What Could an Extension for Bo Bichette Look Like?

On April 14, the Toronto Blue Jays held a media event to officially announce their 14-year, $500 million contract extension with Vladimir Guerrero Jr. Soon after, media and fan attention turned to another extension candidate, Bo Bichette. So, let's take a deep dive into the factors involved in a potential Bichette extension.

Contract Model
Like many people, I use an fWAR-based model to estimate contract values. I project performance (fWAR) for a given term and apply a dollar value per fWAR to the projected performance. The critical assumptions are as follows:

• Age has an impact on performance. Accordingly, based on averages, for ages before 28, fWAR increases by 0.25 per season, and remains the same in the 28-30 age range. Between ages 31 & 37, fWAR is 0.5 lower each season, and 0.75 lower annually after age 37.
• If a player changes positions during the term of the contract, I may need to adjust fWAR. See FanGraphs for further analysis.
• The dollars per fWAR is not a linear relationship. Accordingly, I reduce $/fWAR by 20% when a season's fWAR is 2.0 or less.
• Given that $/fWAR tends to increase over time, I inflate the previous season's $/fWAR by 3%. 

Will Bichette Play Shortstop?
The best defensive middle infield regular on the 2025 Blue Jays is Andrés Giménez, not Bichette. Check out Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3. Before 2024, Bichette's FRV and OAA ranked in the bottom third of all shortstops. Because of injuries, Bichette played just 684 innings at short in 2024, less than the 1,261 innings he averaged in 2021-2023. Accordingly, I put less weight on his FRV and OAA rankings in 2024 due to the small sample size. However, Giménez's 2022-2024 FRV and OAA rankings among second basemen are elite.

So, why would Giménez be a better shortstop than Bichette? First, during his career at short, Giménez has posted 8 OAA in 304 attempts, corresponding with 11 OAA/400. In 2024, an 11 OAA would have ranked T7 among shortstops. Second, the lateral movement components of Giménez's OAA are superior to Bichette's. Third, foot speed over short distances is crucial for playing shortstop effectively. Table 3 shows that Giménez's percentile rankings over five-foot increments, from five to thirty feet, are significantly better than Bichette's. In my opinion, Giménez's superior footspeed over short distances lends itself to better shortstop performance.

From an arm strength perspective, consider Table 4. Regarding maximum velocity, both Giménez and Bichette have the arm strength to play shortstop. Additionally, both players possess the arm strength to play third base; the average arm strength of third basemen was 85.7 mph in 2024.

If I were to offer a contract extension to Bichette, I would condition the offer on his acceptance that he will move to second, or possibly third base. Accordingly, a position change from shortstop would reduce his positional adjustment from 7.5 runs (shortstop) to 2.5 runs (second or third base). Based on 2024's 9.683 runs per win factor, the five-run reduction corresponds to an approximate 0.5 fWAR decrease.

However, if Bichette played better defence at second/third than he does at shortstop, the 0.5 positional fWAR decrease could be mitigated by a higher fielding run number. For estimating a contract extension, I will assume that Bichette's fielding run number will not increase by switching from shortstop because his lateral movement projects to be average, at best.

The Impact of Bichette's 2024 Season
From 2021 to 2023, Bichette averaged 4.5 fWAR per season. In 2024, Bichette posted a 0.3 fWAR in 81 games. Most projections place Bichette's 2025 season in the 3.5 to 3.8 fWAR range. Also, during his career, Bichette is an average baserunner (+1 Baserunning Runs), and his defence is average, at best. Accordingly, Bichette's value-added depends on his bat. He is a career 119 wRC+ batter, which is very good but not great. Given the potential position change and other noted factors, a 2026 4.0 fWAR projection is reasonable.

The Impact of the Guerrero Jr. and Juan Soto Contracts
It is challenging for teams, players, and MLB observers to estimate the current dollar value per fWAR figure. For a Bichette contract estimate, I need to determine the $/fWAR number for the 2026 season. Here is my attempt.

• In December 2022, Aaron Judge signed a nine-year, $360 million contract with the New York Yankees. Based on Steamer's 2023 6.9 fWAR estimate, according to my model, the implied 2023 $/fWAR was $8.8 million and $9.4 million for the 2025 season.
• When the most recent free agent period began, MLB Trade Rumors's estimate for a Juan Soto contract was a 13-year, $600 million deal. Given Steamer's 2025 Soto 6.0 fWAR projection, the implied 2025 $/fWAR was $9.4 million.
• The $9.4 million figure was the implied rate for MLBTR's Willy Adames's six-year, $160 million contract estimate.
• Adames signed a seven-year, $182 million deal, corresponding to $10.1 million per fWAR in 2025. That is close to MLBTR's and Judge's 2025 implied $9.4 million.

So, does the implied 2025 $10.1 million per fWAR work for the Guerrero Jr. and Soto contracts? No, not even close. Please refer to Table 5.

Ultimately, Soto signed a 15-year, $765 million deal. After adjusting for the additional two years and the higher $/fWAR ($10.1 million versus $9.4 million), I arrived at a 15-year, $640 million deal. The implied premium paid by the Mets to land Soto was $125 million ($765 million less $640 million). The premium is understandable. First, suppose the $125 million is paid evenly over 15 years. With a 5% discount rate, the present value of the premium is approximately $86 million, not as astounding as the $125 million sticker price. Second, the bidders included the Mets and the Yankees. Accordingly, a bidding war between teams with deep pockets was likely to push the $/fWAR upwards.

According to my model, Toronto paid a $96 million premium to sign Guerrero Jr. to an extension. The Blue Jays were probably willing to pay more than the market $/fWAR for multiple reasons, including their preference to field a competitive team beyond 2025, maintaining or increasing revenues with Guerrero Jr. to cover the Rogers Centre's renovation costs, and other considerations.

I acknowledge that the estimated Soto and Guerrero Jr. premiums are projections, not known prices. For example, New York's projected fWAR for Soto could be higher than mine, which would reduce the premium. However, because MLBTR has a good record regarding contract estimates, there were probably abnormal factors that caused Soto's deal to exceed expectations. Also, it is unusual for Year 1 $/fWAR to change significantly from one year to the next. According to my calculation, the $/fWAR increased from $9.4 million to $12.0 million for Soto. Lastly, Soto's $12.0 million $/fWAR is substantially higher than Adames's $10.1 million. These points suggest that the Mets and Blue Jays paid premiums, perhaps not as large as $125 million and $96 million, to secure the players.

The special circumstances that led the Mets and Blue Jays to pay significant premiums to Soto and Guerrero Jr. will not apply to Bichette. He is not as valuable to Toronto as Guerrero Jr. Accordingly, I used $10.4 million/fWAR (2025's $ 10.1 million, increased by 3%) for Bichette's contract estimate.

Contract Estimates
Table 6 shows multiple contract estimates. The variables for the projections are contract length (eight or ten years) and first-year fWAR (4.5, 4.0 or 3.5). Because a starting 4.0 fWAR is reasonable, a 10-year, $283.4 million deal or an eight-year, $267.5 million agreement would be sensible. The tenth year of the contract would be Bichette's age-37 season.

The present value of the 10-year deal is slightly higher than that of the eight-year contract. One advantage of the 10-year agreement is that the lower AAV ($28.3 million versus $33.4 million) would result in a lower competitive balance tax number.

Will Bichette accept my reasonable contract? I have no idea, but it's fun to speculate.

The Last Word
Bichette is an average-ish fielder and baserunner. However, he is a very good hitter, which, given Toronto's need to bolster its offence, is worth retaining beyond 2025. Furthermore, the Blue Jays seem to have decided to compete for multiple postseason berths after 2025. The Guerrero Jr. extension is consistent with that goal, as would signing Bichette to a new, but reasonable, contract.