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Bob Ritchie

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  1. Let's return to the halcyon days of 2023, when the Blue Jays starting rotation performed very well. The group posted a 3.85 ERA and a 12.6 fWAR in 895 innings, which ranked second, fourth, and fourth among American League teams, respectively. However, the 2024 staff did not perform as well, as evidenced by their 3.95 ERA (which ranked ninth), 10.6 fWAR (also ninth), and 862 innings pitched (sixth). Although their 3.95 ERA was similar to 2023's 3.85 mark, it is misleading because the offensive environment changed. In 2023, the Toronto rotation ran a 91 ERA-, meaning it was 9% better than league average; in 2024, it was 99, just 1% better. So how will Blue Jay starters perform in 2025? I will use ZiPS DC projections to answer that question, focusing on two critical aspects of starting rotations: quality and depth. Model Talk Many attribute the quote above to George E. P. Box, a British mathematician. It underscores the idea that while no model can perfectly predict the future, some can provide valuable insights. This idea is particularly relevant to our discussion. The ZiPS DC model is a widely respected and comprehensive forecasting model that considers various performance metrics and historical data to project future player performance. Quality Baseball fans are accustomed to arguing about whether a pitcher should be categorized as a number one starter, number two starter, or even lower. The answer depends on the definition of each role. I address the issue by applying a metric-based framework. For a given metric, I define a number one starter as one whose metric (ERA, for example) is in the top 20% of starters. A number two is a starter who posted an ERA that fell into the next 20% of starters, and so on. I used ERA as my metric of choice for the analysis to follow. Table 1 shows the percentile breakpoints/thresholds for 2023 starters, and Table 2 concerns 2024. In 2023, five of Toronto's starters were either a one or a two, which explains, in part, why the Blue Jays' 2023 starter group had the second-lowest ERA among AL teams. Last season, according to this model, a starter with an ERA of 3.36 or lower was a number one. Between 3.36 and 3.77 made a pitcher a number two. A number five had an ERA higher than 4.99. Table 2 reflects the slots for Toronto's 2024 pitchers. Only Bowden Francis qualified as a number one. The Blue Jays had one number two (José Berríos), two number threes (Kevin Gausman and Chris Bassitt), and two number fours (Yusei Kikuchi and Yariel Rodríguez). Toronto's 2024 starter crew had less concentration in one and two slots than the prior season and, accordingly, posted an inferior overall ERA. 2025 Projection The ZiPS DC forecast predicts that Blue Jay starters will outperform the 2024 group. Table 3 provides the details. The projected ERA distribution is narrow. Toronto's fifth-best ERA (3.94) is just 0.11 points away from Tampa's second-lowest ERA (3.83) and 0.12 points lower than Kansas City's tenth-best ERA (4.06). The key takeaway is that the ZiPS DC model projects the Blue Jays' starting rotation to perform better. Let's delve into the specifics. Table 4 shows the projected ERAs of Toronto's starters and how those pitchers slot into the starter framework. The ZiPS DC forecast estimates better ERA seasons than 2024 for Gausman, Max Scherzer (3.61 versus 3.95), and Rodríguez. According to the projection, Alex Manoah (3.70 in 2024), Berríos and Francis should see higher ERAs than they produced last season. In summary, the ZiPS DC model projects the Blue Jays' starting rotation (on a relative basis) to outperform last season's crew and potentially rank among the top five American League rotations in 2025. This projection should fuel excitement among Blue Jays fans about the potential strength of Toronto's starters and the team's overall performance in the upcoming season. Depth Last season, MLB teams used an average of 13 different starters. Thus, the average team required another eight starters in addition to the five on the Opening Day roster. Accordingly, some MLB observers will determine how good the depth of a team's 2025 starting rotation will be by the quality of starters six through 13. However, the need for eight additional starters (13 less the top five) is somewhat misleading for three reasons: the distribution of starts, the average performance level from starters outside of the top five, and opener usage. The Distribution of Starts While the average MLB team will likely use approximately 13 starters in 2025, the distribution of starts is not even. Consider Table 5. In 2024, on average, five pitchers made 76% of all starts, and nine appeared in 94%. Therefore, four pitchers covered the other 6% (approximately 10 games). Suppose the quality of a pitcher decreases as one reaches further down into the organization. Therefore, a team will mitigate the reduced performance level of starters six through 13 because those pitchers will not start as many games as the top five, which is the superior starter group. I will address performance levels in the next section. Concerning the 2024 Blue Jays, five hurlers made 85% of the starts, and nine racked up 99% of the outings. In total, the Blue Jays used ten starters last season. Do you remember Paolo Espino and his 9.00 ERA? Performance Levels The second reason the average number of starters figures can be misleading is that performance levels are different between starter groups. Table 6 shows ERA figures for various groups. In 2024, the MLB average starter ERA was 4.15. However, the average ERA for the top five was 4.02, 4.68 for the next four, and 4.71 for the other starters. Concerning playoff teams, the numbers are 3.72, 4.68, and 5.27, respectively. Accordingly, a team would be satisfied if starters six through nine and 10 to 13 produced ERAs lower than 4.68 and 4.71, respectively. Therefore, the ERA expected from starters six to 13 should be higher than the average MLB starter ERA. Hence, it is okay if starters outside the top five are inferior. The ERA of the top five Blue Jays starters was slightly higher than the MLB average for a top five (4.07 versus 4.02). Still, the other four starters generated a 3.00 ERA, MLB's second-lowest in the six to nine groupings. Those pitchers were Francis (2.92), Manoah (3.70), Ryan Burr (3.38) and Trevor Richards (0.00). Opener Usage Teams can minimize the number of starters called up from the minors by using openers and swingmen such as Rodríguez. Therefore, having 13 pitchers start games does not necessarily mean that a ball club must look deeply into its minor league teams. A ballclub may have spot starters in the bullpen. Given the reasons noted above, a team's task of starting 13 different pitchers is not as daunting as it may seem. Onto the final projection! 2025 Starter Groups' Projection The reader can find Toronto's ZiPS DC projection here. In Table 7, I arranged Blue Jays' starters into the Top Five, Next Four, and Top Nine. The 2025 forecast should encourage Blue Jays fans. According to the ZiPS DC model, Toronto's Top Five slots in as the equivalent of a number two starter, the Next Four as a number three, and the Top Nine as a number two. (Toronto is projected only to need nine starters this season). Given the ZiPS DC projections, the 2025 Blue Jays should have a deep, high-quality starting rotation. The Last Word Toronto's 2024 starting rotation did not perform as well as the 2023 crew. However, ZiPS forecasts that the Blue Jays' 2025 starter group may rank in the top five of American League teams. Furthermore, Toronto's pitching depth should be a competitive advantage. Overall, the Blue Jays' starting rotation holds promise for the upcoming season.
  2. Marcus, nice to see you. The charts and tables have found a new home! Jim Scott also joined the Jays Centre team. I expect he will post an article in a week or so.
  3. Thanks for reading. That is a lot of money! :) Finding playing time for both Alonso and Bregman would be a real challenge. In addition to the plate appearances from the players I noted (Clement, Barger, and Springer), you would have to reduce the plate appearances of others (for example, Wagner, Schneider, more from Springer, etc.) by approximately 700.
  4. Toronto has been active since the end of the 2024 MLB season, adding Andrés Giménez, Nick Sandlin, Yimi García, Jeff Hoffman, Max Scherzer, and Anthony Santander, among others. The question is whether the Blue Jays have done enough to bolster a lackluster offence. In 2024, Toronto’s offence ranked 11th in the American League in runs (671), eighth in slugging percentage (.389) and 13th in home runs (156). Toronto could use another bat. With Santander, Depth Charts projects the team to finish seventh in runs scored in the AL. The issue is whether Pete Alonso and Alex Bregman can enhance Toronto’s ability to score runs. More to the point, do these players excel in aspects of hitting associated with run scoring? Short answer: yes. Depth Charts projects 36 home runs for Alonso, with a 125 wRC+, .473 slugging percentage, and .230 isolated slugging percentage. The projections for Bregman include 24 home runs with a 119 wRC+, .436 SLG, and .180 ISO. All these metrics are above average. Table 1 shows the correlation between runs and other metrics. For example, a strong, positive correlation (.84) between runs and SLG exists. In other words, a change in SLG change can explain 84% of the change in runs scored. The data illustrates that some of Toronto’s projected metrics (SLG, wOBA, etc.) would increase if the Blue Jays added Alonso or Bregman. Therefore, adding either player would improve Toronto's offence, given the correlations between the noted metrics and run-scoring. Although the change in the team metrics is not substantial, Alonso or Bregman would improve Toronto’s ranking vis-a-vis other American League teams. Also, in my experience, the distribution of a projected metric (for example, SLG) has been narrower than the actual spread of a given season. Therefor, in adding a bat such as Alonso or Bregman, the Blue Jays should see a noticeable improvement in runs scored. So, what are the Jays waiting for? Sign either one. Not so fast. Other considerations include defence, base running, contract cost, and Competitive Balance Tax (“CBT”) implications. Let’s examine those areas. It may surprise some, but Vladimir Guerrero Jr. does not field his first-base post well. Neither does Alonso. From 2022 to 2024, Guerrero's -26 OAA ranks last among first basemen, and Alonso (-17 OAA) has not been much better, ranking 34th of 38. Whether Alonso or Guerrero plays first, Toronto will be sub-par defensively. Therefore, an Alonso (with Vladdy moving to third) or Bregman signing will not significantly affect Toronto’s first-base defence. So, what is the third-base story? Bregman is a solid third baseman, as evidenced by his 16 OAA from 2022 to 2024, which ranked seventh-best among third basemen. Incumbent Ernie Clement, whose plate appearances I eliminated to fit Alonso or Bregman into the lineup (see Note 3 in Table 1), started playing third in 2021 and since then has registered 9 OAA in 400 attempts. During the same period, Bregman’s OAA per 400 attempts is 5. With the small sample size caveat for Clement, Bregman is not a better third-base defender. However, Clement’s projected 98 wRC+ trails Bregman. If Alonso signs with Toronto, he will likely be the everyday first baseman, not a DH. In his career, only 7% of his plate appearances have come as a DH, which is lower than Guerrero (21%) and Santander (18%). Therefore, the third base question revolves around Guerrero. Vladdy has played at the hot corner in two seasons, 2019 and 2024. In 2024, in 40 attempts, he put up 1 OAA. In 2019, he registered -20 OAA in 320 attempts, dead last among third basemen. In total, Guerrero Jr. has posted a -19 OAA in 360 attempts. As a first baseman, Guerrero Jr.’s OAA per 360 is -9; he has performed worse at third than first. Can Guerrero Jr. play a cromulent third base? There are two positive points to note. First, of his -19 OAA at third, 11 occurred when he came in on the ball. Moving laterally and backwards, his track record as a third baseman looks the same as his numbers as a first baseman. Given that Guerrero is in better physical shape than he was in 2019, perhaps he will come in on balls better in 2025. A second positive point is Guerrero’s arm strength. To learn more about Arm Strength, see Baseball Savant. In 2024, the average third baseman posted an Arm Strength of 85.7 mph. At first base, Guerrero Jr. registered an Arm Strength of 88.5 mph, the best among all first basemen. That would have been the third-highest among 2024 third basemen. Guerrero has an outstanding arm that is well-suited for third base. In summary, Guerrero’s poor hot-corner record outweighs his potential as a third baseman. If he moves to third, there will likely be a defensive downgrade compared to the expected Bregman or Clement performance level. Both Alonso and Bregman posted -7 baserunning runs from 2022 in 2024, so baserunning skills (or lack there of) are not a differentiator.(or lack t Let’s talk contracts. Assume that recent media reports concerning the contract demands of Alonso and Bregman are accurate. Alonso may receive a three-year deal worth $75 million. Bregman is seeking a six-year deal in the area of $186 million. I used Depth Charts’ projected 2025 fWAR for both free agents: 2.7 for Alonso and 4.1 for Bregman. Based on that, a reasonable three-year deal for Alonso is $57.9 million, while a reasonable siy-year deal for Bregman would be $160.7 million. If I boost Alonso’s projected 2025 fWAR from 2.7 to 3.2, the total value of a three-year deal is $75 million. In Bregman’s case, a 2025 mark of 4.6 fWAR results in a total contract value of $193.1 million, close to his reported demand. All things being equal, the rumoured contracts are reasonable. However, there is more to consider than contract dollars. There is age-performance risk. Given that 2025 will be Alonso’s age-30 season and Bregman’s age-31 campaign, age-related decline over the term of the deal is risky. Toronto can mitigate this risk with a shorter term. Therefore, a shorter contract (Alonso) is more attractive to a team than a longer deal (Bregman). There are two issues concerning CBT implications. Santander, Alonso, and Bregman rejected their qualifying offers. The Santander signing resulted in Toronto surrendering its second-highest pick in the 2025 MLB draft and reducing its bonus pool by $500,000 in the next international signing period. The penalty for signing a second free agent who rejected a qualifying offer is forfeiture of a team’s next-highest pick. Therefore, the draft-pick cost is the same for either player. Second, Toronto's CBT bill will increase. According to Cot’s Baseball Contracts, Toronto’s current CBT payroll is $267.2 million. If that payroll number is the same at season end, the CBT bill will be just under $6 million. Suppose the AAV for Alonso or Bregman is $30 million. That will push Toronto’s CBT payroll to $297.23, translating into a CBT bill of $20,64 million. Also, the Blue Jays will pass the third CBT threshold of $281 million and have their first pick in the 2026 MLB Draft moved back 10 spots. If that first pick is otherwise in the top 6 picks, Toronto’s second pick will drop 10 spots. Make no mistake: It would be expensive to acquire either Alonso or Bregman. If management is willing to absorb that cost, which is the best choice? Bregman is undoubtedly the better player from a performance perspective. Also, his third-base makes Bregman a better fit on the roster. However, Alonso would provide more power, which correlates strongly with run scoring. After all, the objective is to add to the offence. Lastly, from a risk perspective, Alonso is preferred given the difference in contract length (3 years versus six) for two players in their 30s. Considering all factors, I favour Alonso over Bregman. Now, we wait to see what unfolds!
  5. Rumours are circulating that the Toronto Blue Jays want to sign either Pete Alonso or Alex Bregman. Which player would be the better fit? Toronto has been active since the end of the 2024 MLB season, adding Andrés Giménez, Nick Sandlin, Yimi García, Jeff Hoffman, Max Scherzer, and Anthony Santander, among others. The question is whether the Blue Jays have done enough to bolster a lackluster offence. In 2024, Toronto’s offence ranked 11th in the American League in runs (671), eighth in slugging percentage (.389) and 13th in home runs (156). Toronto could use another bat. With Santander, Depth Charts projects the team to finish seventh in runs scored in the AL. The issue is whether Pete Alonso and Alex Bregman can enhance Toronto’s ability to score runs. More to the point, do these players excel in aspects of hitting associated with run scoring? Short answer: yes. Depth Charts projects 36 home runs for Alonso, with a 125 wRC+, .473 slugging percentage, and .230 isolated slugging percentage. The projections for Bregman include 24 home runs with a 119 wRC+, .436 SLG, and .180 ISO. All these metrics are above average. Table 1 shows the correlation between runs and other metrics. For example, a strong, positive correlation (.84) between runs and SLG exists. In other words, a change in SLG change can explain 84% of the change in runs scored. The data illustrates that some of Toronto’s projected metrics (SLG, wOBA, etc.) would increase if the Blue Jays added Alonso or Bregman. Therefore, adding either player would improve Toronto's offence, given the correlations between the noted metrics and run-scoring. Although the change in the team metrics is not substantial, Alonso or Bregman would improve Toronto’s ranking vis-a-vis other American League teams. Also, in my experience, the distribution of a projected metric (for example, SLG) has been narrower than the actual spread of a given season. Therefor, in adding a bat such as Alonso or Bregman, the Blue Jays should see a noticeable improvement in runs scored. So, what are the Jays waiting for? Sign either one. Not so fast. Other considerations include defence, base running, contract cost, and Competitive Balance Tax (“CBT”) implications. Let’s examine those areas. It may surprise some, but Vladimir Guerrero Jr. does not field his first-base post well. Neither does Alonso. From 2022 to 2024, Guerrero's -26 OAA ranks last among first basemen, and Alonso (-17 OAA) has not been much better, ranking 34th of 38. Whether Alonso or Guerrero plays first, Toronto will be sub-par defensively. Therefore, an Alonso (with Vladdy moving to third) or Bregman signing will not significantly affect Toronto’s first-base defence. So, what is the third-base story? Bregman is a solid third baseman, as evidenced by his 16 OAA from 2022 to 2024, which ranked seventh-best among third basemen. Incumbent Ernie Clement, whose plate appearances I eliminated to fit Alonso or Bregman into the lineup (see Note 3 in Table 1), started playing third in 2021 and since then has registered 9 OAA in 400 attempts. During the same period, Bregman’s OAA per 400 attempts is 5. With the small sample size caveat for Clement, Bregman is not a better third-base defender. However, Clement’s projected 98 wRC+ trails Bregman. If Alonso signs with Toronto, he will likely be the everyday first baseman, not a DH. In his career, only 7% of his plate appearances have come as a DH, which is lower than Guerrero (21%) and Santander (18%). Therefore, the third base question revolves around Guerrero. Vladdy has played at the hot corner in two seasons, 2019 and 2024. In 2024, in 40 attempts, he put up 1 OAA. In 2019, he registered -20 OAA in 320 attempts, dead last among third basemen. In total, Guerrero Jr. has posted a -19 OAA in 360 attempts. As a first baseman, Guerrero Jr.’s OAA per 360 is -9; he has performed worse at third than first. Can Guerrero Jr. play a cromulent third base? There are two positive points to note. First, of his -19 OAA at third, 11 occurred when he came in on the ball. Moving laterally and backwards, his track record as a third baseman looks the same as his numbers as a first baseman. Given that Guerrero is in better physical shape than he was in 2019, perhaps he will come in on balls better in 2025. A second positive point is Guerrero’s arm strength. To learn more about Arm Strength, see Baseball Savant. In 2024, the average third baseman posted an Arm Strength of 85.7 mph. At first base, Guerrero Jr. registered an Arm Strength of 88.5 mph, the best among all first basemen. That would have been the third-highest among 2024 third basemen. Guerrero has an outstanding arm that is well-suited for third base. In summary, Guerrero’s poor hot-corner record outweighs his potential as a third baseman. If he moves to third, there will likely be a defensive downgrade compared to the expected Bregman or Clement performance level. Both Alonso and Bregman posted -7 baserunning runs from 2022 in 2024, so baserunning skills (or lack there of) are not a differentiator.(or lack t Let’s talk contracts. Assume that recent media reports concerning the contract demands of Alonso and Bregman are accurate. Alonso may receive a three-year deal worth $75 million. Bregman is seeking a six-year deal in the area of $186 million. I used Depth Charts’ projected 2025 fWAR for both free agents: 2.7 for Alonso and 4.1 for Bregman. Based on that, a reasonable three-year deal for Alonso is $57.9 million, while a reasonable siy-year deal for Bregman would be $160.7 million. If I boost Alonso’s projected 2025 fWAR from 2.7 to 3.2, the total value of a three-year deal is $75 million. In Bregman’s case, a 2025 mark of 4.6 fWAR results in a total contract value of $193.1 million, close to his reported demand. All things being equal, the rumoured contracts are reasonable. However, there is more to consider than contract dollars. There is age-performance risk. Given that 2025 will be Alonso’s age-30 season and Bregman’s age-31 campaign, age-related decline over the term of the deal is risky. Toronto can mitigate this risk with a shorter term. Therefore, a shorter contract (Alonso) is more attractive to a team than a longer deal (Bregman). There are two issues concerning CBT implications. Santander, Alonso, and Bregman rejected their qualifying offers. The Santander signing resulted in Toronto surrendering its second-highest pick in the 2025 MLB draft and reducing its bonus pool by $500,000 in the next international signing period. The penalty for signing a second free agent who rejected a qualifying offer is forfeiture of a team’s next-highest pick. Therefore, the draft-pick cost is the same for either player. Second, Toronto's CBT bill will increase. According to Cot’s Baseball Contracts, Toronto’s current CBT payroll is $267.2 million. If that payroll number is the same at season end, the CBT bill will be just under $6 million. Suppose the AAV for Alonso or Bregman is $30 million. That will push Toronto’s CBT payroll to $297.23, translating into a CBT bill of $20,64 million. Also, the Blue Jays will pass the third CBT threshold of $281 million and have their first pick in the 2026 MLB Draft moved back 10 spots. If that first pick is otherwise in the top 6 picks, Toronto’s second pick will drop 10 spots. Make no mistake: It would be expensive to acquire either Alonso or Bregman. If management is willing to absorb that cost, which is the best choice? Bregman is undoubtedly the better player from a performance perspective. Also, his third-base makes Bregman a better fit on the roster. However, Alonso would provide more power, which correlates strongly with run scoring. After all, the objective is to add to the offence. Lastly, from a risk perspective, Alonso is preferred given the difference in contract length (3 years versus six) for two players in their 30s. Considering all factors, I favour Alonso over Bregman. Now, we wait to see what unfolds! View full article
  6. Thanks! Concerning writing for Jays Centre, I tried multiple times to submit the online form. However, I received the same message: "Error Code EX1364." Is there another way I can inquire about writing for the site?
  7. Below is a table of the Top-20 catchers by bWAR for the period after 1946 (the Jackie Robinson era and after). I believe Martin is a candidate for the Very Good Hall of Fame. Furthermore, Gene Tenace, Thurman Munson and Bill Freehan deserve Hall of Fame membership, particularly considering how they were top-tier in many single seasons (according to WAR7, a player's best seven bWAR seasons).
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