Jump to content
Jays Centre
  • Create Account

Jim Scott

Jays Centre Contributor
  • Posts

    56
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    1

 Content Type 

Profiles

Toronto Blue Jays Videos

2025 Toronto Blue Jays Top Prospects Ranking

Toronto Blue Jays Free Agent & Trade Rumors, Notes, & Tidbits

Guides & Resources

2025 Toronto Blue Jays Draft Pick Tracker

News

Forums

Blogs

Events

Store

Downloads

Gallery

Everything posted by Jim Scott

  1. But is it at the high end of reasonableness? 😁 If you had to pick a fWAR for non-pitchers, would you see it as higher or lower than 2025?
  2. With the signings of Dylan Cease, Tyler Rogers, and Cody Ponce (and with Shane Bieber exercising his player option), the Blue Jays have taken major steps to solidify their pitching staff in preparation for another World Series run in 2026. Attention has now shifted to the other side of the plate, and to the Jays’ ongoing discussions with free agent “big bats” such as Kyle Tucker and Bo Bichette. There is no question that a Kyle or Bo would enhance the Jays’ offence. But there is considerable discussion about how critical such an upgrade really is. Suppose the Jays did not make any further offseason upgrades to their hitting – no Kyle or Bo, and no Ketel Marte or Steven Kwan either. The 2026 Steamer projections for the current Jays are now available on FanGraphs. They project the Jays’ position players to earn only 24 fWAR in 2026, after earning 33 fWAR in 2025. Disappointing! But many of their assumptions, particularly about the Jays’ defense, seem pessimistic. What would the Jays’ fWAR look like with different assumptions? The table below includes actual statistics from 2025, Steamer's 2026 projections, and modified 2026 projections. Note the colours in the final projections section: Yellow assumes 2026 will be the same as 2025, green assumes the same as Steamer, and blue assumes extrapolation of 2025 over a higher number of PA. Some key thoughts about the modified projections: The revised projection assumes a regular outfield of Anthony Santander – Daulton Varsho – Nathan Lukes and an infield of Addison Barger – Andrés Giménez – Ernie Clement – Vladimir Guerrero Jr. George Springer is assumed to be the primary DH, and Alejandro Kirk the primary catcher. The bench is Tyler Heineman – Davis Schneider – Myles Straw – other. This revised projection agrees with Steamer that Vladimir Guerrero Jr. should do better in 2026 and assumes the same 153 wRC+ and 4.8 fWAR. This might be conservative; Vladdy earned 5.3 fWAR in 2024 and 6.3 in 2021, and he is still in his prime. Steamer assumes that George Springer will drop off a cliff, with his fWAR declining 50% from the 5.2 he earned in 2025 to only 2.6 in 2026. The modified projection agrees that his 2025 production might not be sustainable, but assumes that staying at DH continues to energize him and that his decline will only be to 4.0 fWAR. Alejandro Kirk is widely held to be one of the best defensive catchers in baseball. But while Steamer projects his wRC+ to increase from 116 to 122, it has his Def (defensive runs above average) declining from the 24.9 (!) he earned in 2025 to 6.4 in 2026. The revised projection assumes he maintains the same defensive stats as 2025 and that his wRC+ does not increase. Anthony Santander is difficult to project. He had a terrible 2025 due to injury, but averaged 2.7 fWAR from 2022-24. Steamer projects him for 1.0 fWAR in 2026, but the revised projection assumes he returns to his average levels with an fWAR of 2.5. Like Kirk, Andrés Giménez has been an elite defender for most of his career. From 2022-24, his 58 DRS led all of baseball. He had a poor 2025 due to injury, but his defense was still excellent when he took the field. Yet, Steamer projects him to struggle defensively in 2026 (although it does project his hitting to improve to a 95 wRC+). The last time Giménez had a 95+ wRC+ was in 2023, when he put up a 3.8 fWAR. And that was while he was playing second base, where the positional adjustment of +2.5 is substantially less than the +7.5 he will likely earn at shortstop in 2026. The revised projection assumes he returns to his 2023 form, without any positional bonus for moving to shortstop. Daulton Varsho is another Blue Jay difficult to project. He modified his swing in 2025, greatly increasing his power, but was limited to 271 plate appearances due to injury. Steamer projects his wRC+ to decline from 123 in 2025 to 100 and projects his Def to be negative (-1.2) – this despite Varsho being a perennial Platinum Glove candidate. The revised projection assumes that Varsho plays a full season at 2025 levels (this could be conservative, as his defensive WAR in 2025 was well below his historical standards). Steamer’s projections of Myles Straw and Ernie Clement are similar to the system's projections for Varsho in that they have assumed a dramatic decline in those players’ plus-level defense. The revised projection assumes that they will continue to produce at 2025 levels on both offense and defense. The revised fWAR projections for Addison Barger and Davis Schneider are essentially the same as Steamer's. So, What Does This Mean? In aggregate, the revised projection assumes that the Jays will earn 38 fWAR from position players currently on the roster, even without any additions. This would be an increase of roughly 5 fWAR from 2025. Of course, it is hard to make predictions – especially about the future. Key Jays players could be attacked by sentient suitcases, or ambushed by sprinkler heads, or they could get frostbite in August or fall victim to an imaginary spider attack. So, the revised projection, in assuming no injuries or dramatic declines in production, is in one sense optimistic. But the projection is conservative in some respects too, assuming a maximum of 550 plate appearances from Springer, Varsho and Barger, no breakout from Barger or Lukes, only a 98 wRC+ from Clement, and that Vladdy does not return to his 2021 form. The Bottom Line Nobody questions that more elite hitting is better than less elite hitting. But there is a difference between upgrading at a position of extreme weakness and upgrading at one of relative strength. Could this be why the Jays have not pulled the trigger on a mega-deal (free agent or trade) for hitting yet? Their current strength gives them the luxury of being opportunistic, and potentially even waiting until the midsummer trade deadline to shop at the lumber yard. View full article
  3. With the signings of Dylan Cease, Tyler Rogers, and Cody Ponce (and with Shane Bieber exercising his player option), the Blue Jays have taken major steps to solidify their pitching staff in preparation for another World Series run in 2026. Attention has now shifted to the other side of the plate, and to the Jays’ ongoing discussions with free agent “big bats” such as Kyle Tucker and Bo Bichette. There is no question that a Kyle or Bo would enhance the Jays’ offence. But there is considerable discussion about how critical such an upgrade really is. Suppose the Jays did not make any further offseason upgrades to their hitting – no Kyle or Bo, and no Ketel Marte or Steven Kwan either. The 2026 Steamer projections for the current Jays are now available on FanGraphs. They project the Jays’ position players to earn only 24 fWAR in 2026, after earning 33 fWAR in 2025. Disappointing! But many of their assumptions, particularly about the Jays’ defense, seem pessimistic. What would the Jays’ fWAR look like with different assumptions? The table below includes actual statistics from 2025, Steamer's 2026 projections, and modified 2026 projections. Note the colours in the final projections section: Yellow assumes 2026 will be the same as 2025, green assumes the same as Steamer, and blue assumes extrapolation of 2025 over a higher number of PA. Some key thoughts about the modified projections: The revised projection assumes a regular outfield of Anthony Santander – Daulton Varsho – Nathan Lukes and an infield of Addison Barger – Andrés Giménez – Ernie Clement – Vladimir Guerrero Jr. George Springer is assumed to be the primary DH, and Alejandro Kirk the primary catcher. The bench is Tyler Heineman – Davis Schneider – Myles Straw – other. This revised projection agrees with Steamer that Vladimir Guerrero Jr. should do better in 2026 and assumes the same 153 wRC+ and 4.8 fWAR. This might be conservative; Vladdy earned 5.3 fWAR in 2024 and 6.3 in 2021, and he is still in his prime. Steamer assumes that George Springer will drop off a cliff, with his fWAR declining 50% from the 5.2 he earned in 2025 to only 2.6 in 2026. The modified projection agrees that his 2025 production might not be sustainable, but assumes that staying at DH continues to energize him and that his decline will only be to 4.0 fWAR. Alejandro Kirk is widely held to be one of the best defensive catchers in baseball. But while Steamer projects his wRC+ to increase from 116 to 122, it has his Def (defensive runs above average) declining from the 24.9 (!) he earned in 2025 to 6.4 in 2026. The revised projection assumes he maintains the same defensive stats as 2025 and that his wRC+ does not increase. Anthony Santander is difficult to project. He had a terrible 2025 due to injury, but averaged 2.7 fWAR from 2022-24. Steamer projects him for 1.0 fWAR in 2026, but the revised projection assumes he returns to his average levels with an fWAR of 2.5. Like Kirk, Andrés Giménez has been an elite defender for most of his career. From 2022-24, his 58 DRS led all of baseball. He had a poor 2025 due to injury, but his defense was still excellent when he took the field. Yet, Steamer projects him to struggle defensively in 2026 (although it does project his hitting to improve to a 95 wRC+). The last time Giménez had a 95+ wRC+ was in 2023, when he put up a 3.8 fWAR. And that was while he was playing second base, where the positional adjustment of +2.5 is substantially less than the +7.5 he will likely earn at shortstop in 2026. The revised projection assumes he returns to his 2023 form, without any positional bonus for moving to shortstop. Daulton Varsho is another Blue Jay difficult to project. He modified his swing in 2025, greatly increasing his power, but was limited to 271 plate appearances due to injury. Steamer projects his wRC+ to decline from 123 in 2025 to 100 and projects his Def to be negative (-1.2) – this despite Varsho being a perennial Platinum Glove candidate. The revised projection assumes that Varsho plays a full season at 2025 levels (this could be conservative, as his defensive WAR in 2025 was well below his historical standards). Steamer’s projections of Myles Straw and Ernie Clement are similar to the system's projections for Varsho in that they have assumed a dramatic decline in those players’ plus-level defense. The revised projection assumes that they will continue to produce at 2025 levels on both offense and defense. The revised fWAR projections for Addison Barger and Davis Schneider are essentially the same as Steamer's. So, What Does This Mean? In aggregate, the revised projection assumes that the Jays will earn 38 fWAR from position players currently on the roster, even without any additions. This would be an increase of roughly 5 fWAR from 2025. Of course, it is hard to make predictions – especially about the future. Key Jays players could be attacked by sentient suitcases, or ambushed by sprinkler heads, or they could get frostbite in August or fall victim to an imaginary spider attack. So, the revised projection, in assuming no injuries or dramatic declines in production, is in one sense optimistic. But the projection is conservative in some respects too, assuming a maximum of 550 plate appearances from Springer, Varsho and Barger, no breakout from Barger or Lukes, only a 98 wRC+ from Clement, and that Vladdy does not return to his 2021 form. The Bottom Line Nobody questions that more elite hitting is better than less elite hitting. But there is a difference between upgrading at a position of extreme weakness and upgrading at one of relative strength. Could this be why the Jays have not pulled the trigger on a mega-deal (free agent or trade) for hitting yet? Their current strength gives them the luxury of being opportunistic, and potentially even waiting until the midsummer trade deadline to shop at the lumber yard.
  4. I agree with Terry that I would prefer to take the last year of arb discount and see how DV does. If he regresses back to a pure leather-over-lumber CF, $25m AAV is too high. If he continues to excel at the plate, waiting could be a mistake - but sometimes the best moves are the ones you don't make. That said, Bob is right too - a fair contract right now, given the high upside created by DV's 2025 breakout, probably *is* in the $25m AAV range. But do the Jays want to pay that risk premium based on a single half-year plus hitting?
  5. What are your thoughts about Varsho's batting breakthrough in 2025? Epiphany or blip? Certainly a .310 ISO *seems* unsustainable, but he has retooled his swing so it does not appear to be completely random ...
  6. At the 2025 trade deadline, the Padres traded shortstop Leo De Vries (a top-10 prospect in all of MLB) and pitchers Henry Baez, Braden Nett and Eduarniel Núñez to the A’s for fireballer closer Mason Miller and solid starter JP Sears. It was widely regarded as a high price for the Padres to pay, but Miller was (and is) considered one of the best closers in baseball. This past season, his 15.18 K/9 and average fastball velocity of 101.2 mph were both the highest in the majors by comfortable margins, and his Stuff+ of 123 was fifth best among pitchers with at least 50 IP (the highest Stuff+ in 2025? New Jay Tyler Rogers with 128!) Among the main selling points for Miller are his team control and cost. He has just under three years of service time and is not expected to become a free agent until after the 2029 season. He will be in his first year of arbitration in 2026, with a projected salary (per MLB Trade Rumors) in the $3.4 million range. That's cheap for a top closer. Miller certainly sounds like a keeper. But Padres president of baseball operations A.J. Preller is unpredictable, so when rumours are being floated that he is in discussion with the Mets about a possible Miller deal, they can not be easily dismissed. But it raises the question: Should the Jays be in the Miller derby? Let’s start with the fit. A Blue Jays bullpen of Miller – Hoffman – Rogers – García – Varland – Lauer – Fluharty – Little (Ponce? Miles? Bastardo? Tiedemann?) would be one of the best (if not THE best) in baseball. And it would have the advantage of depth, with the top four all having closing experience. There is also a chance of Miller being converted back to a starting role, one he briefly held in his first season with the A's, putting up a very respectable 3.38 ERA and 3.49 xERA in four starts before suffering a UCL sprain. The Jays are said to be looking for arms "capable of starting". But stretching him out would be dangerous, given the stress that his extreme velocity places on his arm. His "mild" UCL sprain in 2023 led to a four-month stint on the injured list. The reward of trying to move him to the rotation might not outweigh the risk. So, what would the Padres be looking for in a Miller trade? Most writers agree that the Padres’ most immediate needs are two or three starting pitchers (with Dylan Cease lost and Yu Darvish hurt) and at least one power bat of the 1B/DH type (with Luis Arráez and Ryan O’Hearn both free agents). An uber-prospect to replace De Vries would also be welcome. The Jays do not have a prospect of De Vries’ calibre. As Trey Yesavage is likely off the table, the top prospect going back to the Padres would likely have to be Arjun Nimmala or JoJo Parker. For the first starting pitcher, the Jays might have to start with Eric Lauer. In 15 starts (74 IP) in 2025, he pitched to a 3.77 ERA. Alternatively, the Jays could offer José Berrós with cash to reduce his cost. For the additional pitcher(s), the Padres would likely expect arms with some MLB experience and upside, but with issues that would need to be resolved. Bowden Francis had a poor 2025, but in 13 starts (77 innings) in 2024, he had an outstanding 2.92 ERA and .221 OBP. Jake Bloss had Tommy John surgery in May 2025, but he was considered a top-100 prospect by FanGraphs before he went down, and he had a 3.18 ERA across the minors in 2024. And Ricky Tiedemann was ranked #22 on Baseball America's top 100 prospects list prior to the 2024 season. If the Jays did choose to include a slugger, it might make sense to discuss Anthony Santander (again, with a potential paydown). Santander had a poor 2025, largely due to injury, but from 2022-24, his 105 home runs were sixth in baseball, and his .234 ISO was top 20. If the Jays succeeded in signing Kyle Tucker, their outfield could be crowded (assuming Springer as the primary DH), with Daulton Varsho, Nathan Lukes, Davis Schneider, Joey Loperfido, and Myles Straw all competing for the remaining two outfield spots. And Santander projects better as a DH, which would perfectly fit San Diego’s needs. So, suppose the deal were Nimmala/Parker + Lauer/Berrios+$$$/Tiedemann + Bloss/Francis? Would the Padres accept? Or what if the Jays offered Francis + Berríos + Santander + $$$, possibly with an additional prospect? The Bottom Line It is always dangerous paying top dollar – whether in cash or in player capital – for a top reliever, as their performance can be unpredictable and inconsistent. But in Miller’s case, the talent is unquestionable. Is it high enough, and does a player who only pitches about 60 innings a year merit, the very high price the Jays would have to pay?
  7. At the 2025 trade deadline, the Padres traded shortstop Leo De Vries (a top-10 prospect in all of MLB) and pitchers Henry Baez, Braden Nett and Eduarniel Núñez to the A’s for fireballer closer Mason Miller and solid starter JP Sears. It was widely regarded as a high price for the Padres to pay, but Miller was (and is) considered one of the best closers in baseball. This past season, his 15.18 K/9 and average fastball velocity of 101.2 mph were both the highest in the majors by comfortable margins, and his Stuff+ of 123 was fifth best among pitchers with at least 50 IP (the highest Stuff+ in 2025? New Jay Tyler Rogers with 128!) Among the main selling points for Miller are his team control and cost. He has just under three years of service time and is not expected to become a free agent until after the 2029 season. He will be in his first year of arbitration in 2026, with a projected salary (per MLB Trade Rumors) in the $3.4 million range. That's cheap for a top closer. Miller certainly sounds like a keeper. But Padres president of baseball operations A.J. Preller is unpredictable, so when rumours are being floated that he is in discussion with the Mets about a possible Miller deal, they can not be easily dismissed. But it raises the question: Should the Jays be in the Miller derby? Let’s start with the fit. A Blue Jays bullpen of Miller – Hoffman – Rogers – García – Varland – Lauer – Fluharty – Little (Ponce? Miles? Bastardo? Tiedemann?) would be one of the best (if not THE best) in baseball. And it would have the advantage of depth, with the top four all having closing experience. There is also a chance of Miller being converted back to a starting role, one he briefly held in his first season with the A's, putting up a very respectable 3.38 ERA and 3.49 xERA in four starts before suffering a UCL sprain. The Jays are said to be looking for arms "capable of starting". But stretching him out would be dangerous, given the stress that his extreme velocity places on his arm. His "mild" UCL sprain in 2023 led to a four-month stint on the injured list. The reward of trying to move him to the rotation might not outweigh the risk. So, what would the Padres be looking for in a Miller trade? Most writers agree that the Padres’ most immediate needs are two or three starting pitchers (with Dylan Cease lost and Yu Darvish hurt) and at least one power bat of the 1B/DH type (with Luis Arráez and Ryan O’Hearn both free agents). An uber-prospect to replace De Vries would also be welcome. The Jays do not have a prospect of De Vries’ calibre. As Trey Yesavage is likely off the table, the top prospect going back to the Padres would likely have to be Arjun Nimmala or JoJo Parker. For the first starting pitcher, the Jays might have to start with Eric Lauer. In 15 starts (74 IP) in 2025, he pitched to a 3.77 ERA. Alternatively, the Jays could offer José Berrós with cash to reduce his cost. For the additional pitcher(s), the Padres would likely expect arms with some MLB experience and upside, but with issues that would need to be resolved. Bowden Francis had a poor 2025, but in 13 starts (77 innings) in 2024, he had an outstanding 2.92 ERA and .221 OBP. Jake Bloss had Tommy John surgery in May 2025, but he was considered a top-100 prospect by FanGraphs before he went down, and he had a 3.18 ERA across the minors in 2024. And Ricky Tiedemann was ranked #22 on Baseball America's top 100 prospects list prior to the 2024 season. If the Jays did choose to include a slugger, it might make sense to discuss Anthony Santander (again, with a potential paydown). Santander had a poor 2025, largely due to injury, but from 2022-24, his 105 home runs were sixth in baseball, and his .234 ISO was top 20. If the Jays succeeded in signing Kyle Tucker, their outfield could be crowded (assuming Springer as the primary DH), with Daulton Varsho, Nathan Lukes, Davis Schneider, Joey Loperfido, and Myles Straw all competing for the remaining two outfield spots. And Santander projects better as a DH, which would perfectly fit San Diego’s needs. So, suppose the deal were Nimmala/Parker + Lauer/Berrios+$$$/Tiedemann + Bloss/Francis? Would the Padres accept? Or what if the Jays offered Francis + Berríos + Santander + $$$, possibly with an additional prospect? The Bottom Line It is always dangerous paying top dollar – whether in cash or in player capital – for a top reliever, as their performance can be unpredictable and inconsistent. But in Miller’s case, the talent is unquestionable. Is it high enough, and does a player who only pitches about 60 innings a year merit, the very high price the Jays would have to pay? View full article
  8. Bo Bichette brings a lot to the table. He led the AL in hits in 2021 and 2022, and would likely have done so again in 2025 had he not been injured (he finished the year with 181 hits to Bobby Witt Jr.’s league-leading 184). But there are negatives. His baserunning has been negative for the last three years, and his fielding at shortstop has been very poor. In 2025, his DRS of -12 and OAA of -13 were both dead last among the 22 qualified shortstops. As a result, despite an excellent 134 wRC+ in 2025, Bo only recorded a 3.8 fWAR. It is possible (probable?) that Bichette could move to second or third base? Doing so would hopefully improve the poor fielding numbers he put up as a shortstop. But it is unlikely that this would dramatically increase his fWAR, as the positional adjustment for second or third is substantially lower than that for shortstop. And many writers speculate that Bo strongly prefers to remain at short and would make that a condition of any new contract. So, what would happen if Bo Bichette were to sign elsewhere? Here are a few scenarios. The Internal Options Suppose, as a worst-case scenario, the Jays are unable to sign or trade for any position players and are accordingly required to backfill for Bichette using only internal options. Assume for this exercise that Andrés Giménez remains at shortstop in 2026. Giménez is projected to have a 95 wRC+ in 2026 (per Steamer) – roughly the same as the 96 he put up in 2023 while playing second base for Cleveland. If we assume that his level of defense at short is equivalent to what it was at second (he *was* a Platinum Glove winner!), then the only difference in his fWAR should be the difference in the positional adjustment, which equates to roughly 1.0 fWAR. So, his 2026 fWAR could be his 2023 fWAR plus one, or 4.8. The highest FanGraphs projection for Bichette in 2026 (playing shortstop) is 4.0. So, taking both offense and defense into consideration, Giménez at short could be roughly a 1.0-fWAR upgrade on Bichette in 2026. But moving Giménez to short creates an opening at second base. Giménez at second could still be expected to produce over 3.0 fWAR. To replace that, Toronto has two options. The first is Davis Schneider. In 2025, “Babe” put up a 1.3 fWAR despite only having 227 plate appearances. Keeping up that pace over 600 PA would have given him 3.4 fWAR. But Schneider was used primarily against left-handed pitching in 2025 – 56% of his PA were against lefties, even though left-handers only comprise roughly 30% of MLB pitchers. Schneider had a 106 wRC+ against lefties in 2025, but a 155 against righties. Playing a full year, with ~70% of his at-bats against right-handed pitching, could raise his fWAR even further, presuming he maintains those reverse platoon splits. And then there is Ernie Clement. Clement only played 423 innings at second base in 2025, but if you extrapolate his +10 DRS to a DRS/1350 (or his +6 OAA to an OAA/400), he was the best fielding second baseman in baseball. (As an aside, DRS/1350 is DRS extrapolated to a full season of 1350 defensive innings, and OAA/400 is similarly OAA extrapolated to a full season of 400 defensive attempts.) True, he only had a 98 wRC+, but even so, he earned a 3.2 fWAR. And if you believe that his outstanding playoff performance was an epiphany rather than a blip, a 2026 fWAR of 4.0+ is not out of the question. And the scary thing about Clement is that, as holy-cow-Batman as his defense is at second base, his defense at third is just as good. In 603 innings at third base in 2025, his +11 DRS (+25 DRS/1350) and +7 OAA (+11 OAA/400) would both have been top-three in the majors over a full season. So, if Schneider is playing second, Clement should be able to put up a similar 3.0-4.0 fWAR at third. But Clement is not the Jays’ only option. Addison Barger had a 125 wRC+ in the first half of 2025 before regressing to an 87 in the second half. He struggled against left-handed pitching with a 69 wRC+ but had a strong 125 against righties. And Barger’s underlying metrics give cause for optimism. His average exit velocity was 91.7 mph (compared to Alex Bregman's 90.1), his hard-hit percentage was 51% (again, for context, Bregman's was 44.4%), and his barrels/PA was 7.8% (Bregman's was 4.8%). And, like Clement, Barger had an excellent postseason with a .367/.441/.583 slash line and a 188 wRC+. Defensively, Barger had a +1 DRS and a zero OAA at third base in 2025 – not exceptional, but more than adequate. So, Barger is a strong breakout candidate for 2026. The Jays could also play Barger in right field. Or, if he is playing third (and cloning technology is not sufficiently advanced), Toronto could go with Nathan Lukes in right. In his 441 innings in right field in 2025, Lukes had a +21 DRS/1350 and a +13 OAA/400, both of which would be elite. He is projected (per Steamer) for a 109 wRC+ in 2026. A 109 wRC+ with elite defense in right field could translate to an fWAR in the 3.0-4.0 range over a full season. So, a (worst-case) purely internal fix could have Schneider/Clement at second, Giménez at short, Clement/Barger at third and Barger/Lukes in right, with the very real potential to have 3.0+ fWAR at every one of those positions. Not bad for a fallback option! The Jays sign Kyle Tucker If the Jays sign Tucker, the uncertainty about who plays right field goes away in a hurry. That likely pushes Barger to third (which is his better fielding position anyway) and Clement to second, potentially making Schneider and Lukes trade candidates for pitching upgrades. The Jays trade for Ketel Marte If the Jays traded for Marte, it would likely push Clement to third and Barger to right. Again, Lukes and Schneider would become either valuable bench contributors or enticing trade pieces (if they were not included in the Marte deal itself). The Jays sign Alex Bregman I am not a big fan of signing aging third basemen, particularly to contracts that take them into their late 30s. And, as noted above, Barger’s underlying hit metrics in 2025 were stronger than Bregman’s, so his upside is arguably higher at this point in Bregman’s career. But if the Jays *did* sign Bregman, it would likely push Barger to right field and leave Clement and Schneider competing for second base. The Bottom Line The Jays are in a very favourable position going into 2026. Not only do they have multiple young players with high upside, but those players have positional flexibility. That flexibility not only creates opportunities for the current roster but also for free agent signings and trades. And as a wise baseball philosopher once said, it can be more valuable to make options than to make plans. View full article
  9. Bo Bichette brings a lot to the table. He led the AL in hits in 2021 and 2022, and would likely have done so again in 2025 had he not been injured (he finished the year with 181 hits to Bobby Witt Jr.’s league-leading 184). But there are negatives. His baserunning has been negative for the last three years, and his fielding at shortstop has been very poor. In 2025, his DRS of -12 and OAA of -13 were both dead last among the 22 qualified shortstops. As a result, despite an excellent 134 wRC+ in 2025, Bo only recorded a 3.8 fWAR. It is possible (probable?) that Bichette could move to second or third base? Doing so would hopefully improve the poor fielding numbers he put up as a shortstop. But it is unlikely that this would dramatically increase his fWAR, as the positional adjustment for second or third is substantially lower than that for shortstop. And many writers speculate that Bo strongly prefers to remain at short and would make that a condition of any new contract. So, what would happen if Bo Bichette were to sign elsewhere? Here are a few scenarios. The Internal Options Suppose, as a worst-case scenario, the Jays are unable to sign or trade for any position players and are accordingly required to backfill for Bichette using only internal options. Assume for this exercise that Andrés Giménez remains at shortstop in 2026. Giménez is projected to have a 95 wRC+ in 2026 (per Steamer) – roughly the same as the 96 he put up in 2023 while playing second base for Cleveland. If we assume that his level of defense at short is equivalent to what it was at second (he *was* a Platinum Glove winner!), then the only difference in his fWAR should be the difference in the positional adjustment, which equates to roughly 1.0 fWAR. So, his 2026 fWAR could be his 2023 fWAR plus one, or 4.8. The highest FanGraphs projection for Bichette in 2026 (playing shortstop) is 4.0. So, taking both offense and defense into consideration, Giménez at short could be roughly a 1.0-fWAR upgrade on Bichette in 2026. But moving Giménez to short creates an opening at second base. Giménez at second could still be expected to produce over 3.0 fWAR. To replace that, Toronto has two options. The first is Davis Schneider. In 2025, “Babe” put up a 1.3 fWAR despite only having 227 plate appearances. Keeping up that pace over 600 PA would have given him 3.4 fWAR. But Schneider was used primarily against left-handed pitching in 2025 – 56% of his PA were against lefties, even though left-handers only comprise roughly 30% of MLB pitchers. Schneider had a 106 wRC+ against lefties in 2025, but a 155 against righties. Playing a full year, with ~70% of his at-bats against right-handed pitching, could raise his fWAR even further, presuming he maintains those reverse platoon splits. And then there is Ernie Clement. Clement only played 423 innings at second base in 2025, but if you extrapolate his +10 DRS to a DRS/1350 (or his +6 OAA to an OAA/400), he was the best fielding second baseman in baseball. (As an aside, DRS/1350 is DRS extrapolated to a full season of 1350 defensive innings, and OAA/400 is similarly OAA extrapolated to a full season of 400 defensive attempts.) True, he only had a 98 wRC+, but even so, he earned a 3.2 fWAR. And if you believe that his outstanding playoff performance was an epiphany rather than a blip, a 2026 fWAR of 4.0+ is not out of the question. And the scary thing about Clement is that, as holy-cow-Batman as his defense is at second base, his defense at third is just as good. In 603 innings at third base in 2025, his +11 DRS (+25 DRS/1350) and +7 OAA (+11 OAA/400) would both have been top-three in the majors over a full season. So, if Schneider is playing second, Clement should be able to put up a similar 3.0-4.0 fWAR at third. But Clement is not the Jays’ only option. Addison Barger had a 125 wRC+ in the first half of 2025 before regressing to an 87 in the second half. He struggled against left-handed pitching with a 69 wRC+ but had a strong 125 against righties. And Barger’s underlying metrics give cause for optimism. His average exit velocity was 91.7 mph (compared to Alex Bregman's 90.1), his hard-hit percentage was 51% (again, for context, Bregman's was 44.4%), and his barrels/PA was 7.8% (Bregman's was 4.8%). And, like Clement, Barger had an excellent postseason with a .367/.441/.583 slash line and a 188 wRC+. Defensively, Barger had a +1 DRS and a zero OAA at third base in 2025 – not exceptional, but more than adequate. So, Barger is a strong breakout candidate for 2026. The Jays could also play Barger in right field. Or, if he is playing third (and cloning technology is not sufficiently advanced), Toronto could go with Nathan Lukes in right. In his 441 innings in right field in 2025, Lukes had a +21 DRS/1350 and a +13 OAA/400, both of which would be elite. He is projected (per Steamer) for a 109 wRC+ in 2026. A 109 wRC+ with elite defense in right field could translate to an fWAR in the 3.0-4.0 range over a full season. So, a (worst-case) purely internal fix could have Schneider/Clement at second, Giménez at short, Clement/Barger at third and Barger/Lukes in right, with the very real potential to have 3.0+ fWAR at every one of those positions. Not bad for a fallback option! The Jays sign Kyle Tucker If the Jays sign Tucker, the uncertainty about who plays right field goes away in a hurry. That likely pushes Barger to third (which is his better fielding position anyway) and Clement to second, potentially making Schneider and Lukes trade candidates for pitching upgrades. The Jays trade for Ketel Marte If the Jays traded for Marte, it would likely push Clement to third and Barger to right. Again, Lukes and Schneider would become either valuable bench contributors or enticing trade pieces (if they were not included in the Marte deal itself). The Jays sign Alex Bregman I am not a big fan of signing aging third basemen, particularly to contracts that take them into their late 30s. And, as noted above, Barger’s underlying hit metrics in 2025 were stronger than Bregman’s, so his upside is arguably higher at this point in Bregman’s career. But if the Jays *did* sign Bregman, it would likely push Barger to right field and leave Clement and Schneider competing for second base. The Bottom Line The Jays are in a very favourable position going into 2026. Not only do they have multiple young players with high upside, but those players have positional flexibility. That flexibility not only creates opportunities for the current roster but also for free agent signings and trades. And as a wise baseball philosopher once said, it can be more valuable to make options than to make plans.
  10. In the 2024 Rule 5 draft, the Jays were picking sixth (yes, it was a tough year!). They chose Angel Bastardo from the Red Sox. In some ways, Bastardo was a classic Rule 5 pick: he had a starter’s arsenal with a 50-grade fastball, slider, and curve, and an “out pitch” in his 60-grade changeup, "an 84-88 mph offering that dies as it approaches the plate as if an invisible parachute has popped out of the back of it" (per FanGraphs). And even if he did not make it as a starter, he could profile as a particularly nasty late-inning reliever. The issue with Bastardo was his health – he had Tommy John surgery in June 2024 and was expected to miss most or all of the 2025 season. So if the Jays took him, they would have to carry him for all of 2025 (using up a 40-man roster spot) before they could meet the 90-day test in 2026. But Toronto clearly thought the upside justified the cost. The Jays currently have 38 players on their 40-man roster. This implies that they want to have the flexibility to make Rule 5 pickups in the upcoming December 10 draft. Might they be considering a similar strategy in 2025? Choosing a player with high upside, but who will be injured for most of 2026? In nine games (eight starts) at double-A ball in 2025, Yordanny Monegro had a 2.67 ERA (2.34 FIP) and a 13.10 K/9 as compared to a 2.14 BB/9. In 2024, in class A+ ball, he finished the season with 42 innings without an earned run. He has four pitches graded (by MLB.com) at 50 or better, and his control is also a 50 grade. But Monegro had Tommy John surgery in August 2025 and is expected to miss most or all of 2026. There are other red flags, as MLB.com notes: Monegro fits the classic high-upside, high-risk pitcher profile. At one time, his upper-70s curveball was ranked as the highest in the Boston farm system, and his pitch mix is still improving (he only added his now-55-grade slider in 2023). So the potential is very real for either a mid-rotation starter or a strong middle-relief/swingman. But the issues with his inconsistent delivery are equally real. There was a time when to say that a pitcher carried “reliever risk” was considered a very strong negative. But with the price of good relievers increasing, and with the importance of a good-to-great bullpen becoming increasingly evident, having a Bastardo or Monegro “only” becoming a Yimi Garcia or Eric Lauer is no longer a negative. If anything, having high reliever potential as a backup plan adds to their value. It is true that the Jays will be picking much later (29th) in the upcoming Rule 5 draft. So it is entirely possible that Monegro might be chosen before then. But Rule 5 picks can be traded, so if Toronto really believed in Monegro’s potential, they might be able to swing a deal with one of the teams picking earlier (Rockies / White Sox / Twins?) whereby that team picks Monegro and then trades them to Toronto. The Jays would then be subject to the same rules as if they had chosen Monegro themselves. The Bottom Line It has become increasingly difficult for teams to find good pitching talent. Even mediocre starting pitching has become very expensive on the free agent market (and top-of-rotation starters even more so). Teams are reluctant to trade young pitching, and when they do, their asks can be extortionate. So it behooves teams to be creative in their search for good pitching help. Bastardo was a gamble in 2024, but an intelligent and high-upside one. Monegro could be a similar intelligent gamble in 2025. View full article
  11. In the 2024 Rule 5 draft, the Jays were picking sixth (yes, it was a tough year!). They chose Angel Bastardo from the Red Sox. In some ways, Bastardo was a classic Rule 5 pick: he had a starter’s arsenal with a 50-grade fastball, slider, and curve, and an “out pitch” in his 60-grade changeup, "an 84-88 mph offering that dies as it approaches the plate as if an invisible parachute has popped out of the back of it" (per FanGraphs). And even if he did not make it as a starter, he could profile as a particularly nasty late-inning reliever. The issue with Bastardo was his health – he had Tommy John surgery in June 2024 and was expected to miss most or all of the 2025 season. So if the Jays took him, they would have to carry him for all of 2025 (using up a 40-man roster spot) before they could meet the 90-day test in 2026. But Toronto clearly thought the upside justified the cost. The Jays currently have 38 players on their 40-man roster. This implies that they want to have the flexibility to make Rule 5 pickups in the upcoming December 10 draft. Might they be considering a similar strategy in 2025? Choosing a player with high upside, but who will be injured for most of 2026? In nine games (eight starts) at double-A ball in 2025, Yordanny Monegro had a 2.67 ERA (2.34 FIP) and a 13.10 K/9 as compared to a 2.14 BB/9. In 2024, in class A+ ball, he finished the season with 42 innings without an earned run. He has four pitches graded (by MLB.com) at 50 or better, and his control is also a 50 grade. But Monegro had Tommy John surgery in August 2025 and is expected to miss most or all of 2026. There are other red flags, as MLB.com notes: Monegro fits the classic high-upside, high-risk pitcher profile. At one time, his upper-70s curveball was ranked as the highest in the Boston farm system, and his pitch mix is still improving (he only added his now-55-grade slider in 2023). So the potential is very real for either a mid-rotation starter or a strong middle-relief/swingman. But the issues with his inconsistent delivery are equally real. There was a time when to say that a pitcher carried “reliever risk” was considered a very strong negative. But with the price of good relievers increasing, and with the importance of a good-to-great bullpen becoming increasingly evident, having a Bastardo or Monegro “only” becoming a Yimi Garcia or Eric Lauer is no longer a negative. If anything, having high reliever potential as a backup plan adds to their value. It is true that the Jays will be picking much later (29th) in the upcoming Rule 5 draft. So it is entirely possible that Monegro might be chosen before then. But Rule 5 picks can be traded, so if Toronto really believed in Monegro’s potential, they might be able to swing a deal with one of the teams picking earlier (Rockies / White Sox / Twins?) whereby that team picks Monegro and then trades them to Toronto. The Jays would then be subject to the same rules as if they had chosen Monegro themselves. The Bottom Line It has become increasingly difficult for teams to find good pitching talent. Even mediocre starting pitching has become very expensive on the free agent market (and top-of-rotation starters even more so). Teams are reluctant to trade young pitching, and when they do, their asks can be extortionate. So it behooves teams to be creative in their search for good pitching help. Bastardo was a gamble in 2024, but an intelligent and high-upside one. Monegro could be a similar intelligent gamble in 2025.
  12. In May 2022, Chad Green left a game against the Orioles with right arm discomfort. Three days later, he was undergoing Tommy John surgery, ending his 2022 season and likely limiting his use in 2023. As 2022 was his last arbitration year, he became a free agent at season's end. In January 2023, Green signed an unusual deal with the Blue Jays. It called for $2.25 million in 2023 and a player option for $6.25 million in 2024. But it also granted the Jays two team options (exercisable under certain conditions): one for three years and $27 million, and one for two years and $21 million. The Jays ultimately ended up exercising the two-year, $21 million option. Green only pitched 12 innings in 2023, so the Jays did not receive $2.25 million of value in that year. But that was expected. Green benefitted from this deal in that he received income in what could otherwise have been a year of unemployment, and (more importantly), as a member of the Jays organization, he had access to their training and medical facilities during his rehabilitation. The Jays benefited not in 2023, but from their option to keep him under contract for future years. Toronto might be faced with a similar opportunity this offseason. In 2021, his first year in the majors, Luis Garcia pitched 155 innings for Houston with a 3.48 ERA and a 3.1 fWAR. He finished second in Rookie of the Year voting (to Randy Arozarena of Tampa Bay) and was named to the Topps All-Rookie Team. He had a similarly strong 2022 but injured his arm in May 2023, requiring Tommy John surgery and ending his year. He missed all of 2024, and while he tried to come back in 2025, he experienced further issues. By October 2025, he was forced to have a second Tommy John procedure, meaning that he will likely miss all of the 2026 season. The Astros released Garcia in November, as his one remaining year of arbitration had no value to them with him recovering from surgery. Even at his healthy best, Garcia is not an ace. But in his 2021-22 years, he had a 3.60 ERA, a 3.74 xERA, a 3.78 FIP and a 5.1 fWAR. That fWAR was 32nd among all pitchers. And Garcia would be pitching in 2027 in his age-30 year, so the potential to return to his 2021-22 form is very real. Should the Jays pull a Chad Green on Garcia? In 2025, Garcia earned $1.875 million. Suppose Toronto offered him a similar amount for 2026, knowing it was unlikely that he could even make it back next year for a playoff run. But the 2026 guarantee would come with a team option – possibly something like the three-year, $27 million option Toronto offered to Green? Perhaps there would also be a one-year player option if the Jays declined their multi-year end of the deal. As with Green, this would guarantee Garcia access to a top MLB medical and rehab staff for the duration of his recovery, and an income in what otherwise could be a barren year. The Jays would be gambling, but if Garcia does recover to anything close to his 2021-22 form, their option would be a bargain. The Bottom Line It seems that every offseason, the Jays (and most teams) are scrambling to fill their rotations for the upcoming year. Planning ahead by creating options could reduce that frenzy. Yes, a deal like this one carries some (considerable?) risk, but as a famous baseball philosopher once said, “you miss 100% of the shots you don’t take." View full article
  13. In May 2022, Chad Green left a game against the Orioles with right arm discomfort. Three days later, he was undergoing Tommy John surgery, ending his 2022 season and likely limiting his use in 2023. As 2022 was his last arbitration year, he became a free agent at season's end. In January 2023, Green signed an unusual deal with the Blue Jays. It called for $2.25 million in 2023 and a player option for $6.25 million in 2024. But it also granted the Jays two team options (exercisable under certain conditions): one for three years and $27 million, and one for two years and $21 million. The Jays ultimately ended up exercising the two-year, $21 million option. Green only pitched 12 innings in 2023, so the Jays did not receive $2.25 million of value in that year. But that was expected. Green benefitted from this deal in that he received income in what could otherwise have been a year of unemployment, and (more importantly), as a member of the Jays organization, he had access to their training and medical facilities during his rehabilitation. The Jays benefited not in 2023, but from their option to keep him under contract for future years. Toronto might be faced with a similar opportunity this offseason. In 2021, his first year in the majors, Luis Garcia pitched 155 innings for Houston with a 3.48 ERA and a 3.1 fWAR. He finished second in Rookie of the Year voting (to Randy Arozarena of Tampa Bay) and was named to the Topps All-Rookie Team. He had a similarly strong 2022 but injured his arm in May 2023, requiring Tommy John surgery and ending his year. He missed all of 2024, and while he tried to come back in 2025, he experienced further issues. By October 2025, he was forced to have a second Tommy John procedure, meaning that he will likely miss all of the 2026 season. The Astros released Garcia in November, as his one remaining year of arbitration had no value to them with him recovering from surgery. Even at his healthy best, Garcia is not an ace. But in his 2021-22 years, he had a 3.60 ERA, a 3.74 xERA, a 3.78 FIP and a 5.1 fWAR. That fWAR was 32nd among all pitchers. And Garcia would be pitching in 2027 in his age-30 year, so the potential to return to his 2021-22 form is very real. Should the Jays pull a Chad Green on Garcia? In 2025, Garcia earned $1.875 million. Suppose Toronto offered him a similar amount for 2026, knowing it was unlikely that he could even make it back next year for a playoff run. But the 2026 guarantee would come with a team option – possibly something like the three-year, $27 million option Toronto offered to Green? Perhaps there would also be a one-year player option if the Jays declined their multi-year end of the deal. As with Green, this would guarantee Garcia access to a top MLB medical and rehab staff for the duration of his recovery, and an income in what otherwise could be a barren year. The Jays would be gambling, but if Garcia does recover to anything close to his 2021-22 form, their option would be a bargain. The Bottom Line It seems that every offseason, the Jays (and most teams) are scrambling to fill their rotations for the upcoming year. Planning ahead by creating options could reduce that frenzy. Yes, a deal like this one carries some (considerable?) risk, but as a famous baseball philosopher once said, “you miss 100% of the shots you don’t take."
  14. As you saw from my article, I think highly of Pete Fairbanks. I would like the Jays to sign him early, ideally at something like the 2/$18m projected by MLBTR. That gives them the luxury of being opportunistic - if someone like Williams can not get the deal he wants due to his poor 2025, and he is considering a Semien-like one year pillow deal to build value, the Jays might consider a 2015-KC-like three-headed bullpen monster.
  15. I wonder if Tampa were unwilling to trade Pete to a division rival without a major payback ... and whether the Jays were not keen to sign him for a single year @ $11m?
  16. The Jays enter the 2025-26 offseason in pretty good shape. Their 2025 offense was excellent; the Jays' team wRC+ of 112 was fourth in baseball, and their FangGraphs Off (a measure of overall offense) was fifth. And this was despite losing Anthony Santander for effectively the entire year, and Daulton Varsho (and his holy-cow-Batman .310 ISO) for half the year. They were no slouches on defence, either. Their FangGraphs Def (a measure of overall defence) of 38.7 was the best in baseball, despite Bo Bichette's struggles at shortstop (his -13 Outs Above Average were tied for last in the majors at any position). On top of that, Shane Bieber’s surprising opt-in gives the Jays a current rotation of Bieber, Kevin Gausman, Trey Yesavage, José Berríos, and Eric Lauer. They're possibly only one more solid starter and a swingman away from being ready for 2026. Which brings us to the bullpen. The bullpen's 3.98 ERA was 16th in MLB in 2025, and their 3.2 fWAR was 18th. To be fair, this was partly due to injuries. Yimi García had a 2.70 ERA (2.21 xERA) in 2024 and was Toronto’s primary setup man before he was traded. In 2025, a combination of injuries and August surgery limited him to 21 innings. Similarly, Nick Sandlin (right elbow inflammation) pitched only 16 innings, and Erik Swanson (who had a brilliant 2023) dealt with a median nerve entrapment in training camp and was ultimately cut. These injuries forced the Jays to make some difficult decisions – as my colleague Bob Ritchie noted in August: "One aspect of [Jeff] Hoffman’s usage is that he has, on five occasions, pitched four times in five days. In 2025, [Josh] Hader has not pitched four times in five days. … [Aroldis] Chapman has pitched four times in five days on two occasions. Hence, Hoffman’s concentrated usage over five days is unusual." In 2026, the Jays should benefit from a healthy García and a full season of Louis Varland. Even so, upgrading the back end of the bullpen should be a priority for the front office this offseason. Not surprisingly, this has led to the Jays being linked to almost every top free agent reliever – including Edwin Díaz and Raisel Iglesias. Devin Williams and Robert Suarez are two more names that have come up in plenty of fan speculation. But the competition for those arms might be intense, raising the price and the risk (giving term to a reliever is always dangerous). Might there be a better option? Suppose there were a reliever with extensive closing experience (75 saves in the last three years, seven more than Williams). And suppose he had a save conversion percentage (saves divided by save opportunities) of 86% – higher than Díaz’s 83%. And suppose he would be pitching in 2026 at age 32 – three years younger than Suarez and four years younger than Iglesias. And (are you tired of supposing yet?) imagine that he is projected to cost only $18 million on a two-year contract – less than half the term and AAV expected for Díaz? Let’s talk about Pete Fairbanks. We can start with the red flags. In 2022 and 2023, Fairbanks’ fastball averaged over 99 mph, with a Stuff+ in the 140 range (in 2022, the stuff+ of 152 on his fastball was second in the majors). As a result, his K/9 was a stellar 13.5. But, as the saying goes, that was then. His velocity and Stuff+ have declined steadily, with the result that in 2025, his velocity was 97 mph and his K/9 was “only” 8.80. There are also injury concerns. Fairbanks’ 60 innings pitched in 2025 were a career high – the most he had ever pitched before was 45.1 innings. These concerns are likely why Tampa Bay did not pick up his $11 million option for 2026, and why they were unable to trade him to a team that would. But let’s examine those concerns, starting with the fastball. Three points to consider: Despite the decline in fastball velocity, Fairbanks still put up a 2.83 ERA (3.00 xERA) in 2025. For comparison, Jeff Hoffman had a 4.37 ERA and a 3.91 xERA, while Williams posted a 4.79/3.07 and Suarez a 2.97/3.67. Stop me if you’ve heard this one: A pitcher has lost 2 mph on his fastball and is struggling. He joins Toronto, and with the help of an excellent pitching coach and his team, miraculously regains his mojo and his velo, going on to an uber season. Am I talking about Robbie Ray in 2021 or Pete Fairbanks in 2026? Finally, Fairbanks started experimenting with a cut fastball in September of 2024. He only threw it 42 times, so the usual small sample size caveats apply. But what was his opponents’ batting average against it? Zero. And how did his Stuff+ rating of 141 for that pitch compare to other pitchers in MLB throwing cutters? Best in baseball (Emmanuel Clase was second with a Stuff+ of 122). Bottom line, Fairbanks is doing just fine with the fastball, and he has crazy-high upside. Now let’s talk about the injuries. It is entirely valid to worry that Fairbanks’ injury record makes him too high-risk to be a solo #1 closer. But as a 1A, working with Hoffman (and possibly García, who has 29 career saves), the expectation should not be for him to pitch so many innings. And remember – Fairbanks pitched 60 innings in 2025. None of the tier one free agent closers pitched as many as 70 (Díaz pitched 66.1, Suarez 69.2, Iglesias 67.1, and Williams 62). The Bottom Line Pete Fairbanks offers an ideal combination of strong recent production and extreme upside. He would hugely enhance the Jays’ bullpen, at a moderate cost and term. The Jays could sign him now, and then, if an elite closer became available on a one-year pillow contract later in the offseason, Toronto could still consider forming its own version of the KC “three-headed monster.” View full article
  17. The Jays enter the 2025-26 offseason in pretty good shape. Their 2025 offense was excellent; the Jays' team wRC+ of 112 was fourth in baseball, and their FangGraphs Off (a measure of overall offense) was fifth. And this was despite losing Anthony Santander for effectively the entire year, and Daulton Varsho (and his holy-cow-Batman .310 ISO) for half the year. They were no slouches on defence, either. Their FangGraphs Def (a measure of overall defence) of 38.7 was the best in baseball, despite Bo Bichette's struggles at shortstop (his -13 Outs Above Average were tied for last in the majors at any position). On top of that, Shane Bieber’s surprising opt-in gives the Jays a current rotation of Bieber, Kevin Gausman, Trey Yesavage, José Berríos, and Eric Lauer. They're possibly only one more solid starter and a swingman away from being ready for 2026. Which brings us to the bullpen. The bullpen's 3.98 ERA was 16th in MLB in 2025, and their 3.2 fWAR was 18th. To be fair, this was partly due to injuries. Yimi García had a 2.70 ERA (2.21 xERA) in 2024 and was Toronto’s primary setup man before he was traded. In 2025, a combination of injuries and August surgery limited him to 21 innings. Similarly, Nick Sandlin (right elbow inflammation) pitched only 16 innings, and Erik Swanson (who had a brilliant 2023) dealt with a median nerve entrapment in training camp and was ultimately cut. These injuries forced the Jays to make some difficult decisions – as my colleague Bob Ritchie noted in August: "One aspect of [Jeff] Hoffman’s usage is that he has, on five occasions, pitched four times in five days. In 2025, [Josh] Hader has not pitched four times in five days. … [Aroldis] Chapman has pitched four times in five days on two occasions. Hence, Hoffman’s concentrated usage over five days is unusual." In 2026, the Jays should benefit from a healthy García and a full season of Louis Varland. Even so, upgrading the back end of the bullpen should be a priority for the front office this offseason. Not surprisingly, this has led to the Jays being linked to almost every top free agent reliever – including Edwin Díaz and Raisel Iglesias. Devin Williams and Robert Suarez are two more names that have come up in plenty of fan speculation. But the competition for those arms might be intense, raising the price and the risk (giving term to a reliever is always dangerous). Might there be a better option? Suppose there were a reliever with extensive closing experience (75 saves in the last three years, seven more than Williams). And suppose he had a save conversion percentage (saves divided by save opportunities) of 86% – higher than Díaz’s 83%. And suppose he would be pitching in 2026 at age 32 – three years younger than Suarez and four years younger than Iglesias. And (are you tired of supposing yet?) imagine that he is projected to cost only $18 million on a two-year contract – less than half the term and AAV expected for Díaz? Let’s talk about Pete Fairbanks. We can start with the red flags. In 2022 and 2023, Fairbanks’ fastball averaged over 99 mph, with a Stuff+ in the 140 range (in 2022, the stuff+ of 152 on his fastball was second in the majors). As a result, his K/9 was a stellar 13.5. But, as the saying goes, that was then. His velocity and Stuff+ have declined steadily, with the result that in 2025, his velocity was 97 mph and his K/9 was “only” 8.80. There are also injury concerns. Fairbanks’ 60 innings pitched in 2025 were a career high – the most he had ever pitched before was 45.1 innings. These concerns are likely why Tampa Bay did not pick up his $11 million option for 2026, and why they were unable to trade him to a team that would. But let’s examine those concerns, starting with the fastball. Three points to consider: Despite the decline in fastball velocity, Fairbanks still put up a 2.83 ERA (3.00 xERA) in 2025. For comparison, Jeff Hoffman had a 4.37 ERA and a 3.91 xERA, while Williams posted a 4.79/3.07 and Suarez a 2.97/3.67. Stop me if you’ve heard this one: A pitcher has lost 2 mph on his fastball and is struggling. He joins Toronto, and with the help of an excellent pitching coach and his team, miraculously regains his mojo and his velo, going on to an uber season. Am I talking about Robbie Ray in 2021 or Pete Fairbanks in 2026? Finally, Fairbanks started experimenting with a cut fastball in September of 2024. He only threw it 42 times, so the usual small sample size caveats apply. But what was his opponents’ batting average against it? Zero. And how did his Stuff+ rating of 141 for that pitch compare to other pitchers in MLB throwing cutters? Best in baseball (Emmanuel Clase was second with a Stuff+ of 122). Bottom line, Fairbanks is doing just fine with the fastball, and he has crazy-high upside. Now let’s talk about the injuries. It is entirely valid to worry that Fairbanks’ injury record makes him too high-risk to be a solo #1 closer. But as a 1A, working with Hoffman (and possibly García, who has 29 career saves), the expectation should not be for him to pitch so many innings. And remember – Fairbanks pitched 60 innings in 2025. None of the tier one free agent closers pitched as many as 70 (Díaz pitched 66.1, Suarez 69.2, Iglesias 67.1, and Williams 62). The Bottom Line Pete Fairbanks offers an ideal combination of strong recent production and extreme upside. He would hugely enhance the Jays’ bullpen, at a moderate cost and term. The Jays could sign him now, and then, if an elite closer became available on a one-year pillow contract later in the offseason, Toronto could still consider forming its own version of the KC “three-headed monster.”
  18. I agree. Not only does it make his price harder to defend, but it puts his leadership / dedication to the team in serious question.
  19. Would you still sign Bo if he made it a condition that the Jays guarantee him the SS gig for the next 5 years? Because he destroys a lot of his value playing short. IMO, a 2B Bo + SS Gimenez tandem is far better for the team
  20. Shall we play a game? On Thursday, MLB Trade Rumors published their annual list of the top 50 free agents, which includes estimates of the contracts it will take to sign each player. So, it is once again time to invite you to put on your GM hat and play the shopping game! Here are the rules: Let's say the Jays have $50 million to spend on free agents. Assume, for the purposes of the game, that every FA on the MLBTR list can be had for their projected average annual value (AAV). You can also ignore contract length and any other factors (opt-outs, no-trade clauses, etc.). Now that Shane Bieber has opted in for 2026, the Jays are arguably not desperate at any position. But adding a frontline starter would push Eric Lauer back to a #6 role (the first time the Jays have had the luxury of such a solid #6 in some years!). Another top-of-the-bullpen arm (or even two) could give Toronto multiple late-inning options. That being said, internal options exist at most positions, and trades are entirely possible, so it does not follow that the Jays have to fill all of their needs on the free agent market. So, with your $50 million, you could sign one top-end free agent (Kyle Tucker is projected to earn $36 million) plus some supplementary pieces, or two $25 million players, or, say, a $24 million, an $18 million, and an $8 million player. It's entirely up to you, except that you cannot exceed $50 million in total spending. Here are the projected AAVs for some of the top players: Kyle Tucker - $36 million Bo Bichette - $26 million Dylan Cease - $27 million Munetaka Murakami - $23 million Alex Bregman - $27 million Framber Valdez - $30 million Tatsuya Imai - $25 million Cody Bellinger - $28 million Kyle Schwarber - $27 million Ranger Suárez - $23 million Pete Alonso - $28 million Josh Naylor - $18 million Edwin Díaz - $21 million Michael King - $20 million Zac Gallen - $20 million Other players of note include: Devin Williams ($17M), Brandon Woodruff ($22M), Trent Grisham ($17M), Kazuma Okamoto ($16M), Eugenio Suárez ($16M), Robert Suarez ($16M), Shota Imanaga ($15M), Chris Bassitt ($19M), Merrill Kelly ($18M), Brad Keller ($12M), Lucas Giolito ($16M), Raisel Iglesias ($13M), Luis Arraez ($12M), Zack Littell ($12M), Ryan Helsley ($12M), Justin Verlander ($22M), and Cody Ponce ($11M). Just for fun, let’s assume that the players who did not make the MLBTR top 50 (including Walker Buehler, Patrick Corbin, Zach Eflin, Paul Goldschmidt, Kenley Jansen and Steven Matz) could be had for $8 million each. So, what would you do? It is actually difficult to find a position at which the Jays need an upgrade, but Tucker in right field (moving Barger to third, and Springer to primary DH) would make an already strong offense even more formidable. If Bichette returns (perhaps playing second base full-time), his bat would look very good in front of the home run hitters in the middle of the lineup (remember, Anthony Santander should be back and healthy in 2026). Or – rather than splurging on a single uberstar – would you rather gamble on multiple upside plays at much lower prices? Some years back, Ross Atkins spoke about adding to this team "with talent that is condensed in one player and super high impact.” Should that still be the plan? Please post your thoughts in the comments section below. View full article
  21. Shall we play a game? On Thursday, MLB Trade Rumors published their annual list of the top 50 free agents, which includes estimates of the contracts it will take to sign each player. So, it is once again time to invite you to put on your GM hat and play the shopping game! Here are the rules: Let's say the Jays have $50 million to spend on free agents. Assume, for the purposes of the game, that every FA on the MLBTR list can be had for their projected average annual value (AAV). You can also ignore contract length and any other factors (opt-outs, no-trade clauses, etc.). Now that Shane Bieber has opted in for 2026, the Jays are arguably not desperate at any position. But adding a frontline starter would push Eric Lauer back to a #6 role (the first time the Jays have had the luxury of such a solid #6 in some years!). Another top-of-the-bullpen arm (or even two) could give Toronto multiple late-inning options. That being said, internal options exist at most positions, and trades are entirely possible, so it does not follow that the Jays have to fill all of their needs on the free agent market. So, with your $50 million, you could sign one top-end free agent (Kyle Tucker is projected to earn $36 million) plus some supplementary pieces, or two $25 million players, or, say, a $24 million, an $18 million, and an $8 million player. It's entirely up to you, except that you cannot exceed $50 million in total spending. Here are the projected AAVs for some of the top players: Kyle Tucker - $36 million Bo Bichette - $26 million Dylan Cease - $27 million Munetaka Murakami - $23 million Alex Bregman - $27 million Framber Valdez - $30 million Tatsuya Imai - $25 million Cody Bellinger - $28 million Kyle Schwarber - $27 million Ranger Suárez - $23 million Pete Alonso - $28 million Josh Naylor - $18 million Edwin Díaz - $21 million Michael King - $20 million Zac Gallen - $20 million Other players of note include: Devin Williams ($17M), Brandon Woodruff ($22M), Trent Grisham ($17M), Kazuma Okamoto ($16M), Eugenio Suárez ($16M), Robert Suarez ($16M), Shota Imanaga ($15M), Chris Bassitt ($19M), Merrill Kelly ($18M), Brad Keller ($12M), Lucas Giolito ($16M), Raisel Iglesias ($13M), Luis Arraez ($12M), Zack Littell ($12M), Ryan Helsley ($12M), Justin Verlander ($22M), and Cody Ponce ($11M). Just for fun, let’s assume that the players who did not make the MLBTR top 50 (including Walker Buehler, Patrick Corbin, Zach Eflin, Paul Goldschmidt, Kenley Jansen and Steven Matz) could be had for $8 million each. So, what would you do? It is actually difficult to find a position at which the Jays need an upgrade, but Tucker in right field (moving Barger to third, and Springer to primary DH) would make an already strong offense even more formidable. If Bichette returns (perhaps playing second base full-time), his bat would look very good in front of the home run hitters in the middle of the lineup (remember, Anthony Santander should be back and healthy in 2026). Or – rather than splurging on a single uberstar – would you rather gamble on multiple upside plays at much lower prices? Some years back, Ross Atkins spoke about adding to this team "with talent that is condensed in one player and super high impact.” Should that still be the plan? Please post your thoughts in the comments section below.
  22. Sports writers and fans frequently refer to the “magic number” of a playoff-bound team as a simple measure of how close the team is to clinching a playoff position (or a divisional championship). This represents the number of wins (by the leading team) or losses (by the next-closest competitor) required before the first-place team clinches. (There is also a flipside number, called an “elimination number” or “tragic number.” This is the number of wins or losses required for a second-place team to be eliminated from the playoffs or to lose the divisional championship.) The history of the “magic number” goes back to 1947: So what is a magic number? How is it calculated (and miscalculated!)? Let’s use the example of the Toronto Blue Jays and the New York Yankees. At the time of writing this article, the Jays have a record of 83 wins and 61 losses, and the Yankees are in second place with an 80-64 record. So the Jays have a three-game lead. If the Jays were to win 16 of their remaining 18 games, they would finish with a record of 99-63. Even if the Yankees won every one of their remaining games, they would only finish with 98 wins and would finish second. Alternatively, if the Jays were to go 15-3 and the Yankees went 17-1, the Jays would still win. So every Jays win – or Yankees loss – brings the Jays closer to a clinch. This gives rise to the conventional formula for magic numbers, which is: 163 minus the first-place team’s wins and second-place team’s losses. Applying this formula to the current Jays would give a magic number of 16 (163 - 83 - 64 = 16). This would have been the correct magic number up to 2022. In those prior years, if two teams tied for the division lead (or the final Wild Card spot), they would play a one-game playoff to determine the winner. But that rule changed for the 2022 and subsequent seasons, following the introduction of the third Wild Card team. The rule now is that if two teams are tied for the division lead (or the final Wild Card spot) at the end of the season, a series of tiebreakers is applied. The first such tiebreaker is the two teams’ head-to-head record. So, consider a scenario in which the Jays go 9-9 in the last 18 games and the Yankees go 12-6. At first glance, it would appear that the Jays did not clinch: Their nine wins plus the Yankees’ six losses equals 15, which is less than the magic number of 16. But here is where the new rules kick in. If the Jays finish 9-9, they will end the season with a record of 92-70. If the Yankees finish 12-6, they will finish with the same 92-70 record. A tie, initially – but then the tiebreakers are applied. The Blue Jays won the season series against the Yankees eight games to five. Since head-to-head record is the first tiebreaker, in this scenario, the Jays win the division. So, their magic number against New York is actually 15, not 16. Head-to-head record also affects the calculation of magic numbers for the other divisional races in 2025. In the AL Central, Detroit has an 83-62 record, and the Guardians are in second place at 74-70. So, Detroit's simple magic number would appear to be 10 (163 - 83 - 70 = 10). But the Tigers are currently 4-3 against the Guardians, with a three-game series coming up next week. If the Tigers win that series and finish with a winning record against Cleveland, their effective magic number will decrease by one. In the AL West, the Astros are 78-67 and the Mariners are 77-68. Houston's simple magic number is 17. Right now, the Astros and Mariners are 5-5 in their season series, with three games left to play. If the Astros win that series, their effective magic number will also decrease by one. The Phillies lead the NL East with an 85-60 record, with the 75-69 Mets in second place. The Phils’ simple magic number is nine (163 - 85 - 69 = 9). But in this case, the Phillies are currently 4-7 against the Mets with only two games left to play. So, even if the Phils sweep the last two games, they will still have a losing record against New York. The tiebreaker rules will therefore not affect their magic number. In the NL Central, the Brewers are 89-57 and the Cubs are 82-63. So, the Brewers’ magic number is 11. As the Brew Crew has already lost the season series against Chicago 6-7 (with no games left to play), their magic number does not change. Finally, in the NL West, the 81-64 Dodgers have a magic number of 16 over the 79-66 Padres. That reduces to 15 due to L.A.'s 9-4 head-to-head record against San Diego in 2025. The Bottom Line There are many statistics in baseball that present a simplified, single-figure answer to a complex question. A player’s overall value to his team can be measured by WAR (wins above replacement). His defensive contributions can be measured by OAA (outs above average) or DRS (defensive runs saved). And it is straightforward (and fun!) to watch your favourite team’s magic number drop – in Toronto’s case, hopefully to zero!
  23. Sports writers and fans frequently refer to the “magic number” of a playoff-bound team as a simple measure of how close the team is to clinching a playoff position (or a divisional championship). This represents the number of wins (by the leading team) or losses (by the next-closest competitor) required before the first-place team clinches. (There is also a flipside number, called an “elimination number” or “tragic number.” This is the number of wins or losses required for a second-place team to be eliminated from the playoffs or to lose the divisional championship.) The history of the “magic number” goes back to 1947: So what is a magic number? How is it calculated (and miscalculated!)? Let’s use the example of the Toronto Blue Jays and the New York Yankees. At the time of writing this article, the Jays have a record of 83 wins and 61 losses, and the Yankees are in second place with an 80-64 record. So the Jays have a three-game lead. If the Jays were to win 16 of their remaining 18 games, they would finish with a record of 99-63. Even if the Yankees won every one of their remaining games, they would only finish with 98 wins and would finish second. Alternatively, if the Jays were to go 15-3 and the Yankees went 17-1, the Jays would still win. So every Jays win – or Yankees loss – brings the Jays closer to a clinch. This gives rise to the conventional formula for magic numbers, which is: 163 minus the first-place team’s wins and second-place team’s losses. Applying this formula to the current Jays would give a magic number of 16 (163 - 83 - 64 = 16). This would have been the correct magic number up to 2022. In those prior years, if two teams tied for the division lead (or the final Wild Card spot), they would play a one-game playoff to determine the winner. But that rule changed for the 2022 and subsequent seasons, following the introduction of the third Wild Card team. The rule now is that if two teams are tied for the division lead (or the final Wild Card spot) at the end of the season, a series of tiebreakers is applied. The first such tiebreaker is the two teams’ head-to-head record. So, consider a scenario in which the Jays go 9-9 in the last 18 games and the Yankees go 12-6. At first glance, it would appear that the Jays did not clinch: Their nine wins plus the Yankees’ six losses equals 15, which is less than the magic number of 16. But here is where the new rules kick in. If the Jays finish 9-9, they will end the season with a record of 92-70. If the Yankees finish 12-6, they will finish with the same 92-70 record. A tie, initially – but then the tiebreakers are applied. The Blue Jays won the season series against the Yankees eight games to five. Since head-to-head record is the first tiebreaker, in this scenario, the Jays win the division. So, their magic number against New York is actually 15, not 16. Head-to-head record also affects the calculation of magic numbers for the other divisional races in 2025. In the AL Central, Detroit has an 83-62 record, and the Guardians are in second place at 74-70. So, Detroit's simple magic number would appear to be 10 (163 - 83 - 70 = 10). But the Tigers are currently 4-3 against the Guardians, with a three-game series coming up next week. If the Tigers win that series and finish with a winning record against Cleveland, their effective magic number will decrease by one. In the AL West, the Astros are 78-67 and the Mariners are 77-68. Houston's simple magic number is 17. Right now, the Astros and Mariners are 5-5 in their season series, with three games left to play. If the Astros win that series, their effective magic number will also decrease by one. The Phillies lead the NL East with an 85-60 record, with the 75-69 Mets in second place. The Phils’ simple magic number is nine (163 - 85 - 69 = 9). But in this case, the Phillies are currently 4-7 against the Mets with only two games left to play. So, even if the Phils sweep the last two games, they will still have a losing record against New York. The tiebreaker rules will therefore not affect their magic number. In the NL Central, the Brewers are 89-57 and the Cubs are 82-63. So, the Brewers’ magic number is 11. As the Brew Crew has already lost the season series against Chicago 6-7 (with no games left to play), their magic number does not change. Finally, in the NL West, the 81-64 Dodgers have a magic number of 16 over the 79-66 Padres. That reduces to 15 due to L.A.'s 9-4 head-to-head record against San Diego in 2025. The Bottom Line There are many statistics in baseball that present a simplified, single-figure answer to a complex question. A player’s overall value to his team can be measured by WAR (wins above replacement). His defensive contributions can be measured by OAA (outs above average) or DRS (defensive runs saved). And it is straightforward (and fun!) to watch your favourite team’s magic number drop – in Toronto’s case, hopefully to zero! View full article
  24. The Blue Jays need pitching help. The current rotation is surviving, but Kevin Gausman, Jose Berrios and Chris Bassitt are racking up the innings, Eric Lauer seems too good to be true, and Max Scherzer is another injury waiting to happen. Toronto does not have —and could badly use—a quality sixth starter who would be ready to step up in case of injury, or if one of the current starters could just use another day of rest. But the bullpen could use another arm too. Yimi Garcia, Ryan Burr and Nick Sandlin are all hurt (to varying degrees) and while Brendon Little and Braydon Fisher are pitching well, it is dangerous to have to rely on pitchers with only 120 major league innings (combined) in their careers. What the Jays could really use is a quality swingman. Someone who has demonstrated the ability to work out of the bullpen in a high-leverage role, but who also can start games at the major league level. It would help if his trade cost were not that high. He could even be a rental, and possibly a player whose conventional stats were sufficiently cromulent to keep his price down, but whose advanced stats (and prior performance) gave reason for optimism. Someone like Michael Soroka of the Nationals. In 2024, Soroka pitched primarily out of the White Sox's bullpen. He had a 2.75 ERA in 36 innings, holding opponents to a .189/.303/.291 batting line. He also started nine games, but with an ugly 6.39 ERA over 44 innings. So far in 2025, Soroka has started 14 games with a 5.10 ERA over 72 innings. So far, “The Rock” seems like a better-than-decent bullpen addition but a poor addition to the starting rotation. But a deeper look gives a different picture. Soroka’s 5.10 ERA comes with a 3.22 xERA, a 3.90 xFIP and a 3.57 SIERA. The difference of 1.88 between his ERA and his xERA is the third highest among pitchers with 150+ balls in play. So, he has either been very unlucky (possible) or the victim of, ahem, “unfortunate” defence (did I mention that Washington’s year-to-date DEF rating of -30.7 is the second worst in baseball?) Even Soroka’s red flags are a potential fit for the Jays. He has a history of injuries, having only pitched 100 innings once in his six-year MLB career. So, if the Jays were looking for a 200+ inning workhorse, he might not be a good fit. But, as a swingman, he would likely not be asked to contribute too many innings over the remaining 62 games of the season, and he has only pitched 72 innings to date. Plus, he would slide beautifully into a bullpen role when (not if!) the Jays make the playoffs. Soroka is a rental—he will be a free agent after this year. As a result (and in part due to his $9 million 2025 salary), his estimated Baseball Trade Value is only $3 million. So, the prospect cost should be something like an Emmanuel Bonilla or RJ Schreck. Good prospects, but not untouchable. The beauty of landing a swingman like Soroka is that it does not limit the Jays in other moves. If, after they deal for him, the opportunity arises to trade for an Edward Cabrera or Mitch Keller, Toronto can just slide Soroka into a (still very valuable!) full-time, high-leverage bullpen role. And having a good swingman creates other opportunities. Maybe Gausman prefers to pitch on six days rest? Maybe Scherzer should miss a start now and then to recharge his batteries? Maybe Bassitt is pitching better at home than on the road, and so would happily trade an away start for a SkyDome one? There has been much speculation about the Jays pursuing a near-elite starter (like Keller) or reliever (like Bednar). But those players will be prohibitively expensive, and there is no guarantee that the Jays would ultimately be the highest bidders. Acquiring a player like Soroka, ideally early in the trade window over the next few days, provides Toronto with a backup plan, and reduces the urgency and desperation associated with additional trades.
  25. The Blue Jays need pitching help. The current rotation is surviving, but Kevin Gausman, Jose Berrios and Chris Bassitt are racking up the innings, Eric Lauer seems too good to be true, and Max Scherzer is another injury waiting to happen. Toronto does not have —and could badly use—a quality sixth starter who would be ready to step up in case of injury, or if one of the current starters could just use another day of rest. But the bullpen could use another arm too. Yimi Garcia, Ryan Burr and Nick Sandlin are all hurt (to varying degrees) and while Brendon Little and Braydon Fisher are pitching well, it is dangerous to have to rely on pitchers with only 120 major league innings (combined) in their careers. What the Jays could really use is a quality swingman. Someone who has demonstrated the ability to work out of the bullpen in a high-leverage role, but who also can start games at the major league level. It would help if his trade cost were not that high. He could even be a rental, and possibly a player whose conventional stats were sufficiently cromulent to keep his price down, but whose advanced stats (and prior performance) gave reason for optimism. Someone like Michael Soroka of the Nationals. In 2024, Soroka pitched primarily out of the White Sox's bullpen. He had a 2.75 ERA in 36 innings, holding opponents to a .189/.303/.291 batting line. He also started nine games, but with an ugly 6.39 ERA over 44 innings. So far in 2025, Soroka has started 14 games with a 5.10 ERA over 72 innings. So far, “The Rock” seems like a better-than-decent bullpen addition but a poor addition to the starting rotation. But a deeper look gives a different picture. Soroka’s 5.10 ERA comes with a 3.22 xERA, a 3.90 xFIP and a 3.57 SIERA. The difference of 1.88 between his ERA and his xERA is the third highest among pitchers with 150+ balls in play. So, he has either been very unlucky (possible) or the victim of, ahem, “unfortunate” defence (did I mention that Washington’s year-to-date DEF rating of -30.7 is the second worst in baseball?) Even Soroka’s red flags are a potential fit for the Jays. He has a history of injuries, having only pitched 100 innings once in his six-year MLB career. So, if the Jays were looking for a 200+ inning workhorse, he might not be a good fit. But, as a swingman, he would likely not be asked to contribute too many innings over the remaining 62 games of the season, and he has only pitched 72 innings to date. Plus, he would slide beautifully into a bullpen role when (not if!) the Jays make the playoffs. Soroka is a rental—he will be a free agent after this year. As a result (and in part due to his $9 million 2025 salary), his estimated Baseball Trade Value is only $3 million. So, the prospect cost should be something like an Emmanuel Bonilla or RJ Schreck. Good prospects, but not untouchable. The beauty of landing a swingman like Soroka is that it does not limit the Jays in other moves. If, after they deal for him, the opportunity arises to trade for an Edward Cabrera or Mitch Keller, Toronto can just slide Soroka into a (still very valuable!) full-time, high-leverage bullpen role. And having a good swingman creates other opportunities. Maybe Gausman prefers to pitch on six days rest? Maybe Scherzer should miss a start now and then to recharge his batteries? Maybe Bassitt is pitching better at home than on the road, and so would happily trade an away start for a SkyDome one? There has been much speculation about the Jays pursuing a near-elite starter (like Keller) or reliever (like Bednar). But those players will be prohibitively expensive, and there is no guarantee that the Jays would ultimately be the highest bidders. Acquiring a player like Soroka, ideally early in the trade window over the next few days, provides Toronto with a backup plan, and reduces the urgency and desperation associated with additional trades. View full article
×
×
  • Create New...