Article: Blue Jay Batter Barrel Blues

[Bob Ritchie]

On April 28, on Bluesky, MLB.com’s Mike Petriello noted that Toronto’s batters posted the second-lowest Barrel% in 2025. Although Toronto's ranking has since improved to 20th, should the Blue Jays be concerned? Can the team improve their Barrel% performance for the rest of the season? Let’s dig into the topic.

According to MLB.com, “The Barrel classification is assigned to batted-ball events whose comparable hit types (in terms of exit velocity and launch angle) have led to a minimum .500 batting average and 1.500 slugging percentage since Statcast was implemented Major League wide in 2015.”

Previously, I wrote about the strong, positive correlation (0.84 R-Squared) between slugging percentage and runs. As of May 9, the Blue Jays rank 24th in runs per game with their 3.71 mark, lower than MLB’s 4.35 average. Toronto’s 0.362 SLG slots in at #25, bested by MLB’s 0.391.

The correlation between runs and various Barrel metrics (Barrels, Barre%, or Barrels/PA%) is positive, but not strong. The highest R-squared is 0.30. Surprisingly, the relationship between SLG and the noted Barrel metrics is positive, but weak. However, all is not lost. Although the noted Barrel metrics have less predictive value than SLG vis-à-vis runs, Barrel metrics can help examine what has happened thus far in 2025. Shout-out to my friend Lorne, a member of the Actuarial Pantheon, with whom I always consult on statistical matters.

Let’s examine Barrel and SLG metrics. Why are the Blue Jays lagging in the Barrel department? I identified two noteworthy reasons:

• Failure to fully implement one of Toronto’s hitting philosophies
• Roster construction

Failure to Implement One of Toronto’s Hitting Philosophies

During spring training, David Popkins, Blue Jays’ new Hitting Coach, described one of Toronto’s hitting philosophies. "Our goal is to slug in slugging counts and be a little more on-base/execution in counts that don't yield slug." I interpret that comment to mean the following:

• With less than two strikes, Toronto hitters will attack pitches they can barrel up. Otherwise, the batters will not swing at the pitch.
• With two strikes, the batter sacrifices power to increase contact probability or take a walk.

For this analysis, I will not examine situational hitting.

A good way to determine if Toronto is applying the noted philosophy is to consider two elements. First, what have Toronto’s hitters done when there are fewer than two strikes, and when there are two strikes? With less than two strikes, a batter can wait for their pitch and barrel the ball. With two strikes, a batter will be in survival mode and focus more on contact than power. The second element is the location of pitches. Instead of examining whether a pitch is in the strike zone, I prefer to look at the attack zones: Heart, Shadow, Chase, and Waste. The chart below depicts the attack zones, courtesy of FanGraphs.

I use xSLG rather than SLG for this analysis for two reasons. First, the inputs for xSLG are exit velocity and launch angle. Hence, the impact of defence is not a factor in the result. Second, exit velocity and launch angle are the factors that comprise Barrels, which is a focus of this article. For context, in 2024, MLB’s average SLG was 0.399; the xSLG average was 0.397.

Also, I combined the Chase and Waste zones. My rationale is twofold. First, the swing rate on pitches in the Waste Zone was less than six percent. Second, the xSLG on pitches in the Waste Zone was 0.014, and the Barrels are zero. In other words, the impact of standalone Waste Zone metrics is insignificant to the overall analysis. In 2024, the Chase/Waste Zones accounted for 27% of pitches. The Heart Zone shares 29%, and the Shadow Zone 44%.

Onto the Blue Jays’ approach. Let’s set a high-performance bar. If Toronto has executed the stated approach well, it should rank in the top five of a given metric. Accordingly, we should expect Blue Jay hitters to do the following:

• With less than two strikes, there is a top-five or higher Swing% on pitches in the Heart Zone.
• The inner part of the Shadow Zone is in the strike zone, and the outer part is not. Hence, with less than two strikes, a batter should not swing at pitches in the Shadow Zone. With two strikes, any pitch in the Shadow Zone is either a strike or too close to take. Hence, with less than two strikes, the Swing% should be lower (ranked highest to lowest) than the 25th team in the Shadow Zone and the combined Chase and Waste Zones. 
• Because Toronto is willing to sacrifice power in two-strike counts, Toronto’s batters should have a contact rate on pitches in the Heart, Shadow, and Chase/Waste zones that is at least the fifth-highest.
• Toronto should have a K% in plate appearances that reach two strikes no higher than 26th among teams (fifth-lowest). For reference, approximately 53% of plate appearances end up in a two-strike count.

As of May 8, what has happened? Table 1 has the details. Spoiler Alert: The Blue Jays are not executing Popkins’s philosophy.

• With less than two strikes, Toronto ranks poorly on Heart Zone Swing% while their Swing% in the other zones is too high.
• Concerning the Heart and Shadow Zones, Toronto’s numbers are consistent with Popkins’s approach when there are two strikes. The Swing% rates are in the top five in the respective zones. However, the Blue Jays’ relatively high Chase & Waste swing rate is inconsistent with Popkins’s philosophy.
• Toronto’s Contact% numbers in non-Heart Zones are within the top seven in all counts.
• Yet, Blue Jay batters have failed to meet the top-five standard in Contact% on pitches in the Heart, particularly with two strikes. 
• Toronto has below-median xSLG and Barrel% numbers on Heart Zone pitches.

On the positive side, when Blue Jay hitters are in two-strike counts, their 37.8 K% mark ranks third-lowest. This result is consistent with Popkins’s focus on contact with two strikes.

In summary, in counts with less than two strikes, Toronto batters swing at pitches in the Heart, Zone, and slug/barrel, at below-desired rates. With two strikes, Toronto’s xSLG metrics are better than the median in all zones. In all counts, Blue Jay hitters’ chase rates are too high.

Roster Construction
In theory, with fewer than two strikes, Toronto batters should be able to produce higher SLG numbers if they increased their Swing% on pitches in the Heart Zone, and reduced their Swing% in the other zones. However, roster construction limits their SLG/xSLG and barrel ceilings. In other words, there is not enough SLG or barrel potential on the roster. Consider Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4.

Table 2 shows 2022-2024 metrics of Blue Jay hitters with plate appearances over 100 this season, plus Daulton Varsho. Except for Varsho, Table 3 depicts the xSLG and Barrel% for the 2025 season for the listed Blue Jays. Table 4 shows the differences between 2025 and 2022-2024 for each metric for the players listed.

Table 3 shows a lot of green (below median performance) regarding xSLG and Barrel%, particularly in the Heart Zone, where xSLG and barrels are at their highest.

I used Table 4’s xSLG and Barrel% data as a thought exercise and weighted each player’s numbers by ZiPS DC Rest of Season at-bats. The results are as follows:

• xSLG for the balance of this season will change little from the Opening Day through May 8 record.
• Barrel% will decline marginally.

Therefore, better xSLG/SLG, and accordingly, run production, would likely occur if one or more of the following happened:

• Blue Jay batters execute Popkins’s philosophy.
• Currently, Toronto has the fourth-largest xSLG-SLG difference (0.408 versus 0.362). Suppose xSLG, which ranks 19th, holds steady. An SLG regression towards the xSLG number could result in a run-production bump.  
• Toronto gives more at-bats to the Blue Jays, with higher xSLG numbers. For example, Addison Barger’s 2025 0.466 xSLG is higher than Ernie Clement’s 0.327.
• Sign a free agent such as J.D. Martinez, who produced a 0.472 xSLG in 2024. I should note that 2025 would be Martinez’s age-37 season. Also, he is strictly a designated hitter, which means more outfield time for defence-challenged Anthony Santander (career -14 OAA and -19 FRV as an outfielder).

The Last Word
Toronto’s below-median Barrel metrics are consistent with their relatively poor xSLG/SLG and run production numbers. The reasons for the underperformance are twofold. First, contrary to the stated approach to hitting, Toronto does not slug in slugging counts nor barrel the ball. Second, the everyday roster does not profile as a team that slugs or barrels. If Toronto can execute their hitting philosophy better, change the regular lineup, and toss in a little positive regression, the ballclub can alleviate their batter barrel blues. 

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[Laika]

Top 4 in both Barrel rate and AvgEV since April 27

The Barger/Varsho effect I guess 

[Bob Ritchie]

17 minutes ago, Laika said:

Top 4 in both Barrel rate and AvgEV since April 27

The Barger/Varsho effect I guess 

For sure, Barger and Varsho. Also, Bo, Vlad, Kirk, Lukes, and Springer had notably better numbers. After April 27, there were also fewer PAs from Roden and Wagner, who were well below the median.