Jim Scott

Is Toronto's focus on defense a new efficiency? A way to add high-floor, high-ceiling players that other teams overlooked or undervalued? Back in the day, the bullpen was considered of secondary importance. A team might spend big on an elite closer (*whimper,* B.J. Ryan, *whimper*) but the remainder of the ‘pen was reserved for aging starters or pitchers who were never quite good enough for a rotation spot. In 2014, the Kansas City Royals were looking to contend. But as a small-market team, they could not just buy their way to success. Instead, they had to find value where other teams did not. Thus, the three-headed monster was born. The Royals signed Wade Davis to go with standouts Kelvin Herrera and Greg Holland, giving the back of their bullpen three of the best arms in baseball. Other teams scoffed, saying spending $22 million out of a $110-million total payroll on three bullpen arms was crazy. But Kansas City was crazy like a fox. They went 72-1 when they had the lead after seven innings, and made the Wild Card (by only two games – if they had gone 69-4, they would have missed the playoffs). They rode their elite bullpen all the way to the World Series in 2014, and won it in 2015. Since then, other teams have placed greater value on the bullpen, and have been looking for the next big efficiency – something that can help a team win but is underappreciated by other teams and therefore undervalued on the market. Is it possible that the Jays have found it? Wins Above Replacement (WAR) has become the catch-all baseball stat. Each major website (and each team) has its own version. The formulae they use to calculate WAR are similar but not identical, which is why we have fWAR (FanGraphs), bWAR (Baseball Reference), and WARP (Baseball Prospectus). One of the largest sources of difference between fWAR and bWAR measures is the metrics the two sites use to award credit for defence. It is an old adage that a run saved equals a run earned, but bWAR (which uses Sports Info Systems' Defensive Runs Saved to measure defense and fWAR (which uses Statcast's Fielding Run Value) can sometimes differ quite a bit in their evaluations of the same playe. Suppose that the Jays internal defensive metrics hew closer to the grades of DRS, and therefore bWAR. What does this mean for player value? Well, consider the last three seasons. Which players had the highest total bWAR? If you guessed names like Aaron Judge, Mookie Betts, Juan Soto, and Shohei Ohtani in the top four, you would be right. But would you have guessed Andrés Giménez at number 10, or Daulton Varsho at number 20? (Remember, this is in all of baseball). And if you only look at defensive WAR, the top two players in baseball in that period were (surprise, surprise) Giménez at 8.0 and Varsho at 7.8 (in case you were curious, Ke’Bryan Hayes was third at 6.7). The Jays’ defensive excellence does not stop there. It is said that a team needs defence most “up the middle” – catcher, shortstop and centre field. So if the Jays were emphasizing defence, you would expect “Captain” Kirk to be no slouch either. No surprise – among full-time catchers, Kirk’s defensive bWAR over those three years is tied for third in baseball. But defence alone does not win ballgames. Ideally, you would want your elite defensive players to also have the potential to contribute with the bat – though, from an acquisition standpoint, it would help keep the price down if they had not yet achieved that potential, or if they were coming off a down year. And all three of the Jays defensive stalwarts have that upside. As recently as 2022, Kirk was at 129 wRC+, Giménez was at 141(!) and Varsho was at 106. But in 2024, all three struggled – Kirk at a 94 wRC+, Giménez at 83, and Varsho at 99. The Jays are in a good position with these three players. If they only maintain 2024 batting levels, their elite defence ensures solid production: in 2024, Giménez put up 4.0 bWAR, Kirk put up 2.0 in just 398 PAs, and Varsho put up 5.0. But if their offense regresses to the mean at all, then all three could well be All-Stars. It is rare to find a high-floor, high-ceiling player – the Jays have three of them. The Bottom Line It is easy to suggest that a team improve by signing all the big-name Ohtanis and Sotos, and extending the Guerreros (or, in my opinion better yet, the Bichettes – but that is another story) but the reality is that players of that calibre have many options and do not come cheaply or easily. For a team (not named the Dodgers) to succeed, they need to resource intelligently and efficiently. And that means finding value where others don’t. That can be difficult, but as an old baseball fan once said, in difficulty there is opportunity. View full article

Take yourself back to Feb 2024. Bo is coming off another ~4 fWAR year, after posting 4.8 and 4.9 fWAR in 2021 and 2022 and leading the AL in hits in both years. This despite playing SS - a position for which he is clearly not suited. Meanwhile, Vladdy is coming off a 1.3 fWAR year (i.e. below mlb average) in 2023 and 3.3 in 2022. Two questions: 1. If I had asked you then which of the two the Jays should extend, assuming you could only extend one, which would you have picked? 2. Should one year make that much difference? IMO, as soon as it became clear that Vladdy wanted $400m++, the Jays should have shifted focus to Bo - on condition that he move to 2B

I am a big fan of old-school swingmen (like Chavez, or Estrada). I would hope that the Jays would give Y-Rod 5-10 starts in 2025, though perhaps limiting him to 4-5 innings, Use him on doubleheader days, or when a scheduled starter has minor pains, or when a matchup is unfavourable. Total of maybe 120 IP. That way, they will know whether he has rotation potential - and if the Jays *do* want to stretch him to ~150 IP and ~25 starts in 2026, he will be ready. I agree completely with Jesse that the 6th and 7th starters are important. I did a mini-study a few years ago and found that the average mlb team got 125 starts from their top 5 starters, and even the top 10 teams (i.e. the ones with the most starts from their top-5 starters) only averaged 135. So a team needs ~30 starts from the swingmen, bullpen, and MiLB callups. And those 30 games count just as much as the ones when the team's ace is starting.

I am not keen on Bregman at 6/$180m or anything close to that. Some reasons: His stats are already in decline. 137 wRC+ in 2022, 126 in 2023, 118 in 2024. And his 2024 hitting stats are suspect: his batting line of .260/.331/.453 was decent (albeit not spectacular) but his Statcast expected line was .257/.319/.417. MLB average line was .243/.310/.399 And his 2024 batted ball stats were very cromulent. Of the 252 players who qualified, his 89.1 mph average exit velo was 125th, his E50 of 99mph was 167th, his hard hit % of 40.5% was 125th, and his barrels/BBE of 6.4% was 166th. A writer named Ritchie something-or-other did an analysis a while back of the speed at which elite 3B decline once they hit their 30s. It was not pretty. I think it is telling that Team Alex have (so far) expressed no interest in a 2021-Marcus-Semien-style one-year show-me contract. There is a time when it makes sense for a player to bet on himself. And there is a time when not.