Bob Ritchie

Jason MacDonald of JFtC Fame?😁

I am optimistic that he can approach a 115 to 120ish wRC+ in 2026. His 2025 XWOBACAON was 0.433 (MLB Average is 0.368). He did change his batting stance in 2025 (6 degrees open to 5 degrees closed), so there were notable changes. Your thoughts on his "epiphany"? Would you sign Varsho to an extension, and if so, what dollar amount and term would you offer?

Starting in 2022, Daulton Varsho began to establish himself as an elite defensive outfielder. Of his 3,836 innings in the outfield, Varsho has played center (2,063), left (1,222) and right (551). Among the 51 center fielders with a minimum of 1,000 innings under their center field belts in that time, his 18 FRV/1200 slots in as the second highest. Concerning the corner outfield positions, Varsho has MLB’s highest FRV/1200 at 14. Did I mention that Varsho is elite defensively? Varsho has also been above average on the basepaths (9.0 XBR) during his career. Regarding hitting, he has been average (career 99 wRC+), although in limited plate appearances (271) in 2025, he generated a 123 wRC+, .345 wOBA, .326 xwOBA and .310 ISO. That ISO mark ranked seventh among the 309 batters with at least 250 plate appearances. Has Varsho turned the corner into becoming an above-average hitter? Time will tell. Concerning fWAR, Varsho has generated a 7.3 score during his three-season tenure with the Toronto Blue Jays. Suppose Varsho had not split time in center field with Kevin Kiermaier in 2023 and 2024. The corner outfield-to-center field positional adjustment boost would have raised his 2023 fWAR from 1.9 to 2.5 and his 2024 fWAR from 3.1 to 3.4. Regarding 2025, Varsho had two lengthy stints on the Injured list: March 27 to April 29 (shoulder) and June 1 to August 1 (hamstring). If one assumes the same level of fielding and hitting and doubles his innings from 550 to 1,100 and plate appearances from 271 to 542, Varsho’s 2025 fWAR soars to 4.5. When he played, Varsho was an All-Star-calibre player last season. An extension for an elite defensive center fielder entering his age-29 season should be simple. Well, no. Time for a journey through Table Land! Generally speaking, center field is the domain of younger players. Please refer to Tables 1 and 2. During the 2005-2025 period, excluding the pandemic-shortened 60-game 2020 season, there were 26 instances (1.3 per season) in which center fielders aged 31-35 started 120 or more games. There were 134 instances (6.7 per season) in which center fielders aged 26-30 started at least 120 games in a season. In percentage terms, among players who started 120 or more games in a season, 58% were older than 25 but younger than 31. By comparison, only 11% of the times that center fielders started at least 120 games in a campaign were those players older than 30 but younger than 36. For the 30-35 age group, Table 3 provides more detail. For the 2021 to 2025 period, no outfielder older than 30 started at least 120 games in center field; there were seven instances when a player older than 30 started more than 99 games in center field. During the most recent 10-year period with a 162-game regular season schedule (2015-2025), a player older than 30 started 120 or more games in center field eight times. Why the concern over players over the age of 30 starting at least 120 games in a season? Because fWAR is a key input used by teams to determine contract values. Two of the factors that affect fWAR are playing time (innings and plate appearances) and a player’s position. As players age, injuries tend to occur more frequently and take longer to heal, thereby reducing playing time. Moreover, as players age, Father Time becomes evident, resulting in diminished athleticism and performance. Hence, teams often move a center fielder to a corner outfield position in their 30s because their defensive skills are better suited to left or right field (see George Springer). Given the fWAR positional adjustment from center field (+2.5 runs) to left or right field (-7.5 runs), if the Blue Jays were to move Varsho to a corner outfield position during the term of the extension, his fWAR would decrease by approximately one win per season for the balance of the contract (all other things being equal). Therefore, a contract extension for Varsho, as he approaches his 30s, must account for the risk of reduced playing time and a position change. However, are there examples of well-above-average defenders in center field that continued to excel into their 30s? Yes, a limited number. I screened for center fielders who met the following criteria: Played in the majors during the 2005-2025 period. At the age of 30, they were well-above-average defensively according to the DRS metric and continued to excel into their early 30s. Reached the age of 35 during the 2005-2025 seasons. Because he is well known to Blue Jays fans, I included Kiermaier, who retired after his age-34 season (2024). I present Table 4. Carlos Beltrán’s center field defence was no longer well-above average after his age-31 season. However, because he posted a 131 wRC+ and 23.6 fWAR during his age-30 to 35 seasons, I am sure that Beltrán’s employers were unfazed that he no longer patrolled center field on a full-time basis. Still, his center field defence declined as he entered his 30s. Kiermaier remained superb defensively post-pandemic (17 DRS/1200), but, due to limited playing time (an average of 770 innings per season) because of injuries and below-average hitting (89 wRC+), Kiermaier generated a meager 6.7 fWAR over four seasons. After playing five games in 2020, Lorenzo Cain decided not to play during the balance of the pandemic-shortened season. In 2021, his age-35 campaign, he was on the injured list from June 1 to July 27 due to a hamstring injury. In total, he played 78 games in 2021. Yet, during his age-30 to 35 seasons, excluding 2020, Cain continued to excel defensively (15 DRS/1200) in 4,839 innings, and he posted a 105 wRC+ and 15.9 fWAR. He is an example of a player who was superb defensively at age 30 and continued to excel at age 33. We now turn to the Varsho contract extension matter. As Tables 1, 2 and 3 showed, it is unusual for a center fielder older than 29 to start 120 or more games in a season. Furthermore, it is rare for a center fielder to continue to log almost 1,000 innings a season and excel defensively after the age of 30. Cain is the sole example during the 2005-2025 period. Therefore, from Toronto’s perspective, the shorter the Varsho extension, the better. Behold Table 5! The key assumptions in Table 5 are as follows: The 2026 $/fWAR rate is $9 million, which is the figure used by Baseball Trade Values. An arbitrary 3% annual fWAR inflator. Cot’s Baseball Contracts’ $11.8 million arbitration award for the 2026 season. The 2026 3.5 fWAR projection is the average of Varsho’s boosted 2023, 2024, and 2025 fWAR numbers noted earlier (2.5, 3.4 and 4.5, respectively). The 3.5 figure is on the optimistic side, but I believe Varsho can nearly replicate his 2025 123 wRC+ and his defensive prowess in the future, at least in the short term. Varsho’s arm strength returns to its pre-2025 level. After his shoulder surgery in 2024, Varsho’s arm strength averaged 73.7 mph, down from the 83.9 and 83.7 mph in 2023 and 2024, respectively. Although Varsho’s arm strength was typically in the 40th percentile before last season, it was in the fifth percentile in 2025. My estimate of a fair contract is a four-year, $100 million deal that would run from 2026-29. The AAV is on the high side, but the contract does not extend beyond Varsho's age-32 season, when the risks of reduced playing time and a position switch are elevated. The Last Word The reader should note that shopping in the free agent market is different from buying broccoli at the grocery store. At the grocery store, a non-negotiable price is posted, and you can typically take the broccoli from the bin whenever you want it. The free agent market does not have a fixed price, nor can a team acquire a free agent on demand. I know the price of broccoli, but I do not know the market price of a Varsho extension; however, I can estimate it. With that proviso in mind, would Varsho accept a four-year, $100 million extension? I do not know, but it is a fair deal. The optimistic fWAR projection and higher AAV would benefit the player, and the short contract length addresses the team’s presumptive concerns regarding playing time and a potential switch from center field to a corner outfield position. View full article

The Toronto Blue Jays fell short of winning the 2025 World Series, but their lengthy postseason run yielded financial benefits to the players, other personnel, and the team/owner. As Jay Centre’s Leo Morgenstern noted in his article, Details on Blue Jays' Share of Postseason Revenue Pool, Toronto’s players and other employees will share in the $128.2 million players’ pool. The amount allocated to the Blue Jays was $30.8 million. At the club/owner level, there were also financial rewards from the Blue Jays’ postseason journey. From this point forward, unless stated otherwise, any reference to what the Blue Jays received from the postseason run excludes any compensation due to the players or other employees. In other words, the focus is on the financial benefits to the Blue Jays’ company/Rogers Communications. The first reward is Toronto’s share of postseason gate receipts. This number is not currently publicly available, but we can use the $128.2 million players’ pool figure and other publicly available figures to estimate the amount the Blue Jays received in postseason gate receipts. Let’s get started! Below is an excerpt from a 2012 FanGraphs article. My understanding is that the allocation above is accurate except for the Wild Card games. When Wendy Thurm wrote the aforementioned FanGraphs article, the Wild Card round was only one game long, as opposed to the current best-of-three format. Under the current Collective Bargaining Agreement (Article X), players receive 60 percent of paid attendance receipts for the first two games of each Wild Card Series. So, what were the total gate receipts from the 2025 postseason? A back-of-the-envelope calculation is as follows: There were 47 playoff games in 2025, 32 of which were games used to determine the $128.2 million players’ pool amount. Given that the players’ share of the gate receipts is 60% of the games noted in the excerpt, those games are equivalent to 19.2 games (32 games x 0.60). Accordingly, the gate receipts per game are $6.7 million ($128.2 million / 19.2 games). Total gate receipts are the number of games multiplied by the gate receipts per game. Hence, total gate receipts are $314.9 million (47 games x $6.7 million). The Commissioner’s Office would receive $47.2 million ($314.9 million x 0.15). Accordingly, the "teams’ pool" is $139.5 million ($314.9 million - $128.2 million - $47.2 million). However, concerning Toronto’s share of gate receipts, we require a more detailed calculation because postseason teams do not share in the teams’ pool per se. Instead, the two teams in each series share equally in the gate receipts allocated to them. Therefore, a more precise estimate of Toronto’s share of gate receipts requires attendance figures and ticket prices for each series. Onto the tables! Table 1 shows MLB’s 2025 postseason attendance by series. Table 2 presents my estimates of gate receipts by series and the allocation of gate receipts to players, teams, and the Commissioner’s Office. Please note that I increased the average ticket price as the postseason continued. I arbitrarily increased the average Wild Card Series ticket price for the Division Series, Championship Series and World Series by factors of 1.25, 1.50 and 2.00, respectively. I am comfortable with the ticket prices shown because they generated the $128.2 million Players’ Pool figure, and the $316.7 million total gate receipts were within 0.6% of my back-of-the-envelope $314.9 million estimate. Please note that, for each series Toronto played, the teams’ share of gate receipts was split equally between the ballclubs. Accordingly, the Blue Jays shared gate receipts with the Yankees (Division Series), the Mariners (League Championship Series), and the Dodgers (World Series). Hence, Tables 1 and 2, and the supporting numbers, are essential for calculating Toronto’s share of gate receipts. Behold Table 3! Toronto’s share of gate receipts was $48.2 million, comprised of the 20 percent share (50% of 40% or $18.2 million, the sum of Rows A) of gate receipts that were also allocated to the Players’ Pool, and the half-share (50% of 100% or $30.0 million, the sum of Rows B) of the gate receipts distributable to the two teams. Lastly, the fee due to the Commissioner’s Office (15% of $48.2 million or $11.3 million) is deducted, leaving Rogers with a tidy net sum of $36.9 million. In addition to the postseason gate receipts, there are other benefits to the team/Rogers that I cannot calculate. These include increased merchandise, concession, and other game-related revenues attributable to the postseason. Additionally, regular season revenue streams and ticket sales likely increased due to Toronto’s run for the American League East division title. Additionally, 2026 ticket sales should increase due to a successful 2025 regular season and playoff campaign. Lastly, Rogers owns Sportsnet, which holds the Blue Jays' television and radio rights. Although I do not have data to support this claim, Sportsnet’s television ratings, in particular, must have increased substantially, benefiting the broadcaster and, indirectly, Rogers financially. A non-financial reward of the regular season and postseason could be that free agents are viewing the Blue Jays more favourably as a destination. Toronto’s extended playoff run, together with the enthusiastic nationwide fan support during the regular season and playoffs, should make the Blue Jays more attractive. Indeed, money is a significant factor for free agents, but players may view a team that projects to be a well-supported, successful franchise in 2026 more positively. The Last Word For the Toronto Blue Jays and their fans, the 2025 postseason did not culminate in a World Series championship. However, the players and the owner benefited financially from the playoff journey. The players and other employees will participate in their $30.8 million share of the players’ pool. The team/Rogers benefited from an estimated $36.9 million net share of 2025 postseason gate receipts. Other benefits to the team/owner include increased merchandise, concession, and other game-day-related revenue streams. May 2026 bring a World Series championship to the Blue Jays and their fans, as well as more financial benefits from another long postseason journey. View full article

Pat Gillick many times recounted his wife's reaction to the big 1990 trade. Fred McGriff was Doris Gillick's favourite player. Before the deal was announced publicly, Pat called Doris to tell her about the deal, particularly the inclusion of McGriff. Doris, after a long pause, replied, “Why don’t you get home as soon as possible before you screw up the team anymore?” https://www.mlb.com/news/padres-biggest-winter-meetings-moves

There are two ways former MLB players can be elected to the National Baseball Hall of Fame. The first is the annual election conducted by the Baseball Writers’ Association of America (“BBWAA”). The second is selection by an Era Committee, formerly known as the Veterans Committee. Of the 278 former major league players who are members of the Hall of Fame, 117 were elected by an Era/Veterans Committee. This year's Era Committee will officially announce the election results on December 7, 2025. Concerning the BBWAA’s election, an eligible player’s name must appear on at least 75% of the BBWAA ballots cast in a given year to become a Hall of Fame member. The BBWAA removes a candidate from future ballots if either the candidate’s name appeared on fewer than five percent of the ballots or the player was on the ballot for 10 years but did not meet the 75% condition. Delgado’s name initially appeared on the BBWAA’s ballot in 2015. Unfortunately, his name appeared on only 3.8% of ballots cast, and the BBWAA removed him from future ballots. Now, for the first time, Delgado is on a Contemporary Baseball Era Committee ballot, for the Hall of Fame class of 2026. To gain entrance into the Hall, Delgado’s name must appear on at least 12 of the 16 Era Committee ballots cast. Delgado played 17 seasons, 12 with the Blue Jays (1993-2004), one with the Marlins (2005) and four with the Mets (2006-2009). He posted a 135 wRC+ and a 44.4 bWAR. Other highlights from his career include the following: His wRC+ was 19th among the 162 players who played during his career (1993-2009) and had at least 5,000 plate appearances. Concerning first basemen, Delgado’s wRC+ was the eighth highest, and, notably, five of the seven first basemen ahead of Delgado are Hall of Famers (or future Hall of Famers, in the case of Albert Pujols). Delgado hit 473 home runs, which is 34th all-time. Among players whose careers began after 1979, his home run total ranks #16 overall and eighth among first basemen. In four seasons, Delgado finished in the top 10 of MVP voting: 2000 (4th), 2003 (2nd), 2005 (6th) and 2008 (9th). He won three Silver Slugger Awards (1999, 2000 and 2003). Delgado had two seasons in which his bWAR was in the top 10 among position players (2000 and 2003). Delgado’s last full MLB season was 2008, his age-36 campaign. He generated a 123 wRC+ with 38 home runs and a 1.3 bWAR. In 2009, he played 26 games, but did not play after May 10 due to a hip injury. Subsequently, Delgado underwent two hip surgeries. He attempted a comeback in 2010 with Boston’s Triple-A affiliate, but after five games, he called an end to the comeback and his MLB career. Delgado was not known for his defence. As a first baseman, his Total Zone per 1,200 innings was -2. That is inferior to Don Mattingly’s +3, and many MLB observers considered Mattingly to be a premier defender at first base. I wrote about Mattingly's candidacy earlier this week; the former Blue Jays bench coach is on the same Hall of Fame ballot as Delgado. Concerning dWAR, the career marks of Delgado and Mattingly are -17.2 and -6.2, respectively. Delgado’s best case for Hall of Fame membership is his home run total. Of the 33 players with more home runs, 24 are Hall of Famers, seven were linked with performance-enhancing drugs (Barry Bonds et al.) and have yet to be elected to the Hall of Fame, and two are almost-certain Hall of Fame members (Albert Pujols and Miguel Cabrera). If the Era Committee does not elect Delgado to the Hall of Fame, he will be the only non-PED-linked name among the top 34 home run hitters not in the Hall. Onto the bWAR numbers! Three bWAR-based metrics are valuable for evaluating whether a player has earned Hall of Fame membership: bWAR, WAR7, and JAWS. bWAR does not require explanation, but WAR7 and JAWS do. One of the limitations of career bWAR is that a Hall of Fame candidate may have generated a high bWAR because they had a lengthy career. Since a Hall of Famer should be one of the best at their position over multiple seasons, WAR7, the total of a player’s seven highest bWAR seasons, is informative because it measures dominance across many years. JAWS, developed by Jay Jaffe, is the average of bWAR and WAR7, and it is instructive because it balances these two metrics (bWAR and WAR7). Jaffe, now of FanGraphs, wrote an excellent article about Delgado’s Hall of Fame candidacy. However, as with Mattingly, it is the bWAR-related metrics that most hurt Delgado’s Hall of Fame candidacy. In addition to Delgado, Table 1 shows the career bWAR marks of the top 15 first basemen whose MLB careers began after 1979. Delgado’s bWAR, WAR7 and JAWS numbers are noticeably below the average of the Hall of Famers on the list (Jeff Bagwell, Frank Thomas, Jim Thome, Todd Helton, Fred McGriff, and David Ortiz). Of these Hall of Fame members, McGriff was the only one voted in by an Era Committee. Delgado’s bWAR, WAR7 and JAWS marks are 44.4, 34.5 and 39.4, which rank 19th, 21st and 18th, respectively. Concerning the all-time Hall of Fame list, there are 25 first basemen. Their average bWAR, WAR7 and JAWS are 65.0, 42.0 and 53.5, respectively. Furthermore, among all first basemen, Delgado’s bWAR and WAR7 rank 40th, and his JAWS slots in at #38. Circling back to Table 1, Delgado’s WAR7, like Mattingly's, is similar to those of Ortiz and McGriff. So, should he be in the Hall of Fame? The answer is no, because Hall of Fame membership should be exclusive and reserved for those who were clearly the best of their era at their position. In other words, the entrance bar should be set high. The Hall of Fame candidacies of Ortiz and McGriff were marginal. The bar should not be lowered further to grant Hall of Fame access to Delgado or Mattingly. The Last Word The threshold to be a Hall of Famer should be set high. Although Delgado’s home run total is impressive, there should be more than one aspect of hitting, no matter how important that one aspect is, that vaults a player into the Hall. Delgado’s all-around game, as measured by bWAR-related metrics, places him, like many players, in the Hall of Very Good, not the Hall of Fame. View full article

On December 2, the Toronto Blue Jays announced that their seven-year, $210 million contract with Dylan Cease had been finalized. Today on X, the New York Post's Jon Heyman reported the financial structure of the deal. When the Cease deal was first reported, pending the results of a physical, it was widely believed that the contract included deferrals. According to Heyman and others, the total amount deferred will be $64 million. The salary to be paid from 2026-2032 is $123 million, plus a $23 million signing bonus. Also, the contract contains a limited no-trade clause. The timing of the deferred payments Toronto will make to Cease was not reported. The Athletic's Ken Rosenthal reported that the AAV of the deal was close to $27 million ($189 million divided by seven). That would make the present value of the deferrals for Competitive Balance Tax (“CBT”) purposes approximately $43 million ($189 million less $146 million in salary and bonus). It should be noted that under the CBA, teams must fund a deferral by the second July 1 following the season in which the deferral was earned. In other words, Toronto would have to fund the $10 million deferral for 2026 by July 1, 2028. The amount funded is the present value of the deferred amount using a 5% discount rate. A rough estimate is that Toronto's first funding payment will be approximately $7.5 million. From the team’s perspective, the primary advantage of deferrals is the reduction of the AAV used for CBT purposes. Given that Toronto pays the CBT, every little bit helps! Featured image courtesy of Denis Poroy, Imagn Images. View full rumor

There are two ways MLB players can be elected to the National Baseball Hall of Fame. The first is the annual election conducted by the Baseball Writers’ Association of America (“BBWAA”). The second is selection by the Era Committee, formerly the Veterans Committee. Of the 278 former major league players who are members of the Hall of Fame, 117 were elected by the Era/Veterans Committee. The Era Committee will officially announce the election results on December 7, 2025. Concerning the BBWAA’s election, an eligible player’s name must appear on at least 75% of the BBWAA ballots cast each year to become a Hall of Fame member. The BBWAA removes a candidate from future ballots if either the candidate’s name appeared on fewer than five percent of the ballots or the player was on the ballot for 10 years but did not meet the 75% condition. Don Mattingly was first on the BBWAA’s ballot in 2001 and appeared on 28.2% of the ballots. Under the then-rules, Mattingly was on the ballot for 15 years, did not meet the 75% threshold, and was removed from future ballots. In 2015, Mattingly’s last year of eligibility, his name appeared on 9.1% of the ballots. In 2018 and 2020, Mattingly was eligible for Hall of Fame consideration by the Veterans Committee but did not receive a vote in either year. In 2022, the Hall of Fame renamed the Veterans Committee the Era Committee and split the ballots into two time periods: the Contemporary Baseball Era (post-1979) and the Classic Baseball Era (pre-1980). Mattingly received 50% of the 16 votes in the 2023 Contemporary Era ballot. He is on the 2026 ballot. Mattingly played 14 seasons for the New York Yankees (1982 to 1995) and posted a 42.4 bWAR and a 124 wRC+. He was considered by many to be one of the best defensive first basemen of his generation. His notable achievements include the following: The 1985 AL MVP. Also, he finished fifth, second, and seventh in the 1984, 1986, and 1987 AL MVP voting. Nine American League Gold Glove Awards (1985-1989 and 1991-1994). Three Silver Sluggers (1985-1987). During his MLB career, the Yankees failed to qualify for the postseason from 1982 to 1993; MLB cancelled the 1994 playoffs due to the players’ strike. However, in his one postseason (1995), Mattingly posted a 200 wRC+ in 25 plate appearances. Starting in the late 1980s, back issues plagued Mattingly, and his power declined significantly. From 1982 to 1987, Mattingly generated a 0.212 ISO, much higher than MLB’s non-pitcher 0.137 average. However, for the 1988-1995 period, Mattingly’s 0.164 ISO was just 27 points higher than the MLB non-pitcher 0.137 average. Between 1982 and 1987, Mattingly’s wRC+ was 146, and it was 109 for the balance of his career. A valuable tool to evaluate whether a player has earned a Hall of Fame membership is three bWAR-based metrics: bWAR, WAR7, and JAWS. bWAR does not require explanation, but WAR7 and JAWS do. One of the limitations of career bWAR is that a Hall of Fame candidate may have generated a high bWAR because they played many seasons. Since a Hall of Famer should be one of the best at their position over multiple seasons, WAR7, a player’s seven-highest bWAR seasons, is informative because it measures dominance across many seasons. JAWS, developed by Jay Jaffe, is the average of bWAR and WAR7, and it is instructive because it balances these two metrics (bWAR and WAR7). Jaffe, now of FanGraphs, wrote an excellent article about Mattingly’s Hall of Fame candidacy. It is the bWAR-related metrics that hurt Mattingly’s Hall of Fame candidacy. In addition to Mattingly, Table 1 shows the top 15 career bWAR marks of first basemen whose MLB career began after 1979. Mattingly’s bWAR, WAR 7, and JAWS numbers are noticeably below the average of the Hall of Famers on the list (Jeff Bagwell, Frank Thomas, Jim Thome, Todd Helton, Fred McGriff, and David Ortiz). Of these Hall of Fame members, McGriff is the only player voted in by the Era Committee. Mattingly’s bWAR, WAR7, and JAWS stats are 42.4, 35.7, and 39.1, which rank 21st, 17th, and 20th, respectively. Concerning the all-time Hall of Fame list, there are 25 first basemen. Their average bWAR, WAR7, and JAWS are 65.0, 42.0, and 53.5, respectively. Furthermore, among all first basemen, Mattingly’s bWAR, WAR7, and JAWS ranks 45th, 34th, and 40th, respectively. There is an argument that, because an injury curtailed Mattingly’s performance significantly and shortened his career, one should judge his career in that light. Accordingly, I present Hall of Fame pitcher, Sandy Koufax. From a performance perspective, Koufax’s career is nearly the mirror image of Mattingly’s. Whereas Mattingly’s first half of his 14-year career accounts for 69% of his career bWAR, Koufax generated 87% of his career pitching bWAR over the last six seasons of his 12-year career. Despite an arthritic elbow, which he linked to jamming his throwing arm on the basepaths in a 1964 game against the Braves, Koufax was dominant in 1965 and 1966 (18.4 bWAR). However, arthritic pain and concerns about the health effects of painkillers led Koufax to retire at 30 after the 1966 season. At the conclusion of the 1971 season, Koufax’s 48.9 bWAR and 46.0 WAR7 were below the then-average Hall of Fame pitcher’s 66.4 bWAR and 48.3 WAR7. Koufax was on the BBWAA ballot for the first time for the 1972 Hall of Fame Class; his name appeared on 86.9% of the ballots cast, and he was elected to the Hall of Fame. When Koufax was elected to the Hall of Fame, the Wins Above Replacement model did not exist, at least publicly. For many writers, one metric they consider is pitcher wins. At the conclusion of the 1971 campaign, the average win total of the Hall of Fame pitchers was 246, which Koufax fell short of (165). However, during the last six years of his career, Koufax recorded 129 wins, or 21.5 wins per season. I guess that BBWAA writers used the 21.5 wins per season as evidence of Koufax’s dominance in the last six years of his career. The Koufax historical review is a long-winded journey back to Mattingly. Was Mattingly Hall-of-Fame-worthy dominant before injuries either curtailed performance or shortened his career? The answer is no. As Table 2 shows, Koufax was dominant at his peak. In his four and five-best bWAR campaigns, he posted 9.1 and 8.4 per-season marks. That is dominant. However, if one looks at Mattingly’s comparable periods, his per-season bWAR figures are 6.3 and 5.8, respectively. Mattingly’s best years were impressive but not elite enough to overcome his 21st career bWAR mark among post-1979 era first basemen. Koufax’s four, five, and six-year peaks were more than enough to justify his induction into the Hall of Fame, despite lower career, wins, bWAR, and JAWS numbers. Circling back to Table 1, Mattingly’s WAR7 is like those of Ortiz and McGriff. So, should he not be in the Hall of Fame? For two reasons, the answer is no. First, the career bWAR marks of Ortiz and McGriff are at least 10 units higher than Mattingly’s. Accordingly, Mattingly’s peak years were not dominant enough to overcome his career bWAR shortfall. Second, Hall of Fame membership should be exclusive and reserved for those who were clearly the best of their era at their position. In other words, the entrance bar should be set high. The Hall of Fame candidacies of Ortiz and McGriff were marginal. The bar should not be lowered further to grant Hall of Fame access to Mattingly. The Last Word Early in his career, Mattingly was among the best at his position. No doubt injuries limited his performance and shortened his career. However, his best seven seasons rank 17th among first basemen in the post-1979 era. Compared to a player like Koufax, whose career was also shortened partially due to injury, Mattingly’s best seasons were not as dominant. The threshold to be a Hall of Famer should be set high. Accordingly, like many players, Mattingly belongs in the Hall of Very Good, not the Hall of Fame. View full article

On November 26, news broke that the Toronto Blue Jays signed free agent Dylan Cease to a seven-year, $210 million contract, pending the results of a physical. If completed, the deal would be the most significant financial commitment that Toronto has made to a free agent. According to multiple websites, including DiamondCentric, FanGraphs, and MLB Trade Rumors, the top three MLB-proven free-agent starters were Cease, Framber Valdez, and Ranger Suárez. From Toronto’s perspective, what separated Cease from Valdez and Suárez? Let us start with the basics. Cease is a seven-year MLB veteran with career ERA, xERA, and FIP marks of 3.88, 3.66, and 3.67, respectively. Valdez has eight MLB seasons on his resume and has posted career ERA, xERA, and FIP metrics of 3.36, 3.76, and 3.51, respectively. Suárez has generated ERA, xERA, and FIP numbers of 3.38, 3.61, and 3.54 during his eight-year MLB career. Those xERA and FIP numbers would make any of these starters attractive to MLB teams. Let us focus on the seasons post-2021, when all three pitchers became full-time members of a starting rotation. Accordingly, behold Table 1. I used ERA- and FIP- instead of ERA and FIP to account for park factors and run-scoring environments across different seasons. I was unable to find an xERA- equivalent. One can note a slight difference in FIP- between these starters during the 2022-2025 period. According to xERA, Cease (3.40) has pitched better than Valdez (3.69) and Suárez (3.74). If one considers ERA-, Cease does not look as attractive as Valdez or Suárez. Cease’s 2025 112 ERA- and 2023 107 ERA- raise a Spockian eyebrow. However, BABIP is a factor. Cease’s career BABIP is .295. Yet, in 2025 and 2023, his BABIPs were .320 and .330, respectively. Those elevated BABIP numbers suggest that Cease experienced a bit of bad luck or poor defence behind him. Regarding defence, the fielders behind him in 2022 and 2024 posted OAA numbers of +1 and -2, respectively. In 2023 and 2025, Cease’s defence generated OAA marks of -7 in both years. It is impossible to quantify the impact of luck on Cease’s elevated BABIP, but the OAA numbers show that poor defence probably boosted his 2025 and 2023 ERAs. For comparison purposes, Valdez’s 2025 BABIP was .297, and Suárez's was .317, both of which were 15 points higher than their career marks before 2025. Cease’s 2025 BABIP was 30 points higher than his pre-2025 career BABIP. Also, the 2025 defences behind Valdez and Suárez posted OAA marks of +7 and 0, respectively. Therefore, all factors considered, Cease’s 2022-2025 ERA-, FIP-, and xERA scores are comparable to those of Valdez and Suárez. A quick word on Stuff+, Location+, and Pitching+. Please take a look at Table 2. In 2025, Cease and Valdez were above average according to Stuff+, and Suárez produced the best Location+ mark among starters. All three excel at the factors considered by Pitching+. Based on these models, Cease, Valdez, and Suárez were, overall, particularly good in 2025. Okay, what is the first separator? Glance upon Table 3! Cease and Valdez have been exceptionally durable. Since 2022, Cease’s 130 starts are the second most in MLB, Valdez’s 121 starts are the 11th highest, and Suárez's 104 starts rank 34th. Regarding innings, Valdez is #2, Cease #7, and Suárez #31. Suárez has not been as durable as Cease or Valdez. In 2022, 2024, and 2025, he was on the IL due to back issues, totalling 87 days. In 2023, Suárez had two stints on the IL: 45 days with an arm ailment and 15 days because of a hamstring injury. Durability is the first separator between Cease and Suárez. Gaze upon Table 4, as we have another separator: Cease's strikeout rate over the past four seasons is 29.2%, much higher than Valdez's (23.9%) and Suárez's (22.0%). Among all pitchers, in 2025, Cease’s K% ranked in the 89th percentile, whereas Valdez and Suárez both ranked in the 55th percentile. A metric related to K% is Whiff%. Concerning 2025 Whiff%, Cease ranked in the 95th percentile among all pitchers, while Valdez was 59th and Suárez 24th. For the Blue Jays, who emphasize a low K%, high contact rate, and OBP when it comes to hitting, seeking the opposite attributes in a pitcher would be logical. Hence, Cease’s high-ranking K% and Whiff% would make him stand out for Toronto compared to Valdez and Suárez. Okay, we must talk about Cease’s BB% because it is high (in the 20th percentile in 2025). Cease’s BB% ranking pales in comparison to Suárez's (86th percentile) and even Valdez's (40th percentile). However, there are two positives of note. First, pitching coach Pete Walker has a history of helping pitchers lower their BB%. Remember Robbie Ray, a high K% and BB% starter? From 2018 to 2020, Ray posted a 30.7 K% but a 13.1 BB%. However, after working with Walker, Ray generated a 32.1 K% and 6.7 BB% on his way to the 2021 AL Cy Young Award with Toronto. Second, despite the high BB%, Cease’s 2025 K-BB% was 19.9%, which ranked 24th among the 166 starters with at least 60 innings. Valdez and Suárez ranked 69th and 40th, respectively. Therefore, Cease’s higher K-BB% would be attractive to a team like the Blue Jays that seeks a high K% (net of BB%) from their starters. Concerning K% and BB%, a final comment. Table 3 shows that, in terms of average innings per 2025 start, Valdez and Suárez had noticeably longer outings than Cease. A likely reason for Cease’s shorter outings was his average of 4.23 pitches-per-plate appearance (“P/PA”). The P/PA marks of Valdez and Suárez were 3.61 and 3.74, respectively. There are two likely reasons for Cease’s higher P/PA. First, one cause could be his high K%. According to Baseball Savant, in 2025, among the 170 starters who faced at least 250 batters, Cease had the 10th-highest K%. Notably, seven of these 10 starters had P/PA rates above the median (3.88). Second, of the 25 starters with the highest BB% (Cease was #24), 19 had P/PA numbers higher than the median. Accordingly, given Cease’s higher K% and BB% rates, we should expect shorter outings from Cease compared to Valdez and Suárez. I guess Toronto can accept shorter outings, given all the other positives Cease brings to the table. Yet, if Walker can work his magic with Cease, a lower BB% should lead to longer outings. Another element of Cease’s performance is his ability to positively contribute to controlling the running game. A hat tip to Sportsnet’s Chris Black (@DownToBlack) for highlighting Cease’s effectiveness in this area. During the 2022-2025 period, according to Baseball Savant, Cease ranked second in Net Bases Prevented (“NBP”) with a score of 25. Valdez (-14) was 482nd of 503 pitchers, and Suárez (8) was 60th. This past season, Toronto’s pitchers (starters and relievers) generated a -11 NBP, which ranked 22nd. Among Toronto’s notable starters in 2025, Kevin Gausman and Chris Bassitt each posted -5 NBPs, Eric Lauer a -3, and Max Scherzer a -2. Bowden Francis and José Berríos had +3 NBPs, and Shane Bieber posted +1. Therefore, Toronto’s addition of Cease should improve the team's effectiveness at limiting the running game of other teams more than either Valdez or Suárez. The Last Word When the free agency period commenced this offseason, Cease, Valdez, and Suárez were at the top of the class. All three starters have produced excellent FIP-, xERA, and Pitching+ numbers in their careers. Yet, it is understandable why Toronto would prefer Cease over Valdez and Suárez. Compared to Valdez, Cease is two years younger; has better K%, K-BB%, and Whiff% numbers; and is superior at neutralizing the running game. Judged against Suárez, Cease has been more durable; has a better K%, K-BB%, and Whiff% profile; and has proven more effective at controlling the running game. It is clear why Cease stood above Valdez and Suárez in the eyes of the Blue Jays. View full article

Garcia is recovering from elbow surgery, and 2026 will be his age-35 season. He had two elbow-related stints on the IL in 2024: Toronto (June 24 to July 19) and Seattle (August 20 to the end of the 2024 season). In 2025, Garcia was twice on the IL: May 24 to July 2 (shoulder) and July 5 to the end of the season (ankle). Garcia has pitched only 30 innings since the 2024 trade to Seattle, and not well (ERA: 4.50, xERA: 5.30, FIP: 4.88). My preference would be for Toronto to plan for Garcia to be unavailable or ineffective in 2026. If he can be effective, then it would be a bonus.

During his November 6 media availability, a reporter asked Ross Atkins about Jeff Hoffman’s role as Toronto’s closer. “The great thing about Jeff is he’s not married to that,” Atkins said. “I think he would be open to anything that makes us better.” In the same media event, Atkins indicated that Toronto was open to improving the team through any means. So, if Toronto is open to adding a bona fide closer in the free-agent market, who are some closers worth considering? Hoffman had a disappointing 2025. On the positive side, among all pitchers, his Whiff% and K% were both in the 83rd percentile. However, his xERA, BB% and Barrel% percentile rankings were 57th, 26th and 1st, respectively. Furthermore, surrendering home runs was an issue, not only in Game 7 of the World Series but also during the regular season. Hoffman’s 2025 regular-season HR/9 was 1.99, tied for the second-highest among 144 relievers with at least 50 innings pitched. Therefore, although I am confident that Hoffman will be better next year, one can understand why Toronto would consider adding a closer to its 2026 bullpen. I identified four free-agent closers as options for the Blue Jays: Edwin Díaz, Raisel Iglesias, Robert Suarez, and Devin Williams. These relievers were the first four closers listed on MLB Trade Rumors' (“MLBTR”) list of the top 50 free agents. Before I delve into the 2025 results of these closers, let’s review how they performed in the three seasons before. Consider Table 1. The listed relievers had impressive resumes before the 2025 campaign. All of them posted 89th percentile or higher wOBA marks, and Díaz, Iglesias and Williams generated xwOBA scores in the 95th percentile or higher. Also, one can see why Toronto was interested in Hoffman, given his percentile rankings in K%, K-BB%, wOBA, xwOBA, and Whiff%. Hoffman, although not elite during the 2022-2024 seasons, was particularly good. Now to the most recent season! Table 2 shows some 2025 pitching metrics for the noted pitchers. Except for BB%, Díaz was elite in 2025. His xERA/xwOBA was 99th percentile, as were his K-BB% and Whiff%. Furthermore, Díaz's Barrel/PA% was at the 96th percentile. In other words, his opponents swung and missed at an elevated rate. However, when they connected, those batters barreled the ball at an exceptionally low rate. Iglesias, although not elite like Díaz, was very good in 2025. Other than his barrel rate, Iglesias was much better than the median reliever last season. His xERA/xwOBA, K-BB%, and Whiff% were in the 78th percentile or better. However, he did record a high Barrel%. Suarez has had an interesting journey to MLB. The Venezuelan-born player pitched in Nippon Professional Baseball from 2018 to 2021. He made his MLB debut with the Padres in 2022 in his age-31 season and posted a 3.27 xERA and a 3.22 FIP. Fast forward to 2025, wherein Suarez posted some impressive and some concerning numbers. His wOBA was 96th percentile. However, his xERA/xwOBA was 57th. Also, batters barreled up his pitches at a high rate (Barrel% in the 29th percentile), and they did not swing and miss at a high rate, given his 33rd percentile Whiff%. Williams had a noteworthy 2025 for the Yankees. From a headline perspective, he posted a 4.79 ERA and lost his job as closer. However, under the hood, he performed well last season. Williams generated an xERA/xwOBA in the 80th percentile, and his Whiff%, K% and K-BB% were 94th percentile or better. However, his BB% was high (32nd percentile), and his Barrel/BBE% was 25th percentile. Table 3 has more 2025 numbers to consider. The highlights are as follows: Except for Hoffman, the listed closers posted particularly good to excellent FIP numbers. Of the 144 relievers with at least 50 innings, Díaz's 3.73 WPA was fourth highest, and Suarez’s 3.16 WPA tied for sixth best. For Iglesias, Williams, and Hoffman, their WPA scores ranked 53rd, 105th and 117th, respectively. Regarding Save%, even elite closers (Díaz and Suarez) blow saves. Hoffman, who had some notable blown save opportunities, posted an average Save%. Furthermore, in terms of xwOBA splits by batter handedness, all four closers had better numbers against right-handed hitters than left-handed batters. Still, none had xwOBA stats that exceeded the MLB average when facing left-handed batters. In summary, these free-agent closers are worthy candidates for a role as Toronto’s closer for the 2026 season. Let’s talk contracts! Concerning contract estimates, I will put my calculator aside and rely on MLBTR and FanGraphs. Behold Table 4! The first matter to note is that Díaz is the only closer to receive a qualifying offer from his previous team. Second, Toronto is a competitive balance taxpayer. Accordingly, if the Blue Jays signed Díaz to a contract, they would “lose their second- and fifth-highest selections, as well as $1 million from their international bonus pool for the upcoming signing period” (per MLB.com). Another issue to note is that, except for Williams, the MLBTR and FanGraphs contract estimates are similar. Apparently, MLBTR believes the market will look past Williams' high 2025 ERA, demotion from the closer role, and the non-receipt of a qualifying offer. On the other hand, FanGraphs appears to think the market for Williams’ services will be more muted than MLBTR does. A word or two on risk. First, relievers can exhibit significant performance volatility from one season to another due to small sample sizes, injuries, and other factors. For example, in 2022, the relievers in the top three in saves were Emmanuel Clase, Kenley Jansen and Liam Hendriks. After 2022, Clase and Jansen posted xERA figures that were at least 0.87 runs higher than their 2022 marks. Specifically, during the 2023-2025 period, Clase generated a 2.84 xERA and Jansen a 3.40 xERA. Unfortunately, Hendriks pitched only 18 innings after 2022. Also, although it is not a reliever risk per se, Clase is currently under indictment in a gambling scandal that may end his MLB career. Accordingly, projecting a reliever’s future performance level is not an easy task. The second point concerning risk is age. These four free-agent closers are in their 30s. Hence, the impact of aging is an issue. Accordingly, I present Table 5. For information regarding Stuff+ and Pitching+, please take a look at the FanGraphs website. Based on the Pitching+ numbers, unlike Díaz and Iglesias, Williams and Suarez have not displayed a worrying deterioration in their respective pitching process. Lastly, courtesy of Spotrac, a history of recent injuries for the closers: Díaz underwent knee surgery and did not play during the 2023 season. Also, he had a shoulder impingement in 2024 and was on the IL (May 29 to June 13). Atlanta placed Iglesias on the IL in 2023 (March 30 to May 5) with a shoulder strain. In 2022, Suarez had a stint on the IL (June 7 to August 6) with a knee ailment. During the following season, the Padres placed him on the IL (March 30 to July 20) with elbow inflammation. Williams landed on the IL in 2024 (March 28 to July 28) due to stress fractures in his back. The Last Word If I had to sign one of these closers, I would opt for Williams. He is the youngest of the group, his Pitching+ history does not suggest a near-term performance decline, and his 2025 showing was not as poor as his 4.79 ERA suggests. If MLBTR has overstated his market value, there may be a worthwhile opportunity to sign him to a shorter, less expensive deal. Díaz has been elite. However, a four-year, $82 million contract is too rich (and risky) given signs of performance decline (Stuff+ and Pitching+). Also, the loss of draft picks and international pool money is a sizeable additional cost. Iglesias would be a nice add as a set-up reliever, but he does not appear to be a noticeable upgrade over Hoffman. Suarez is tempting, but a three-year deal will take him to his age-37 season, which is very risky. Also, his elevated 2025 xERA gives me pause. If Toronto considers adding a closer for the 2026 season, Díaz, Iglesias, Suarez, and Williams are worthy free agent candidates. There are, of course, other options available to Toronto, including other free agents and the trade market. Let the articles flow! View full article

Toronto, as a competitive balance tax payor, would not receive a first-round pick as compensation. They would receive a pick after the fourth round is concluded https://www.mlb.com/glossary/transactions/qualifying-offer

Before the American League Division Series between the Toronto Blue Jays and the New York Yankees began, I examined how the Blue Jays compared with recent World Series teams. The analysis consisted of two parts. The first part of the analysis was titled, How Does the Blue Jays’ Offence Stack Up to That of Recent World Series Teams?. The second part was titled, How Does the Blue Jays’ Pitching and Defence Stack Up to That of Recent World Series Teams? Fast forward to today, Game One of the American League Championship Series. Hence, it is time to examine how the Toronto Blue Jays measure up against the Seattle Mariners. I organized the analysis of Toronto’s and Seattle’s batting and baserunning as follows: Key batting metrics (wRC+, runs, home runs, and others) Distribution of runs scored between home runs and balls in play Hitting performance by pitcher handedness, including runners in scoring position Batting order balance and hitting by inning segments Baserunning The analysis of Toronto’s and Seattle’s pitching and defence is structured as follows: Distribution of runs allowed Starting pitchers Relievers Defence As I noted in the previous articles, compared to the regular season, the following observations concerning the postseason are essential to keep in mind: Runs per game are lower. Home runs per game are similar. Runs per home run are alike. The share of runs via home runs is higher. Batting and Base Running Table 1 shows the key batting metrics of the Blue Jays and Mariners. Toronto ranks much better in runs, K%, and OBP, whereas Seattle has generated more power (home runs and ISO) than Toronto. In many areas (home runs, ISO, and K%), Seattle resembles the Yankees, which ranked first in home runs and ISO, and 25th in K%. However, concerning each team’s leading home-run hitter, Seattle had a higher percentage of home runs attributable to Cal Raleigh (25%) than New York had with Aaron Judge (19%) or Toronto with George Springer (17%). Therefore, given Seattle’s higher reliance on Raleigh’s home run production than Toronto’s dependence on Springer’s, if Toronto’s pitchers could curtail Raleigh’s home run output, it would reduce Seattle’s home run hitting advantage over Toronto. However, in his career, Raleigh has hit a home run against Toronto every 8.4 at-bats, a better rate than his overall 14.1 AB/Home Run rate. It will be a challenge, but possible, for Toronto to limit Raleigh’s home run output. Table 2 shows the distribution of runs scored. That is, what percentage of runs scored is the result of home runs, and what percentage is attributable to balls in play, balks, and other non-home run plays. For simplicity’s sake, I will lump all runs not arising from home runs to be runs from balls in play (“BIP”). Based on the conclusions from my previous article, compared to the 2025 regular season, the number of runs scored per game will likely be lower in the ALCS, and the runs per home run and home run rate will remain materially the same. Therefore, teams that have a higher share of runs scored via home runs will likely score more runs in total compared to teams with a lower share of runs scored attributable to home runs. Why? Because runs from BIP per game are likely to decline, which makes sense because postseason teams typically have good pitching staffs. Consequently, to score runs from BIP, teams need to string non-homer hits together, which is more difficult when facing good pitching. Accordingly, given Seattle’s elevated percentage of runs scored attributable to home runs (50% versus Toronto’s 39%), the Blue Jays may find it more difficult than Seattle to score runs, all things being equal. However, all things are not equal. Toronto’s run total was four percent higher than Seattle’s. In other words, Toronto’s offence was more potent than Seattle’s in the run-scoring department. Table 3 shows the wRC+ marks of the Blue Jays and Mariners by pitcher handedness. The upper part of the table reveals that, in all situations, Toronto and Seattle do not have significant splits. However, the table’s lower portion shows two facts. First, Toronto has performed well in RISP situations and has insignificant handedness splits. Second, Seattle has not hit as well as Toronto in RISP situations, and the Mariners have been below average when facing left-handers with runners in scoring position. Accordingly, Seattle’s 91 wRC+ in RISP situations may provide Toronto with opportunities to use its left-handed relievers in critical situations successfully. However, it is worth noting that RISP numbers tend to be volatile due to small sample sizes. For batting order and wRC+ performance by innings, please take a look at Table 4. The numbers show a slight difference between the Blue Jays and the Mariners, whether by batting order or by innings (before the seventh or after the sixth). The last item on the offensive front is baserunning. Table 5 shows that Toronto and Seattle are below average. Toronto is better at taking extra bases, but Seattle is more proficient at stealing bases. Pitching and Defence Table 6 displays the distribution of runs allowed by the two teams. There is a slight difference in the percentage of runs allowed via home runs between Toronto (46%) and Seattle (43%). However, because the Mariners score runs from home runs at a higher rate than the Blue Jays (50% versus 39%), Toronto projects to allow more runs than Seattle, all things being equal, which, as noted, they are not. Regarding starting pitchers, I anticipate that each team will use four starters in the ALCS. Accordingly, I presented the unweighted average of the 2025 regular season numbers of two starter groups for both teams. Behold Table 7! For Toronto, the first three starter locks are Kevin Gausman, Shane Bieber, and Trey Yesavage. I expect either Chris Bassitt or Max Scherzer to be the fourth starter. Regarding Seattle, I expect Luis Castillo, Logan Gilbert, and George Kirby to be part of their rotation. The Mariners are likely to add either Bryce Miller or Bryan Woo to the noted trio. As Table 7 shows, a group’s numbers are dependent on who the fourth starter will be. For example, if Toronto adds Scherzer instead of Bassitt, Toronto’s ERA jumps from 88 to 96. In Seattle’s case, the average ERA- would be 110 with Miller and 92 with Woo. Notably, Woo recently suffered a pectoral injury and has not appeared in an MLB game since September 19. However, before his injury, Woo posted a 76 ERA- and an 86 FIP-. He may return for the ALCS. Miller posted a 148 ERA- and a 130 FIP- during the regular season. Notably, Miller generated a 108 ERA- and a 54 FIP- in four and a third innings against the Tigers. Overall, I would give Seattle’s projected starting rotation a slight advantage over Toronto’s. First, Bieber and Yesavage did not pitch many innings during the regular season. Bieber had 40 innings, and Yesavage had 14. However, to the extent Seattle has an advantage regarding starters, Kirby, Gilbert, and Castillo pitched in Friday’s game against the Tigers. Kirby threw 64 pitches, and Gilbert and Castillo had 34 and 15, respectively. Perhaps Gilbert and Castillo, who appeared as relivers on Friday, will encounter abnormal fatigue due to Friday’s appearances. Regarding bullpens, Table 8 provides the necessary information. The Toronto and Seattle bullpens have performed similarly. However, one clear advantage for Seattle is their closer, Andrés Muñoz, who posted ERA-, FIP-, and K-BB% marks of 45, 60, and 21.7, respectively, in 62 innings. Toronto’s closer, Jeff Hoffman, recorded ERA-, FIP-, and K-BB% scores of 107, 116, and 19.9, respectively, in 68 innings. On the bright side, Toronto’s bullpen has not pitched since October 8, whereas Seattle’s reliever corps last pitched on October 10. Furthermore, Toronto’s relievers have pitched seven fewer innings than Seattle’s (20 versus 27). Hence, the Blue Jays’ bullpen may be a little more rested than the Mariners. A final thought regarding pitchers: if the trend depicted in the chart below continues, each team’s bullpen will pitch as many, if not more, innings than their respective starting rotations. Accordingly, Toronto may mitigate its apparent disadvantage in starting rotations due to more reliever usage in the ALCS than in the regular season. One area where Toronto is clearly better than Seattle is team defence. As Table 9 shows, Toronto’s defence is superior in the noted areas: infield, outfield, and catching. Summary time! Summary - Batting and Base Running The key points from the analysis are as follows: Concerning run scoring, not striking out, and getting on base, the Blue Jays are better than the Mariners. Seattle generates more power but is more dependent on home runs from its home run leader (Raleigh) than Toronto (Springer). Because Toronto is more reliant on scoring runs from balls in play, the Blue Jays may be challenged to score runs than Seattle because the Mariners have generated 50% of their runs via home runs. Neither team has pronounced wRC+ splits by pitcher handedness. However, Seattle has struggled against left-handers with runners in scoring position. Neither team runs the bases well. Summary – Pitching and Defence The critical points from the analysis are as follows: Although there is minimal difference between the percentage of runs allowed via home runs by Toronto and Seattle, there is, in theory, upward pressure on Toronto’s runs allowed metric because the Seattle offence scores more runs via home runs at a higher rate than Toronto. Seattle’s projected starters have a slight edge over Toronto’s. However, if Woo is not on the ALCS roster or falters because of inactivity, Toronto projects to have a smidgen of an edge. The bullpens of the two ballclubs are both good. However, Seattle’s closer (Muñoz) is elite, and Toronto’s (Hoffman) is not. The Blue Jays’ defence is elite, and Seattle’s is worse than the Yankees.’ The Last Word Given the circumstances, I give the edge to Toronto primarily because of better overall hitting, run scoring, and superior defence. View full article

As the first game of the American League Division Series approaches, media members and others will comment on how the Toronto Blue Jays compare to other 2025 postseason teams, including the Yankees. Such analysis is interesting. However, it would be thought-provoking to examine how Toronto compares at the macro level with the teams that have recently played in the World Series. This examination consists of two parts. In the first segment, How Does the Blue Jays’ Offence Stack Up to That of Recent World Series Teams?, I discussed how Toronto’s offence measures up with World Series teams for the 2014-2024 period. In the second part of the examination, I focus on the Blue Jays’ pitching and defence and assess how the club compares with the World Series participants from 2015 to 2024. Please note that for this analysis, I excluded 2020 for the reason I outlined in my previous article: The abbreviated, 60-game schedule was not representative of a typical MLB season. In the analysis that follows, I also omitted 2014 because FanGraphs’ splits leaderboard did not include the relevant data from before the 2015 season. I organized the analysis as follows: Distribution of runs allowed Pitching (starters and relievers) Starting pitchers Relievers Defence As I noted in the previous article, compared to the regular season, the following observations concerning the postseason are essential to keep in mind: Runs per game are lower. Home runs per game are similar. The share of runs via home runs is higher. The relevant charts are below. Table 1 shows the distribution of runs allowed. That is, the percentage of runs allowed that is the result of home runs, and the percentage attributable to balls in play, balks, and other non-home run plays. For simplicity’s sake, I will lump all runs not arising from home runs to be runs from balls in play (“BIP”). Based on the conclusions from my previous article, compared to the 2025 regular season, the number of runs allowed per game will likely be lower, and the runs per home run and home run rate will remain materially the same during the 2025 postseason. Therefore, teams that had a higher share of runs allowed via home runs during the regular season will likely allow more runs in total compared to teams with a lower share of runs allowed attributable to home runs. Why? Because runs from BIP per game are likely to decline, which makes sense because postseason teams typically have good pitching staffs. Consequently, to score runs from BIP, teams need to string non-homer hits together, which is more difficult when facing good pitching. Accordingly, given Toronto’s slightly elevated percentage of runs allowed attributable to home runs (46% versus the 42% average), the Blue Jays' pitching (starters and relievers) appears to lag the recent World Series teams. However, a deeper dive into Toronto’s starters and bullpen is required. Table 2 shows how Toronto’s pitching (starters and relievers) measures up against recent World Series teams. The numbers are not kind to the Blue Jays. Toronto’s 2025 wOBA, ERA-, FIP-, and HR/9 rankings are near or in the bottom third of MLB teams. The average rankings in these metrics for the World Series ballclubs are near or in the top third in their respective seasons. Not good. Onto Table 3! Oops, not good. Except for K%-BB%, Toronto’s starters rank in the bottom third of MLB teams. We need another table. Behold Table 4! Okay, better news. I constructed Table 4 as follows: Concerning the World Series teams, I included the season stats of the three starters with the most innings pitched in the postseason. I assumed Kevin Gausman, Shane Bieber and Trey Yesavage will rack up the most starter innings for Toronto during the 2025 postseason. For all teams reflected in the table, I used a simple, unweighted average of the noted metrics. I settled on three starters per team because, as noted in my article, The Blue Jays' Top Three Starters Need A Boost At The Trade Deadline: Here Are Options, for the 2014-2024 period, 83% of all postseason starts for World Series teams were attributable to three starters. Table 4 shows that the listed metrics of the Gausman-Bieber-Yesavage trio align with the average of recent World Series teams. Undoubtedly, there are caveats concerning Bieber and Yesavage, given the small sample size in 2025. However, at least on paper, Toronto’s trio measures up favourably with the World Series ballclubs. Concerning relievers, consider Table 5. Based on wOBA, FIP-, HR/9, and K-BB%, Toronto’s bullpen is in line with the average regular-season metrics of World Series teams. There are cautionary matters to note: The composition of a bullpen changes throughout the season. Many teams add to their relief corps ahead of the trade deadline. For example, Toronto added Seranthony Domínguez and Louis Varland before the 2025 trade deadline. Teams often bolster postseason bullpens by moving pitchers from the starting rotation into the relief corps. Accordingly, the team metrics for the whole of the regular season may not accurately reflect the quality of the bullpen in the postseason for the noted World Series teams. A final word on pitching. As the chart below shows, relievers have increased their share of innings pitched during the postseason since 2015. In 2024, starters accounted for 48% of innings pitched, much less than the 61% of total innings hurled by starters during the 2015 postseason. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise if Toronto’s relievers pitch a greater share of innings in the 2025 postseason than their 42% share of regular-season innings suggests. Furthermore, fans of the Blue Jays should be encouraged that Toronto’s bullpen, which struggled in August with a 4.62 FIP and 4.55 xERA, rebounded with a 3.60 FIP and 4.02 xERA in September. The final element to examine is defence. Table 6 has the goods. Not much needs to be said other than Toronto’s defence compares favourably with World Series teams after 2017. Please note that Baseball Savant’s Fielding Run Value data starts with the 2018 regular season. The Last Word Toronto’s defence is elite, be it among 2025 MLB teams or recent World Series teams. However, at first blush, Toronto’s pitching does not compare favourably with recent World Series teams. Toronto’s relatively higher percentage of runs allowed attributable to home runs is cause for some concern. Also, whereas the average World Series team (2015-2024) ranks in or near the top third of pitching staffs, Toronto’s is closer to the bottom third of 2025 pitching staffs. However, an examination of likely starters reveals that the metrics of the Gausman-Bieber-Yesavage trio align with those of the average World Series team. Furthermore, the bullpen’s metrics are comparable to those of the average bullpen from recent World Series teams. In summary, Toronto’s pitching compares favourably with the average World Series team from the 2015-2024 period. View full article

Well done, Terry!

As the 2025 regular season winds down, media members and others will comment about how Toronto measures up against other 2025 postseason teams. Such analysis is interesting and, for sure, timely. However, I thought it would be thought-provoking to examine Toronto’s 2025 offence at the macro level and see how it measures up against the offences of the teams that have recently played in the World Series. The period I studied spans from 2014 to 2024, except for 2020, which I excluded because the 2020 campaign consisted of only 60 games. The Blue Jays-World Series ballclubs comparison should provide insights into Toronto’s batting and baserunning strengths and weaknesses relative to MLB’s 2025 postseason. The aspects of Toronto’s offence covered are as follows: Key batting metrics (wRC+, runs, home runs, and others) Distribution of runs between home runs and balls in play Hitting performance by pitcher handedness Performance with runners in scoring position Batting order balance Hitting by inning segments Baserunning Speaking of balance, there is a table for each of the bullet points above! Please note that each table contains averages and medians for the indicated period. If the period stated on a table is not 2014-2024, it is because the data did not include seasons before 2016 or 2015. Onto the tables! Table 1 shows key batting metrics for the Blue Jays and the noted World Series participants. The 2023 Diamondbacks are the outlier with their, at best, middle-of-the-pack numbers. Concerning the Blue Jays vis-à-vis wRC+, runs and OBP, the 2025 squad lines up nicely with the teams listed and the average and median rankings for the 2014-2024 period. However, the 2025 Blue Jays trail the non-Arizona teams in home runs and ISO, whether in terms of numbers or rankings. Another way to examine power (ISO) and home runs, particularly, is to look at how teams score runs. That is, how many runs are the result of home runs, and how many runs are attributable to balls in play, balks, and other non-home run plays. For simplicity’s sake, I will lump all runs not arising from home runs to be runs from balls in play (“BIP”). Behold Table 2. As of September 15, 38% of Toronto’s runs have come via home runs and 62% from BIP. In percentage terms, Toronto’s run production due to home runs lags the median by five percentage points and by seven percentage points compared to the average of World Series teams shown (from the 2019 Astros to the 2024 Dodgers). Is Toronto’s relatively low percentage of runs arising from home runs a disadvantage? Yes, because, as FanGraphs’ Jay Jaffe noted in the article, "No-Hitters Are Great, but the Long Ball Still Wins in October", the share of runs due to home runs increases in the postseason compared to the regular season. Let us take a deeper dive. I updated the data in Jaffe’s article for the 2023 and 2024 postseasons. The sources for my numbers were Baseball Savant, FanGraphs and Baseball Reference. The reader should note that my percentage of runs due to home runs (RHR%) is slightly different from Jaffe’s. For the 2015-2022 period, my regular season RHR% is, on average, 1.8 percentage points higher than Jaffe’s. My postseason RHR% is 0.2 percentage points lower than Jaffe’s. These differences are insignificant. It is table chart time! There are three charts: Runs Per Game, Home Runs Per Game, and Percent of Runs Via Home Runs. The chart data support the observations reached by Jaffe, which I also share. The observations are as follows: Compared to the regular season, run scoring per game is lower in the postseason. Scoring runs in the playoffs is more difficult because batters typically face better pitchers in the postseason than in the regular season. Home runs per game have tended to be higher in the postseason compared to the regular season. For the 2015-2024 period, home runs per game were higher in the playoffs in seven of the ten seasons examined. The share of runs attributable to home runs is higher in the postseason than in the regular season. Recent history suggests that the upcoming postseason run scoring will decrease, while home runs per game will remain at least equal, resulting in fewer runs scoring from balls in play. Please note that the runs per home run do not vary much for a given year’s regular and postseason. Accordingly, the conclusion that the share of runs attributable to home runs is higher in the postseason than in the regular season still holds, despite a variance in runs per home run between the regular and postseason. So, what does this mean for Toronto? As of September 21, Toronto leads the American League in runs from BIP (482). Compared to the six non-Toronto American League teams currently in or tied for a playoff spot, the Blue Jays’ 482 mark is much higher than the 403 average BIP runs of the six noted teams. Therefore, Toronto could be more vulnerable to a run-scoring decline because of its relatively high reliance on runs from BIP. Let us get back to the positive news! Consider Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. The highlights are as follows: Concerning wRC+ by pitcher handedness, Table 3 shows that Toronto is well-balanced versus right-handers (fourth best) and left-handers (third best). Those rankings stack up well against recent World Series teams. Table 4 shows that Toronto’s RISP wRC+ ranks well, be it overall, versus right-handers or left-handers. Furthermore, Toronto’s 2025 RISP wRC+ rankings line up nicely against recent World Series ballclubs. A word of caution. Batting numbers in RISP situations are volatile in small samples. Furthermore, small samples are characteristic of the postseason. Therefore, consider the Table 4 data as descriptive rather than predictive. Many MLB observers have commented upon the high quality of the Blue Jays’ batting order depth, and Table 5 supports that view. In all three batting order segments (#1 to #3, #4 to #6, and #7 to #9), Toronto ranks no worse than eighth among 2025 MLB teams, which compares favourably to the 2015-2024 World Series participants. Regarding wRC+ data by inning segments, Table 6 is the place to see. In the first six innings of the game, Toronto’s 110 wRC+ slots into the seventh spot. Even better, after the sixth inning, the Blue Jays’ 121 wRC+ is MLB’s best. Additionally, Toronto’s noted rankings are in line with those of World Series teams during the 2015-2024 period. Another cautionary note. My interpretation of Toronto’s wRC+ after the sixth inning is not that the Blue Jays are clutch. Instead, Toronto’s excellence in the seventh or later innings demonstrates that the Blue Jays perform well against relievers. Performance after the sixth inning should be a Blue Jays’ strength because relievers share a greater load of the pitching workload in the postseason than in the regular season. The final aspect to examine is baserunning. Table 7 shows that Toronto does not run the bases well, whether stealing bases or taking extra bases in non-stealing situations. For context, Detroit has the highest Baserunning Runs total (8) of the American League teams in contention for a postseason berth. However, baserunning has often not been a strength of several teams that played in the World Series. Hence, Toronto’s baserunning appears to be only a slight disadvantage in the postseason. The Last Word Toronto has had a successful season at the plate in 2025. As of September 17, their wRC+, runs scored, and OBP rank third, fourth and first, respectively, among MLB teams. Furthermore, the Blue Jays have performed well against right-handers and left-handers, be it in RISP or non-RISP situations. Also, Toronto hitters have performed well before the sixth inning and after, and the batting order is deep. Additionally, all these rankings compare favourably with those of recent World Series teams. One area where Toronto does not compare as well is in the power department. Recent history shows that runs via home runs make up a higher percentage of runs scored in the postseason compared to the regular season. Given that run scoring declines in the postseason, teams that are more reliant on runs from BIP can struggle to score. In other words, because pitching in the postseason is better than in the regular season, it is more difficult for teams to string non-homer hits together to score runs. However, Toronto’s home run total and ISO rank as MLB’s 12th highest. Being #12 is not a disaster. It just means that Toronto’s ranking in the power department, which is not as elite as it is in other areas (such as wRC+, OBP, pitcher handedness balance, and other aspects of hitting), may impact Toronto’s run scoring more than teams that are elite in the power department. All things considered, Toronto’s offence compares favourably with teams that have made recent World Series. View full article