerrero was hitting approximately .261/.334/.359, with nine home runs and a 96 wRC+. FanGraphs had him at just 1.1 WAR. ZiPS had projected Guerrero for 32 home runs, 102 RBI, a 145 wRC+ and roughly 4.5 WAR in 2026. There is at least evidence that Guerrero has hit better than the traditional results suggest. Baseball Savant gives him a .284 expected batting average, .407 expected slugging percentage and .336 xwOBA. His 44.4 percent hard-hit rate and 90.5 mph average exit velocity remain better than Toronto's team averages. Injuries have wreaked havoc on the 2026 season. Anthony Santander’s injury-plagued Jays tenure continued in 2026. José Berríos underwent Tommy John surgery in May after elbow problems and has missed the season. Bowden Francis also underwent Tommy John surgery and was lost for 2026. Cody Ponce's year ended nearly before it started with an ACL injury. Mid-season addition Jameson Taillon has been lost because of elbow inflammation. Shane Bieber has been sidelined by teres major inflammation. Trey Yesavage required arthroscopic knee surgery and will be limited in his return. And this weekend's news that Cease had undergone an MRI on his shoulder is yet another concerning piece of news. Yimi García underwent thoracic outlet surgery earlier this season, after attempting a return, and is done for the season. Addison Barger required elbow surgery. Luis Urías has dealt with a quadriceps strain. That isn’t even the full list. The coaching staff and front office have been juggling and adjusting throughout the season. Perhaps the biggest reason this team has remained anywhere near .500 is that portions of the pitching staff have been excellent. Despite some blips of late, Cease has had a monster of a season. Through 29 starts, Cease has thrown 169 innings with a 2.40 ERA, a 2.55 FIP and a staggering 34.9 percent strikeout rate. FanGraphs credits him with 5.5 WAR. Louis Varland has been a shutdown closer, posting a 1.30 ERA and 1.81 FIP over 76 innings, worth approximately 3.0 fWAR. His 31.7 percent strikeout rate against a 7.3 percent walk rate was probably better than expected. The Tampa Bay Rays are 95-60, with the New York Yankees at 89-66 and Boston Red Sox at 84-72. Toronto, at 77-79, sits fourth. As the defending American League Champs, this season has been a painful fall. Even if the team can sweep their remaining games, this season has come up short of expectations. Measured against the injuries, underperformance and adversity the club endured, fighting back to .500 might be one of the few positive storylines. The Jays' outlook for whenever MLB returns remains brighter than their 2026 record suggests. Much will depend on the health of the pitching staff and whether key offensive contributors rebound to expected levels. The organization still has a strong core under their control and a front office willing to invest. If several injured players return healthy, Guerrero rediscovers his form and its younger core progresses, the 202? Jays should contend. 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