Article: The Questionable April 5 Bullpen Decisions

[Bob Ritchie]

On Saturday, the Blue Jays led 2-0 after six innings but lost 3-2. Were John Schneider’s bullpen decisions reasonable?

Chris Bassitt pitched six and two-thirds innings against the Mets on Saturday. Entering the seventh, Bassitt scattered a triple (Jesse Winker) and two doubles (Francisco Lindor and Winker) and posted nine strikeouts and no walks through six innings. In the seventh, he retired the first two batters on weak ground outs (the exit velocities were 84.1 mph and 66.4 mph). The next batter, Mark Vientos, hit a line drive to left field (99.4 mph exit velocity). Bassitt’s outing ended when Schneider turned to Yimi García as Bassitt’s replacement.

The next three hitters were at the bottom of New York’s batting order. Those hitters (Brett Baty, Jose Siri, and Hayden Senger) all struck out in the fifth inning. Bassitt had thrown 92 pitches when he left the game, and it was a cold night in New York. Whether John Schneider should have replaced Bassitt at that point in the game is a matter for debate. However, there is a strong case that the manager’s reliever choices were highly questionable.

The Coin Flip
Jim Scott, a colleague at JaysCentre, often poses the following scenario. Suppose someone offers you a coin-flip opportunity. You can pick heads or tails, and you selected heads. If the coin comes up heads, you win $5; if it's tails, you pay $2. Given that the odds are 50/50 that the coin flip will be heads, you calculate your expected value to be $1.50 (50% of $5 less 50% of $2). Accordingly, you agree to the bet terms. The person who made the offer flips the coin, and it lands on tails. You lose $2.

Did you make a good decision? Yes, because your expected value of the bet was +$2.50. Unfortunately, your decision did not work out. I will revisit this concept later in the article.

The Recap After Bassitt’s Exit
García replaced Bassitt with two outs in the seventh. Baty placed a single in right field with an 80.0 mph exit velocity, and Siri walked on four pitches to load the bases. Starling Marte pinch-hit for Senger and grounded out softly (44.7 mph exit velocity) to end the inning. García threw 10 pitches in total.

Brendon Little took the mound to start the eighth. Lindor walked, Juan Soto blooped a single (73.4 mph exit velocity), Pete Alonso struck out, Brandon Nimmo lined out to center (105.1 mph exit velocity), and the Mets scored two runs on Winker’s triple (99.8 mph exit velocity). Schneider replaced Little with Nick Sandlin, who struck out Vientos to close the bottom of the eighth.

Sandlin returned to begin the ninth. Baty grounded out (107.1 mph exit velocity), Siri walked and soon advanced to second on a Sandlin wild pitch, and Luis Torrens dropped a soft single into left (71.7 mph exit velocity). Jeff Hoffman entered the game with one out and runners at the corners, but unfortunately for Toronto, Lindor greeted Hoffman with a sacrifice fly that scored Siri. A 3-2 loss for Toronto.

Why the Bullpen Decisions are Questionable
In high-leverage situations, teams utilize their best relievers differently than they did many years ago. For example, suppose the game is close in the eighth inning and the opposing team has the top of their order due up. Many moons ago, a manager was likely to save his closer for the ninth and use another reliever instead. In 2025, many managers will bring the closer into the game in the eighth to face the opposition’s best hitters in that high-leverage situation.

In high-leverage situations from 2022 to 2024, García and Hoffman allowed wOBA of .279 and .211, respectively. The 2024 MLB average wOBA in high-leverage situations was .307. For this reason, I would argue that they are ideally suited to be high-leverage relievers this season.

Let’s revisit Saturday’s game. When Bassitt exited, the number seven, eight, and nine hitters were due up. Although Toronto had a slim lead (2-0), the situation was medium leverage, not high. Accordingly, Schneider had options other than Garcia as Bassitt’s replacement. Table time! Please refer to Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1 shows that Chad Green, Sandlin, Little, García, and Hoffman were well-rested for Saturday’s game. Table 2 shows that Green and Sandlin, whose career wOBA splits are better than the 2024 MLB average, were viable options to face Baty. Therefore, Green or Sandlin could have replaced Bassitt and produced the final out.

Suppose Schneider selected Green instead of García and Baty was the final out. Toronto could have brought Green back in the eighth inning to face the number eight and nine hitters and have the option to have Green or García face Lindor. Alternatively, García could have started the eighth inning. Assuming Green and García performed well, Hoffman could have taken the mound in the ninth inning to close the game. Alternatively, Hoffman could have entered the game in the eighth, saving García for the ninth.

My analysis is not a case of judging a decision by the result. The decision to replace Bassitt with García, Garcia with Little, and Little with Sandlin was suboptimal. The better option would have been Green or Sandlin as Bassitt’s replacement and using García and Hoffman in the eighth and ninth innings. Furthermore, if Schneider brought García into the game in the seventh because Schneider believed that was a high-leverage situation, why not use Hoffman in the eighth? The eighth was high leverage because the score was close and the top of New York’s batting order was on the horizon. Schneider’s error in judgment was as much what he chose to do in the eighth as what he did in the seventh.

The Last Word
Judging a decision by the result is easy but not the correct approach. One should evaluate the soundness of a decision based on the information available when the person makes the choice. Accordingly, given that information, was the decision optimal? In other words, did the choice make sense?

There were many unknowns on Saturday, including how the relievers would perform. Like the coin flip example, Schneider’s bullpen decisions did not work out. However, unlike the coin flip example, Schneider’s decision was not sound. A reasonable decision would be to bring Green or Sandlin into the game in the seventh inning, a medium-leverage situation, thereby preserving García and Hoffman for the eighth and ninth innings. A less optimal choice, but better than Schneider’s decision to have Little enter the game in the eighth, would have been to use Hoffman in that inning. In summary, not every criticism of a decision is a case of 20/20 hindsight. Some decisions were not reasonable when made.

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[Spanky99]

Good writeup, fwiw I thought along the same line as yourself. It simply didn't make sense, and talk about killing a rookie's confidence in 2 outings, lol. Poor Fluarty.

[Mike LeSage]

I want to put you in a room with John Schneider and listen to you discuss the Monty Hall Problem.

[Terry Mesmer]

Well-reasoned.